... and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What...

... pragmatism evidentialism wrong kind of reasons ethics of activities authoritative normativity It is exceedingly plausible that there are distinctively epistemic reasons that provide normative support for or against beliefs. 1 Call this thesis evidentialism . For instance, the fact that you...

... 2014 . Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Hieronymi Pamela 2005 . “ The Wrong Kind of Reason .” Journal of Philosophy 102 , no. 9 : 437 – 57 . Ridge Michael 2014 . Impassioned Belief . Oxford : Oxford University...

... of the right kind of reasons here is that of the agent-neutral ones (because, somewhat rough- ly, all agents engage in deliberation) (142). Now, worries can be raised about Schroeder’s solution to the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem, either in general (in terms of a relevant activity), or more...

... . Barnett, David James. 2019. “Cogito and Moore.” davidjamesbar.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Cogito-and-Moore.pdf . Barnett, David James. 2020. “Higher-Order Evidence is the Wrong Kind of Reason.” davidjamesbar.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Barnett-Higher-Order-Evidence-is-the-Wrong-Kind...

... between her W-judgments and blame most reason-responsive. The third and final element in the explanation are normative premises that tell us what it takes to make the right kind of sense of the blame-link: (1) A reason-responsive agent would be such that judging that Harry's cheating was wrong...

... sense : ‘Wrong’ means ‘blameworthy’ (1:165). Reactive attitude sense : ‘Wrong’ means ‘an act of a kind that gives its agent reasons to feel remorse or guilt, and gives others reasons for indignation and resentment’ (1:165). Decisive-moral-reason sense : ‘What we ought to do’ means ‘what we have...

... particular ethical standpoint, gives us some reason to doubt a class of ethical theories that includes utilitari- anism. Section 5, the final section before the conclusion, considers some issues concerning partially worthy actions, including the case of wrong actions that seem nonetheless partially...

.... Why? It is not that you do not have the kind of goal that could justify killing; you do: saving a person’s life. The reason why killing is impermissible is that it fails an important condition on defensive force: necessity. To justify killing, it must be a necessary means to achieve one’s goal...

... it was not the case that had the janitor not killed the surgeon, she would have killed the two in that particular manner, under those circumstances, and for those kinds of reasons. Con- sider, for instance: TWO IN THE WAY: Everything is as it is in TRANSPLANTexcept that the surgeon has obtained...

... be both at once; yet both patterns are apt to get you labeled a hypocrite. Thus there is reason to doubt that the concept of hypocrisy corresponds to a unified moral kind. But we do not need to settle that question in order to proceed. My discussion will be strictly limited to the question of the moral...

... is in opponents who do not concede RA, which (in their view) implies that our commitment to personal re- 16. Admittedly, Strawson nowhere actually says this. But it’s telling that he focuses on expectations for certain kinds of interpersonal consideration, for at least two reasons. First, our expressly...

... Lancashire, England The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) VTImARIANISM, INSTflVTIONS, AhD JUSTICE, By JAMES WOODBAILEY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xii, 203. Utilitarianism is subject to objections of at least three kinds: (1) It is wrong...

... of distribu- tion, my interest in the impartial spectator metaphor concerns its impli- cation of a kind of moral symmetry between self and other: everyone’s happiness counts in exactly the same way, when it comes to evaluating acts as right and wrong. We might call this commitment deontic impar- tiality...

... Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) UTILJTARIANISM, INSTflUTIONS, AhD JUSTICE. By JAMES WOODBAILEY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xii, 203. Utilitarianism is subject to objections of at least three kinds: (1) It is wrong about the nature of the fundamental property...

... statements of fact; for noncognitivists, moral statements are speech acts of some other kind, such as expressions of emotion or prescriptions. ‘Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 15. ‘For an example of reductive naturalism, see Frank Jackson, From...

... to deprive any being of the potential for certain kinds of valuable future experiences—of a “future like ours” (FLO). (By “seriously wrong,” Mar- quis means “seriously presumptively wrong.” I’ll follow his lead.) Since abortion typically deprives the fetus...

... that are not based on bad reasons. (Ultimately, I will claim that simply picking may do.) Here is a first example. If all that a fair lottery is supposed to do is keep out motives of the wrong kind, then it should be enough that the decision maker believes that the lottery is fair. Suppose you toss a coin that you...

... response? Are you justified in feeling love only so far as you do not act on it? Surely not. If love is warranted, what is warranted is a response that affects how you behave, and the reasons for the response transmit to that behavior. Velleman is wrong to draw so sharp a line between the reasons for love...

.... They can claim that game ends are acquired for the wrong kinds of reasons and so cannot function as real ends. Why might this be? Consider Millgram's (1997: 11–28) discussion of the right and wrong reasons to desire. 28 Millgram argues that one can never acquire a desire for instrumental reasons...