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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 14. (Color online.) Schematic model of the choice of whether to scrutinize an argument. More
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Chiwook Won The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. This essay does two things. First, it takes up the question whether...
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The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 459–490.
Published: 01 July 2023
... tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a lawlike relation between the putative cause and effect. Applied to the case of action, no maxim can be the cause...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... foreknowledge and human freedom and the Ockhamist's way. In particular, this essay further demonstrates that when it comes to divine foreknowledge's compatibility with human freedom, the fundamental question is not the Ockhamist's question of whether God's beliefs about what an agent will do in the future...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental facts are qualitative are arguably...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 129–168.
Published: 01 April 2022
..., and it examines whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
... under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 159–210.
Published: 01 April 2020
... matters is whether they suffer from an autonomy flaw. To answer this question, the author develops an account of autonomy failure, according to which a preference is nonautonomous if an injustice played an appropriate role in its causal history. The author then discusses the moral implications...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
..., and dogmatists. That is, such “bad ideology” cases are, in all relevant respects, just like cases that are thought to count against externalism—except that they intuitively favor externalism. This, the author argues, is a serious worry for internalism. What is more, it bears on the debate over whether...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... of the structure of morality and seems to explain certain salient features of the debate over whether the principle is true, goes some way toward recommending it. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Thanks to audiences at New York University, Southern Methodist University, and the University...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitudes will filter up to the attitudes themselves. © 2011 by Cornell University 2012...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
... be taller than I would be’ or ‘if I am seven feet tall, I am taller than I am’. These examples exemplify the fact that whether a sentence's evaluation remains at the actual world in the scope of a modal or conditional depends on the combination of mood in the embedded and matrix clauses rather than...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Nicolas Bommarito The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 49–75.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Stephen S. Bush Nicomachean Ethics presents a puzzle as to whether Aristotle views morally virtuous activity as happiness, as book 1 seems to indicate, or philosophical contemplation as happiness, as book 10 seems to indicate. The most influential attempts to resolve this issue have been either...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
.... The argument against the commonsense moralist concerns not benevolence but whether there are further duties that pass the tests. The essay raises the worry that here Sidgwick is unfair since sometimes he criticizes all-things-considered versions of commonsense duties; such criticisms would count against...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 481–524.
Published: 01 October 2008
... commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions. Other nonconventionalist accounts make problematic concessions...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
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The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
...Tad M. Schmaltz It is a matter of continuing scholarly dispute whether Descartes offers a metaphysics of the material world that is “monist” or “pluralist.” One passage that has become crucial to this debate is from the Synopsis of the Meditations , in which Descartes argues that since “body taken...