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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Chiwook Won The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. This essay does two things. First, it takes up the question whether...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... reconciles divine foreknowledge and human freedom and the Ockhamist's way. In particular, this essay further demonstrates that when it comes to divine foreknowledge's compatibility with human freedom, the fundamental question is not the Ockhamist's question of whether God's beliefs about what an agent will...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental facts are qualitative are arguably...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 481–524.
Published: 01 October 2008
... commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions. Other nonconventionalist accounts make problematic concessions to the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... structure of morality and seems to explain certain salient features of the debate over whether the principle is true, goes some way toward recommending it. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Thanks to audiences at New York University, Southern Methodist University, and the University of Massachusetts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitudes will filter up to the attitudes themselves. © 2011 by Cornell University 2012 For...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism, with...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Nicolas Bommarito The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 49–75.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Stephen S. Bush Nicomachean Ethics presents a puzzle as to whether Aristotle views morally virtuous activity as happiness, as book 1 seems to indicate, or philosophical contemplation as happiness, as book 10 seems to indicate. The most influential attempts to resolve this issue have been either...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
...Tad M. Schmaltz It is a matter of continuing scholarly dispute whether Descartes offers a metaphysics of the material world that is “monist” or “pluralist.” One passage that has become crucial to this debate is from the Synopsis of the Meditations , in which Descartes argues that since “body taken...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... argument against the commonsense moralist concerns not benevolence but whether there are further duties that pass the tests. The essay raises the worry that here Sidgwick is unfair since sometimes he criticizes all-things-considered versions of commonsense duties; such criticisms would count against...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
... taller than I would be’ or ‘if I am seven feet tall, I am taller than I am’. These examples exemplify the fact that whether a sentence's evaluation remains at the actual world in the scope of a modal or conditional depends on the combination of mood in the embedded and matrix clauses rather than, as is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences; they are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005
... regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... God believed that you would sit a few minutes from now, at t . If God had that belief one thousand years ago, then there's nothing you can now do about God's having had it: you could have no choice about whether someone had or lacked a given belief in the past. At most, you could now have a choice...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 519–522.
Published: 01 July 2013
... do, and does well, is to focus on four aspects of Pyrrhonian skepticism that emerge from a consideration of Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism (hereafter PH ) that he thinks are of particular philosophical significance. 1 They are: the issue of whether the skeptic is committed to searching for...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 447–482.
Published: 01 October 2003
...Nishi Shah Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (October 2003) How Truth Governs Belief Nishi Shah Introduction Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 261–263.
Published: 01 April 2015
... not features, and they are continuants rather than events. LoLordo's account of Lockean modes is, of course, one part of a larger package; the attractions of the entire package depend on whether it does better than its competitors at accommodating texts and solving puzzles. LoLordo effectively parades...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 153–155.
Published: 01 January 2015
... of Quine shows. Whether one can believe in both de re modality and relative identity depends on the version of relative identity. Stuart's Locke thinks that we can judge whether something continues to exist only relative to a sort, and so we can judge whether a feature belongs to it necessarily...