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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... be exported to the know-how debate. On the one hand, some of the expressivists' semantic resources can be used to deflect Stanley and Williamson's influential argument for factualism about know-how: the claim that knowing how to do something consists in knowing a fact. On the other, expressivism provides...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... Knows. In his Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Williamson, T. 1999 . Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula. Dialectica 53 : 253 -70. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 3 (July 2002) Reflections on Knowledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 123–127.
Published: 01 January 2022
...John Mackay jmackay2@wisc.edu Williamson Timothy , Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2020 viii + 278 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 The material interpretation of the conditional is motivated...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 317–322.
Published: 01 April 2020
... to “help the knowledge first project to avoid counterintuitive consequences” (8). The knowledge first project is not easy to define. It was born, everyone agrees, with Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits ( 2000 ). Williamson proposed turning the theory of knowledge on its head: instead...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 356–362.
Published: 01 July 2019
... that do not . . . have anything . . . to do with paradoxes” (319). Turn now to Timothy Williamson's contribution. Historically, many approaches to the Liar paradox have involved replacing classical logic by another logic. But Williamson argues that this is a mistake: rather, classical logic ought...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Unger, Peter. 1975 . Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weinberg, Jonathan, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. 2001 . Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29 : 429 -60. Williamson...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
....” Erkenntnis 62 : 47 -69. Douven, Igor, and Jos Uffink. 2003 . “The Preface Paradox Revisited.” Erkenntnis 59 : 389 -420. Douven, Igor, and Timothy Williamson. In press. “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . Dreier, James. 2004 . “Decision Theory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
... of the form ‘ p and I don’t know that p ’, and from the assumption that some epistemically accessible situation is at least as normal as any other (which is plausible in this case). 46. Zardini ( 2017 ) uses a similar example to make roughly this point, framed as an objection to Williamson’s thesis...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... an appropriate causal connection to its content ( Goldman 1967 ), or is a product of a reliable or safe method ( Armstrong 1973 ; Goldman 1979 ; Sosa 1996, 1999, 2000 ; Williamson 2000 ; Pritchard 2005 ). 10 It is generally thought, by internalists and externalists alike, that intuitive reflection...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... by repeated conditionalization, and starts with P 0 ( A ) = 0, then at every time t , P t ( A ) = 0, so the agent will stubbornly refuse to believe A , no matter what the evidence. Timothy Williamson (2002, 214) gives a similar version of this argument as a reason not to accept the Bayesian...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 297–326.
Published: 01 July 2005
.... Forthcoming. Absolute Generality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Inwagen, Peter. 1986 . Two Concepts of Possible Worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 : 185 -213. Williamson, Timothy. 1998 . Bare Possibilia. Erkenntnis 48 : 257 -73. ____. 1999 . Truthmakers and the Converse...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 259–262.
Published: 01 April 2003
... approaches. On the face of it this seems a legitimate and effective way to proceed. But consider for example that Timothy Williamson employs the same presentational strategy in defending his epistemic theory of vagueness.2 He proceeds by attacking in turn each of the other major theories, including...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
.... But a moderate objectivist might allow the deceived agent's beliefs to qualify as rational (or “reasonable”) in some derivative sense, despite violating more fundamental objective requirements like N o E rrors ( Lasonen-Aarnio 2010 ; Williamson 2017 , forthcoming). If so, my discussion here might need...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
... and Reflective Knowledge , vol. 1 . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stanley, Jason. 2005 . Knowledge and Practical Interests . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Unger, Peter. 1975 . Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williamson, Timothy. 2000 . Knowledge and Its...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 427–440.
Published: 01 July 2007
...” problem should be approached. Finally, in section 4 I try to shed some light on the role of the interpreter in metasemantics. I am grateful to Maya Eddon, Ted Sider, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson, an audience at Cornell, and especially to Tamar Gendler and Robert Williams for com- ments...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 537–589.
Published: 01 October 2020
...-order language, where quantification over possible interpretations for the predicates was achieved by using quantification into predicate position, and similarly for other grammatical categories. Indeed, there are good reasons to prefer this approach (see Williamson 2003 ). 6 In this section...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... forms. Following the basic direction of comments by G. E. Moore, most advocates tend to formulate the account in terms of a principle to the effect that when one asserts that P, one represents it as being the case that one knows that P.20 But more recently, Timothy Williamson, in defending...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 382–386.
Published: 01 July 2022
.../phc3.12756 . Williamson Timothy . 2013 . Modal Logic as Metaphysics . Oxford : Oxford University Press . 1. Perhaps the most influential recent defense of the higher-order approach is due to Williamson 2013. For a useful overview, see Skiba 2021. 2. It should be mentioned...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 384–391.
Published: 01 July 2010
... . “Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga.” Analysis 62 : 292 –95. Hawthorne, John, and Ofra Magidor. 2009 . “Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.” Mind 118 : 377 –97. Williamson, Timothy. 2001 . Knowledge and Its Limits . New York: Oxford University Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
... on possessed normative reasons, whereas BIV-Justin is stuck with motivating reasons? Lord picks up an idea from Williamson (2000) to explain how BIV-Justin can be rational after all. The idea is that BIV-Justin is still in a position to know many appearance facts. For example, he can know that it appears...