... and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What...

... and importance of epistemic reasons. 41. For similar skepticism, see Papineau (2013) , and Glüer and Wikforss (2013) . 42. Many thanks to Susanna Rinard for helpful discussion of these issues. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 pragmatism evidentialism wrong kind of reasons ethics...

..., as much as action) is to “double count” reasons ( Dancy 2000 , 2004 ). Or perhaps “someone who is moved primarily by overall moral verdicts, such as an action's being wrong, rather than the individual grounds for such verdicts, has been said to have a kind of moral fetish, rather than being truly morally...

...). Reactive attitude sense : ‘Wrong’ means ‘an act of a kind that gives its agent reasons to feel remorse or guilt, and gives others reasons for indignation and resentment’ (1:165). Decisive-moral-reason sense : ‘What we ought to do’ means ‘what we have decisive moral reasons to do’ (1:166). Morally...

... particular ethical standpoint, gives us some reason to doubt a class of ethical theories that includes utilitari- anism. Section 5, the final section before the conclusion, considers some issues concerning partially worthy actions, including the case of wrong actions that seem nonetheless partially...

... then peacefully rescue Victim. In such a case, killing is impermissible. Why? It is not that you do not have the kind of goal that could justify killing; you do: saving a person’s life. The reason why killing is impermissible is that it fails an important condition on defensive force: necessity. To justify...

... it was not the case that had the janitor not killed the surgeon, she would have killed the two in that particular manner, under those circumstances, and for those kinds of reasons. Con- sider, for instance: TWO IN THE WAY: Everything is as it is in TRANSPLANTexcept that the surgeon has obtained...

... move in which the content of a moral claim is rejected on the grounds that the same claim applies to the speaker herself. The claim at issue here is that X's ϕ'ing makes it morally wrong for X to utter her criticism, not that X's ϕ'ing gives us reason to reject that criticism's content (which would...

... for certain kinds of interpersonal consideration, for at least two reasons. First, our expressly moral expectations concerning how individuals treat one another are a proper subset of these demands. Second, it’s hard to imagine reconfiguring our emotional responses in such a way that we remain prone...

... Lancashire, England The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) VTImARIANISM, INSTflVTIONS, AhD JUSTICE, By JAMES WOODBAILEY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xii, 203. Utilitarianism is subject to objections of at least three kinds: (1) It is wrong...

... of distribu- tion, my interest in the impartial spectator metaphor concerns its impli- cation of a kind of moral symmetry between self and other: everyone’s happiness counts in exactly the same way, when it comes to evaluating acts as right and wrong. We might call this commitment deontic impar- tiality...

... Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) UTILJTARIANISM, INSTflUTIONS, AhD JUSTICE. By JAMES WOODBAILEY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xii, 203. Utilitarianism is subject to objections of at least three kinds: (1) It is wrong about the nature of the fundamental property...

... statements of fact; for noncognitivists, moral statements are speech acts of some other kind, such as expressions of emotion or prescriptions. ‘Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 15. ‘For an example of reductive naturalism, see Frank Jackson, From...

... to deprive any being of the potential for certain kinds of valuable future experiences—of a “future like ours” (FLO). (By “seriously wrong,” Mar- quis means “seriously presumptively wrong.” I’ll follow his lead.) Since abortion typically deprives the fetus...

... of the wrong kind, then it should be enough that the decision maker believes that the lottery is fair. Suppose you toss a coin that you and everyone else concerned reasonably believe to be fair. After the lottery is over, some scientists decide to have a look at the coin. Just when you set yourself to save...

... I learn that I was wrong about her from the start. This kind of commitment conflicts with the need for valuable qualities, even past ones, as reasons for love. There is a deeper complaint here, against love as a response to positive qualities. To repeat what I said before: if reasons for love...

... Language . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Hieronymi Pamela 2005 . “ The Wrong Kind of Reason .” Journal of Philosophy 102 , no. 9 : 437 – 57 . Ridge Michael 2014 . Impassioned Belief . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Shah Nishi 2003 . “ How Truth...

... an argument for ONIM: he claims that reasons “do not evaporate when they are outweighed or overridden, any more than the security guard evaporates when she is overcome by the bank robber,” or any more than “my sweater disappears when it is penetrated by an icy wind.”  7. According to another kind...

... pride of place in the story of nor- mative authority over one’s emotional states and putative virtues. But again, it isn’t obvious on Carroll’s account how or why judgments about wrongness or reasons could play this kind of regulative role, or what a satisfying general...

... would have a certain pride of place in the story of nor- mative authority over one’s emotional states and putative virtues. But again, it isn’t obvious on Carroll’s account how or why judgments about wrongness or reasons could play this kind of regulative role, or what a satisfying general...