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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): i.
Published: 01 July 2003
... will be judged by members of the Sage School of Philosophy. Provided the number and standard of submissions is sufficiently high, a winner will be chosen to present their article at a symposium to be held at Cornell University. Two spe- cialists in the field will be invited to comment on the winner's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): i.
Published: 01 April 2003
... School of Philosophy. Provided the number and stan- dard of submissions is sufficiently high, a winner will be chosen to present their article at a symposium to be held at Cornell University. Two specialists in the field will be invited to comment on the winner's article at the symposium...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): i.
Published: 01 January 2004
... will be judged by members of the Sage School of Philosophy. Provided the number and standard of submissions is sufficiently high, a winner will be chosen to present their article at a symposium to be held at Cornell University. Two spe- cialists in the field will be invited to comment on the winner's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
.... (Perhaps the number of each ticket is only printed on its front, and we can only see the colored backs of the tickets.) The winner (there is only one) has been drawn, and we know that the blue ticket won. But since we don't know whether the blue ticket is ticket #1 or ticket #2, we don't know the number...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 395–404.
Published: 01 July 2003
... in what you know is a fair 1,000,000-ticket lottery with exactly one winner, and that, given the odds, you believe your ticket is a loser. If it is a loser indeed, do you know that it is? The widely shared intuition is that the answer should be negative. However, since there are few empirical facts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 253–271.
Published: 01 April 2005
... implications of Arrow’s results survive Buchanan’s critique. Conceding that the concept of preference might not apply to society as a whole, Sen observes that Arrow’s theorem can be proven for social choice functions that pick winners from menus without presupposing that society has an underlying unified...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 438–441.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... The orthodox story, written by the winners, is that frequentism triumphed on the merits. Fisher prevailed, it is said, because he had better arguments and better mathematics: he showed that Bayesianism is objectionably subjective, and that its central tenet, the Prin- ciple of Insufficient Reason (PIR...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 511–515.
Published: 01 October 2019
... of their place in the tradition: they are philosophical “losers” written into and out of history by the winner, an “alliance of Platonism and Aristotelianism” (34). Given the continued utility of the concept, Presocratic philosophy, it nevertheless behooves us to investigate its problematic features more...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 254–258.
Published: 01 April 2003
... is such-and-such, or the winner of the World Series was so-and-so, then inno- cence can also be achieved. 257 BOOK REVIEWS Szabó's book ranks with Theo Janssen’s overview from the Handbook of Logic and Language as one of the two best recent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
... on, it will be useful here to present a truncated version of the former: Let L be a lottery that we know to be fair, to have exactly one winner, and to be large enough for its tickets to have a chance of losing that exceeds the threshold for rational credibility. Supposing (7), we can then rationally...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
... we judge that you don’t know you’ve lost the lottery is that (a) al- though you believe you are a loser, we realize that you would believe this even if it were false (even if you were the winner), and (b) we tend to judge that S doesn’t know that P when we think that S would...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 423–462.
Published: 01 October 2019
..., is the winner, and the best part of the game is watching how long it takes them to figure out that they've won. Consider also a game like Twister , in which you try to keep in balance as long as you can, but the funniest part is when everybody collapses on top of each other. To have the desired experience...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... a one-in-a-million chance of winning a lottery from which the winner receives one twenty dollar bill. Before the lottery, you have no money. Let A be the action of holding a twenty dollar bill in your hand and rotating it 360°. Let us suppose that this action has no cost, but that it is also...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
... 454 BOOK REVIEWS the best strategy to pick a unique winner. 4] Computational models provide a big clue as to how we should approach the problem of identi- fying relevant similarities and differences. Siding with the structuralists, we should do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
... BOOK REVIEWS the best strategy to pick a unique winner. 4] Computational models provide a big clue as to how we should approach the problem of identi- fying relevant similarities and differences. Siding with the structuralists, we should do this dynamically, rather than...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
... BOOK REVIEWS the best strategy to pick a unique winner. 4] Computational models provide a big clue as to how we should approach the problem of identi- fying relevant similarities and differences. Siding with the structuralists, we should do this dynamically, rather than...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
... BOOK REVIEWS the best strategy to pick a unique winner. 4] Computational models provide a big clue as to how we should approach the problem of identi- fying relevant similarities and differences. Siding with the structuralists, we should do this dynamically, rather than...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
... BOOK REVIEWS the best strategy to pick a unique winner. 4] Computational models provide a big clue as to how we should approach the problem of identi- fying relevant similarities and differences. Siding with the structuralists, we should do this dynamically, rather than...