Search Results for what is said
1-20 of 529 Search Results for
what is said
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
... subquestion to superquestion under a strict entailment relation between questions, and it discusses ways of lying and misleading in relation to multiple questions. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 lying misleading questions what is said inquiry We sometimes have goals that urge us to...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 545–581.
Published: 01 October 2000
...Gopal Sreenivasan Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4 (October 2000) What Is the General Will? Gopal Sreenivasan What is the general will? In this essay, I propose a simple and straightforward answer...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
... Sceptical Challenge . London: Routledge. Wright, Crispin. 1991 . “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.” Mind 100 : 87 -116. Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... acceptance of that claim by its members. What both of these cases make clear is that group justification cannot be wholly determined by factors over which the members of the group have direct voluntary control . For it is this voluntary control that enables the members of Philip Morris to simply decide not...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This essay argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one's knowledge of what the relevant kind of thing looks like. To make the case requires examining the nature of knowing what Fs look...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... option of extending what we have said about testimony to ordinary cases of memory, then we should understand why. And finally, even though it is false, I think the diary model contains important insights that will figure into a positive account of some hard cases of memory that involve memory failures...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 281–283.
Published: 01 April 2001
... J. KUPPERMAN.New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. vi, 168. In this concise book Joel J. Kupperman discusses a wide range of issues about value, or what is good as an end or in itself. These include metaethical issues about what value is and how we know it, normative issues about...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 205–233.
Published: 01 April 2002
..., spontaneously to affirm claims concerning their own attitudinal states which for the most part, both to themselves and oth- ers, seem—by the standards of the practice—to make decent sense of their behavior and projects. But how we talk, it may be said, is one thing and what the world is really like is...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... anything to add to what Alice already knows. Yet, Williamson argues, asserting (6) is not unacceptable in the same way as asserting (1); “the worst to be said of [the] assertion [of (6)] is that it is banal and unkind” (2000, 147). So a parallel to our Gricean argument seems to yield the wrong result...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... what makes those acts right. . . . [M]oral theories are in the business of specifying what makes acts right. And so even two moral theories that are extensionally equivalent in their deontic verdicts can constitute distinct moral theories—that is, distinct theories about what makes acts right.” 6...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 199–241.
Published: 01 April 2006
.... ____. Fricker. 1995 . “Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting; Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Mind 104 : 353 -411. ____. 2003 . “Understanding and Knowledge of What Is Said.” In Epistemology of Language , ed. Alex Barber, 325 -66. Oxford: Oxford University Press...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 288–290.
Published: 01 April 2005
... the rhetorical utility of being able to demand one’s “rights” in the face of unjust laws. The main reason people want children, Warnock says, is “a kind of insatiable curiosity: what will the random mixture of genes produce? What will be famil- iar, what unfamiliar?” (41). She denies that there...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2007
... fi gure in causal explanations. We can even speak of a person’s “know- ing” what to do, and of epistemic (or “quasi-epistemic”) virtues in plan- ning and plan-laden judgment. (251) The result is a metaethically ecumenical form of expressivism that endorses many of the claims...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 483–523.
Published: 01 October 2003
... York: Oxford University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1985 . What is Human Agency? In Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 : Human Agency and Language . New York: Cambridge University Press. ____. 1991 . The Dialogical Self. In The Interpretive Turn , ed. J. F. B. David R. Hiley, James F. Bohman, and...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2005) 114 (3): 359–398.
Published: 01 July 2005
...- conceptual content” defined above. In the case of absolute nonconcep- tual content, we appealed to the idea of two different mental state types having different kinds of content; but very little is usually said about what these different kinds might be, or even about what it might mean for there to be...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other than what you are determined to do would require one of two things: either a miracle , a violation of the actual laws of nature, or a...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles are jointly satisfied if and only if rational belief is...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Mark Schroeder According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions —the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... is appropriately necessary, then no one now has a choice about what the past was like, not even about which prop- ositions were true in the past. Because (0) implies (1), here is what I said about this descendant of the Main Argument: Suppose we recast the Main...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... activity of watching a particular material object is perceptual. While there is much to be said about what exactly the fact that watching is a perceptual activity consists in, it appears to be a relatively uncontrover- sial consequence of the fact that watching a particular material object is a...