Search Results for williamson

... be exported to the know-how debate. On the one hand, some of the expressivists' semantic resources can be used to deflect Stanley and Williamson's influential argument for factualism about know-how: the claim that knowing how to do something consists in knowing a fact. On the other, expressivism provides...

... Knows. In his Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Williamson, T. 1999 . Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula. Dialectica 53 : 253 -70. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 3 (July 2002) Reflections on Knowledge...

...John Mackay [email protected] Williamson Timothy , Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2020 viii + 278 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 The material interpretation of the conditional is motivated...

... to “help the knowledge first project to avoid counterintuitive consequences” (8). The knowledge first project is not easy to define. It was born, everyone agrees, with Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits ( 2000 ). Williamson proposed turning the theory of knowledge on its head: instead...

... that do not . . . have anything . . . to do with paradoxes” (319). Turn now to Timothy Williamson's contribution. Historically, many approaches to the Liar paradox have involved replacing classical logic by another logic. But Williamson argues that this is a mistake: rather, classical logic ought...

... of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Unger, Peter. 1975 . Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weinberg, Jonathan, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. 2001 . Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29 : 429 -60. Williamson...

....” Erkenntnis 62 : 47 -69. Douven, Igor, and Jos Uffink. 2003 . “The Preface Paradox Revisited.” Erkenntnis 59 : 389 -420. Douven, Igor, and Timothy Williamson. In press. “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . Dreier, James. 2004 . “Decision Theory...

...-reductive methodology. Williamson ( 2009 : 9–10), for example, explicitly rejects the possibility of giving an account of “closeness” which does not itself presuppose epistemic notions such as knowledge. Rather, following Lewis’s ( 1973 ) attitude to the notion of comparative similarity central to his...

... belief that anthropogenic climate change was a myth. For my part I have the intuition that such a belief would be justified, though I am certain of the reality of anthropogenic climate change, and despair those who deny it. 47. Like Williamson , I endorse an externalism on which epistemic...

... by repeated conditionalization, and starts with P 0 ( A ) = 0, then at every time t , P t ( A ) = 0, so the agent will stubbornly refuse to believe A , no matter what the evidence. Timothy Williamson (2002, 214) gives a similar version of this argument as a reason not to accept the Bayesian...

.... Forthcoming. Absolute Generality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Inwagen, Peter. 1986 . Two Concepts of Possible Worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 : 185 -213. Williamson, Timothy. 1998 . Bare Possibilia. Erkenntnis 48 : 257 -73. ____. 1999 . Truthmakers and the Converse...

...-nominalization .” Noûs 35 , no. 1 : 74 – 92 . Williamson Timothy . 2002 . “ Necessary Existents. ” In Logic, Thought and Language , edited by Anthony O’Hear, 233–51. Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press . This focus on Quine is to my mind unfortunate, because there is much...

... approaches. On the face of it this seems a legitimate and effective way to proceed. But consider for example that Timothy Williamson employs the same presentational strategy in defending his epistemic theory of vagueness.2 He proceeds by attacking in turn each of the other major theories, including...

.... But a moderate objectivist might allow the deceived agent's beliefs to qualify as rational (or “reasonable”) in some derivative sense, despite violating more fundamental objective requirements like N o E rrors ( Lasonen-Aarnio 2010 ; Williamson 2017 , forthcoming). If so, my discussion here might need...

... and Reflective Knowledge , vol. 1 . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stanley, Jason. 2005 . Knowledge and Practical Interests . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Unger, Peter. 1975 . Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williamson, Timothy. 2000 . Knowledge and Its...

.... Stich, S. 1990 . The Fragmentation of Reason . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Williamson, T. 2004 . “Philosophical `Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgment.” Dialectica 58 : 109 -53. Craziness and Metasemantics John Hawthorne...

...-order language, where quantification over possible interpretations for the predicates was achieved by using quantification into predicate position, and similarly for other grammatical categories. Indeed, there are good reasons to prefer this approach (see Williamson 2003 ). 6 In this section...

... forms. Following the basic direction of comments by G. E. Moore, most advocates tend to formulate the account in terms of a principle to the effect that when one asserts that P, one represents it as being the case that one knows that P.20 But more recently, Timothy Williamson, in defending...

... of our experiences. There is a familiar concern for perceptualist accounts of intuitions like Chudnoff’s, which claim that intuitions have a special “presentational” phenomenology. Some struggle to locate experiences with such phenomenology, apart from perceptual experiences (Williamson 2007: 217...

...Stephan Krämer 2. It should be mentioned that Trueman develops a more detailed critique of cumulative type theory together with Tim Button in Button and Trueman 2021. 1. Perhaps the most influential recent defense of the higher-order approach is due to Williamson 2013. For a useful...