Search Results for well
1-20 of 799 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 603–632.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Louis Kaplow Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well-Being? Louis Kaplow Harvard Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research 1. Introduction Theories of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 630–633.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Kok-Chor Tan Talbott William J. , Human Rights and Human Well-Being . New York : Oxford University Press , 2010 . xi + 410 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Huw Price, Naturalism Without Mirrors. New York: Oxford University...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2013
...E.J. Coffman Sosa Ernest , Knowing Full Well . Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2011 . xii +164 pp . © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 BOOK REVIEWS Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for a wide range of conceptions of evidential support...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... interesting further questions about the nature of beneficence (sections 5 and 6). Our first example involves moral theories that direct you to pay special attention to the less well-off (henceforth progressivist moral theories , for short). Consider a very simple, very extreme, progressivist moral...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 390–393.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Richard Kraut Badhwar's theory contains many other riches—and not only the provocative ideas I have been discussing. Her work deserves the attention of all students of value theory. Badhwar Neera K. , Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life . New York: Oxford University Press...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... to quareers instead of to careers, would serve equally well. It is further argued that the circularity objection to psychological accounts can be answered without appeal to the notion of quasi-memory. Because of the internal relations between the causal profiles of mental states and the persistence...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... from its restrictor. The article shows that split readings can occur not only with attitude verbs but with modals, tense, and aspectual markers as well. The upshot of the article is that although there is a real threat to our comfortable assumption that the sort of bare quantification we routinely...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
...; it essentially consists in causal mapping. Unlike the comparative model presupposed in the literature on deliberation, Aristotle's model can account for the virtuous agent's deliberation, as well as deliberation with a view to “satisficing” desires and deliberation that fails to uncover any expedient...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... from ordinary interpersonal relationships. On this basis, he concluded that relinquishing moral blame isn't a real possibility for us, given our commitment to personal relationships. If well founded, this conclusion puts the traditional free-will debate in a new light. In particular, insofar as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have if it is to measure the distance from a set of credences to a set of truth values; he shows that, on any such measure, and for any...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Dale Dorsey Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued , under the proper conditions, by x . Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
... in general” is a substance, and since all substances are “by their nature incorruptible,” this sort of body is incorruptible as well. In this article I defend a pluralist reading of this passage, according to which there are indefinitely many bodies-taken-in-general, each of which counts as an...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... benevolence as well. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 Sidgwick gives four tests for highest certainty. (1) The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise. (2) The proposition must be (as far as I can tell by reflection on it) self-evident. (3) The proposition must be consistent with...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... commitments really are. In particular, investigating prepunishment can help to bring out the inadequacy of the “Ockhamist” reply to the argument, as well as the sense in which God's past beliefs need to depend on what we do, if we are plausibly to have a choice about those beliefs. There is, I think...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... this. The definite article is sometimes pronounced with names in the singular: ‘The Ivan we all love doesn't feel well’. Sloat proposed a disjunctive generalization of when the definite article must be pronounced with a singular name. This essay shows that by slightly revising Sloat's generalization...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... definition as well as the scope of the notion of substance. For it is often thought that the ultimate subject of properties need not—and, in some cases, cannot—be independent. Drawing on a suite of historical, textual, and philosophical considerations, this essay argues for an interpretation that reconciles...