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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 423–446.
Published: 01 July 2011
... to deal with the intuitions that all those reasons do not exist is to offer an account of the weight of reasons that will entail that these reasons are vanishingly weak. And then we can plug in some plausible assumptions about the pragmatics of conversation, arguing that though it wouldn’t be false...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
.... Antony, 194 –214. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fitelson, Branden, and David Jehle. 2009 . “What Is the `Equal Weight View'?” Episteme 6 , no. 3 : 280 –93. Hájek, Alan. 2008 . “Arguments for—or against—Probabilism?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 : 793 –819...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
... skeptical consequences when combined with the incomparability hypothesis, since it predicts that, if the scale even slightly underestimates Bjorn’s weight, then any amount of overestimation will be compatible with his knowledge, so his knowledge places no lower bound on his weight. i-normality is thus...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... of “the strength of a reason” have been able to use that notion only in a meta- phorical way. The natural metaphor here is with the strength of a physi- cal force such as weight. As John Broome puts it, “Weighing is just what reasons are made for.” 4 As a result, these philosophers have thought...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 230–235.
Published: 01 April 2022
... with the metaphysics of selves and persisting agents, he proposes a new theory of rational choice for persisting agents. His solution, in brief, is that one should choose in accordance with a weighted general value function (U G ) that is the amalgamation of the local functions U 1 , U 2 , …, U n of one’s n...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 286–289.
Published: 01 April 2015
... in normative reasoning—both practical (reasons for action) and theoretical (epistemic reasons for belief). It is now a commonplace of moral philosophy that what an agent ought to do is determined by how the normative “weights” or “forces” of different reasons combine. But as Horty complains, these are just...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... Desert would no longer apply, and would thus not imply that either deserves punishment. That is implausible. I have shown that, to maintain Desert, we have to deny either Irrelevance of Others, or (i) or (ii) in the Fusion Problem. Giving due weight to the independent plausibility of Irrelevance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 603–632.
Published: 01 October 2007
..., but neither feature can justify treating such means as equivalent to the totality of the good under an ideal theory.4 The central argument developed here is that the foregoing prob- lem is especially acute when the means have multiple dimensions, for then it is necessary to weight the means...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
.... VE (A) = C (V = v | A)v (1) v In other words, A’s e-expected value is a weighted average of the values of possible outcomes that might result from choosing A, where the weighting of each value v is determined by the agent’s conditional credence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 495–499.
Published: 01 July 2020
...). But it’s not entirely neutral. For instance, if we define the value of a life going forward in a way that gives greater weight to the near future than to the far future, then the third premise would be false. (Similarly, our parody argument is not neutral on how to define things going well overall...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... above, for example). They show, furthermore, that the weight of some epistemic reason to believe that p is unaffected by the weight of practical considerations bearing on your doxastic attitude toward p . Again, with some reservations (recall the “testimonial affirmative action” case above), we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... into two categories: big and small. Now suppose that, for whatever reason, big and small things are relevant for different purposes. Given how they are used, we need to know the temperature (but not weight) of the big things and the weight (but not temperature) of the small things. So the big things...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
... that there is no confirmation of either QME or QMS when “Up” is observed. (Similarly for observing “Down There is a complication that must be dealt with—branches may have unequal weights. Weights are introduced to QME to allow for the possibility that—in the terminology of QMS—not all the outcomes are equally likely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
...–94; Goodman 2008 , 152; Wolterstorff 2011 , 98–99). For Aquinas, “as” denotes the manner, not the degree of love: to love your neighbor as yourself is not to give your interests equal weight (see Oderberg 2008 , sec. 3). And in his classic study of agape, Gene Outka never imagines that love...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 111–113.
Published: 01 January 2001
... puts all the epistemic weight on his own intuition, nor a proto-Rawlsian offering some kind of reflective equilibri- um theory. Rather, Sidgwick’s appeal to self-evidence sits alongside “discur- sive” and “social” verifications, which appeal respectively to intra- and inter- personal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 1–34.
Published: 01 January 2016
...:151–90 / 1974, 109–46 ) initiated the mathematical study of elasticity in general, and the strength of rigid bodies in particular, with the second day of his Two New Sciences . There, Galileo introduces the following problem: if a prismatic beam is set into a wall at one end and loaded with a weight...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 422–425.
Published: 01 July 2015
... authority within a larger structure of such authority” (83). Managerial authority can thus be justified, as a form of political authority , by its good consequences, and in particular, by its role in promoting the public good. We might wonder how much stock to put in McMahon's assessment of the weight...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 532–535.
Published: 01 October 2017
... of occasionally treating the remarks of other philosophers—for example, Russell (114–15) and Frege (112–14)—as if those remarks by themselves constituted evidence for the correctness of his interpretations of Tractarian remarks. Moreover, these extraneous texts are even sometimes accorded more weight than...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 259–262.
Published: 01 April 2003
... is significant, and that it provides reason to doubt that any extant theory of vagueness is correct. 261 BOOK REVIEWS Even if one’s pre-theoretic intuitions are weighted in certain ways, the weights change as one theorizes. Indeed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 103–106.
Published: 01 January 2003
... Aquinas wants to give the first principles of synderesis, and one might object that I am giving these prin- ciples undue weight as substantive moral truths. (See, e.g., Westberg, 1994b, pp. 103–6, 150–51.) But it is enough for the purposes of my argument if it sometimes happens...