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zombie

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Joseph Levine Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 594–597.
Published: 01 October 2002
... that “zombies” (crea- tures physically identical to conscious creatures but who lack consciousness) are conceivable, hence possible. The objection is not to the premise that zom- bies are conceivable, but rather to the inference to the conclusion that they are possible. Chapter 3 is the core of the book...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2002
... argument), Kripke (the modal argument), and Chalmers (the zombie argument), fail to provide such reason, and moreover that each failure stems from an overly restrictive conception of the content of thought. Type-identity physicalism aims to preserve certain intuitions about mind. Mental states...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., seeing “double,”having afterimages, and the like Class 111 Objections An objection of this type amounts to the claim that some sort of “zom- bie”-scenario is possible. A zombie, in this context, is a creature who is intentionally just the same as you or me, but whose inner phenome...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
...- quacy, whereas nonreductive views of consciousness could be so motivated only if we were to include as empirical the results of journeys to zombie- and invert- worlds—but it is instructive as a case in which taking a quality as fundamental rather than reducible is no bar to constructive science...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
... the results of journeys to zombie- and invert- worlds—but it is instructive as a case in which taking a quality as fundamental rather than reducible is no bar to constructive science. Chapters 5–7 are in many ways the centerpiece of the book and focus on the metaphysics of consciousness. Chalmers...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 137–139.
Published: 01 January 2012
... in part by purely extensional concerns about empirical ade- quacy, whereas nonreductive views of consciousness could be so motivated only if we were to include as empirical the results of journeys to zombie- and invert- worlds—but it is instructive as a case in which taking a quality as fundamental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2005
... there are such principled reasons: the conceiv- ability of zombies, say, suggests that what it’s like to be conscious isn’t a func- tional property at all, since it suggests that functional duplicates needn’t be duplicates with respect to consciousness. Melnyk will argue, no doubt, that this is precisely the sort...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 619–623.
Published: 01 October 2021
... think “I could have globally broadcast nonconceptual content without This-R ,” even if ‘ This-R ’ in fact refers to globally broadcast nonconceptual content. It also explains why you believe in the explanatory gap, why you can conceive of zombies, and why Mary can’t deduce what it’s like to see red...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... conscious. Philosophical zombies who are physical and functional duplicates of us but lack phenomenal consciousness cannot know anything. They cannot know anything because they cannot have any epistemic justification for their beliefs. And that is because all epistemic justification derives from mental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 532–536.
Published: 01 October 2022
... and conceivability arguments for its strong emergence do not succeed, leaving the strong emergence of consciousness an open empirical question, while its weak emergence is best secured through recognizing that qualitative states of consciousness are typically not maximally determinate. Her analysis of the ‘zombie...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 601–607.
Published: 01 October 2010
..., Richard, and K. Silem Mohammad, eds. 2010. Zombies, Vampires, and Philosophy: New Life for the Undead. Popular Culture and Philosophy 49. Chicago: Open Court. xii + 303 pp. Gross, Michael L. 2010. Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 589–594.
Published: 01 October 2002
... to the conceivability argument against materialism, namely that “zombies” (crea- tures physically identical to conscious creatures but who lack consciousness) are conceivable, hence possible. The objection is not to the premise that zom- bies are conceivable, but rather to the inference to the conclusion...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 409–414.
Published: 01 July 2006
... + 191 pp. Kirk, Robert. 2005. Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon. xii + 235 pp. Kirwan, James. 2005. Sublimity: The Non-Rational and the Irrational in the History of Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. viii + 213 pp. Lear, Gabriel Richardson. 2006 [2004]. Happy Lives and the Highest...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
...- terpart development of the intrapersonal absent qualia case, after the initial stage described above, I imagine that I lose all my memories, including my phenomenal ones of my life before the fateful operation. Now, it seems, I am a full-fl edged zombie replica of my earlier self. It should...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
... an epistemic gap to an ontological gap is invalid, since a zombie (a physical duplicate of a conscious being, without 357 DAVID CHALMERS ANLI FRANK JACIGSON that necessities cannot be epistemically primitive in this way, and that the only...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... -62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dretske, Fred. 1995 . Naturalizing the Mind . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ____. 2000 . Perception, Knowledge, and Belief . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ____. 2003 . “How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?” In Privileged access , ed. B...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
... the better (and, indeed, truer) the claim that the car is “like new.” Cars could be like new even for beings as much like us as possible without having phenomenal consciousness—though I do not say they would be philosopher’s “zombies” exactly like us in nonphenomenal ways. The same holds for humanlike...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
..., “conceivable.” According to some, that is evidence that they are possible. Fortunately, we need not investigate this here, because conceivability casts a very wide net indeed: in the sense in which philosophers’ hallucinations are conceivable, so are “zombies,” whose healthy brains are unaccompanied...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2009
... view, (i) we’re igno- rant of a special type of empirical experience-relevant nonexperiential truth; (ii) were we to come to understand truths of this type, we would see that the modal arguments against physicalism (that is, the zombie and knowledge arguments) fail; and (iii) given (i) and (ii), we...