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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 627–632.
Published: 01 October 2000
...Kent Bach Cornell University 2000 CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG. By Jerry A. Fodor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 174. BOOK REVIEWS dez’s project, where having a concept is linked to having linguistic abilities. So...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 532–536.
Published: 01 October 2019
... a critical race theoretical edifice inquiring into social and racial epistemology, racial capital, and the remarkably and enduringly white sociology of the profession. The purpose of Black Rights/White Wrongs , then, is at once straightforward and herculean—to systematize twenty years of philosophy to once...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 132–134.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Terence Cuneo © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 Wolterstorff Nicholas , Justice: Rights and Wrongs . Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2008 . vii +400 pp . BOOK REVIEWS Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics. New York...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... wrong. In other cases of conflict, including some recent examples suggested by Andy Egan, EDT and BT seem to get things right, while CDT seems to get things wrong. In still other cases, EDT and CDT seems to get things right, while BT gets things wrong. It's no accident, this essay claims, that all three...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2012
... for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s suppositional test is wrong...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
..., occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and resentment. Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
...) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. Insofar as we cannot deny (i), we are either forced...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
...J. Robert G. Williams The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... as a responsible agent can require that you assist them in committing what may in fact be serious moral wrongs. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 friendship,  moral disagreement,  deference,  shared ends Friends do things for one another, and the closer the friendship, the more each is willing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 387–422.
Published: 01 October 2019
...Daniela Dover It is widely believed that we ought not to criticize others for wrongs that we ourselves have committed. The author draws out and challenges some of the background assumptions about the practice of criticism that underlie our attraction to this claim, such as the tendency to think...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 159–210.
Published: 01 April 2020
... and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Paolo Santorio According to the orthodox account developed by Kaplan, indexicals like I, you , and now invariably refer to elements of the context of speech. This essay argues that the orthodoxy is wrong. I, you , and the like are shifted by certain modal operators and hence can fail to refer...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (1): 1–33.
Published: 01 January 2025
... wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications. [email protected] [email protected] © 2025 by Cornell University 2025 Boltzmann Brain cosmology skepticism Bayesian reasoning center indifference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 295–300.
Published: 01 April 2017
...? It will be difficult to fully dissociate. In Tristram McPherson's pro-vegan essay, he tries to navigate some of these problems by contending that it “is typically wrong to aim to benefit by cooperating with the wrongful elements of others' plans” (83). Since factory farming is wrong, and grocery stores intend...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... identifying normative with natural statements and facts do not transfer seamlessly to identifying normative with natural properties. 16. Nor does it to help to fix the concept of moral wrong to say that it can also be expressed by the phrase “mustn't be done.” A doctor can convincingly say that a patient...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 433–463.
Published: 01 July 2020
... killing, it must be a necessary means to achieve one’s goal. In this case, killing is unnecessary and therefore wrong. But now consider another case: Whom to Rescue : Attacker is trying to kill Victim and, to save her, you must kill Attacker. Hiker has been bitten by a snake and, to save her, you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
..., and living human being. The second premise is a moral principle to the effect that (at least generally, at least presumptively) it’s wrong to kill beings with the metaphysical sta- tus in question. I focus here on the metaphysical rather than the moral...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
... is on the action being promised, and the two-layer structure is essentially pointless. That is, (2) collapses into a promise to take the person to the airport if it is raining. Now the present question is in what sense is preemptive forgiving conditional: (1a) “I promise that if you do the wrong, I will promise...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (1): 35–64.
Published: 01 January 2025
... credence 0.49 in a utilitarian moral theory, according to which, because cows have exactly the same moral status as humans, there is strongly decisive moral reason to order the wrap. It seems morally reckless, and hence morally wrong, for you to order the steak, given your credences. For you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 124–126.
Published: 01 January 2003
...) concerns the nature and wrongness of racism. It begins with the observation that the charge of “rac- ism” has come to express an especially strong condemnation but that the charge is often used indiscriminately to cover all wrongs in the racial realm. To avoid this “conceptual inflation” and “moral...