... by weighing the reasons for each. But then the reasons generated by having undertaken the foregone commitment can explain the rationality of regret. Thus it is possible for regret to be ratio- nal even when a rational resolution of a conflict is available. The remaining essays are difficult...

... undertaken a commitment (209). Conflicts between commitments may be resolvable by weighing the reasons for each. But then the reasons generated by having undertaken the foregone commitment can explain the rationality of regret. Thus it is possible for regret to be ratio- nal even when a rational...

... undertaken a commitment (209). Conflicts between commitments may be resolvable by weighing the reasons for each. But then the reasons generated by having undertaken the foregone commitment can explain the rationality of regret. Thus it is possible for regret to be ratio- nal even when a rational...

... by weighing the reasons for each. But then the reasons generated by having undertaken the foregone commitment can explain the rationality of regret. Thus it is possible for regret to be ratio- nal even when a rational resolution of a conflict is available. The remaining essays are difficult...

... by weighing the reasons for each. But then the reasons generated by having undertaken the foregone commitment can explain the rationality of regret. Thus it is possible for regret to be ratio- nal even when a rational resolution of a conflict is available. The remaining essays are difficult...

... 2018 . “ Wondering about What You Know .” Analysis 78 , no. 4 : 596 – 604 . Bader Ralph 2015 . “ Conditions, Modifiers, and Holism .” In Weighing Reasons , edited by Lord Errol Maguire Barry , 27 – 55 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Basu...

... in question. While the present distinction between universalism and relativism focuses on the normative relevance function, one might also draw a similar distinction along a second dimension. Recall that, under our definition of a reasons structure, the weighing relation does not depend on the context...

... is that these probabilities are not individual situations, but rather of classes of relevantly equivalent situations: what matters is not how likely it is that every aspect of a particular situation obtains, but how likely it is, say, that Bjorn weighs as much as he does in a given situation. For this reason, the account has...

... they attribute the comparative model of deliberation underlying Alexander’s position to Aristotle. In their view, deliberation essentially consists in weighing incompatible courses of action. This activity is rational only if we believe that we have the power also to do the opposite of what we in fact do.4...

.... He then argues that competing motivational forces need not interact in this way. Scanlon describes a kind of decision in which more complex structures than the weighing of competing desires are involved. Many decisions, he says, “involve bracketing the reason-giving force of some of your...

... the link between such reflection and attaining the truth is largely set aside. On the resulting view, then, epistemic rationality is apparently divorced from knowledge and justification. Epistemic authority can give us reasons that make our beliefs rational, in some sense, but it is unclear whether those...

... of such conclusions is not part of the activity of reasoning, but goes beyond it” (38). To see the problem with this proposal, recall that reasons are always reasons for something: a reason is a consideration that supports or weighs in favor of some action or attitude. If you say that the fact that donuts...

... Clinton’s first term of office. He claims that this experience reinforced his philosophical views, and enhanced his confidence that in real politics acceptable outcomes can be reached despite there being no principled way of weighing the different values and perspectives that arise in disputes. He...

... reasons, welfare, and ethics, many of which are contemporary classics. New here are a unifying introduction and the paper “Subjectivism and Reasons to Be Moral.” The volume would make a useful centerpiece to a graduate seminar focused on reasons, welfare, or consequentialism. And the new essay...

... as one does, on what basis can one say that one already has reason enough? The idea that it is of practical value to have some reason, but no longer of practical value to have full reason, might appeal to those for whom living in accordance with reason is just one value to be weighed against many...

... developed to a degree which met Lewis’s challenge: dynamical-collapse theories, Bohm-style hidden-variable theories, and Everett-style many-worlds theories, for all their respective problems and challenges, all offer ways of understanding quantum mechanics that metaphysicians can reasonably engage...

... Descartes’s rejection of Caterus’s objection. What Hatfield says about Descartes’s attempts to justify his fundamental principle is of special interest. He points out that “in general there is no reason to assume that just because an idea is innate it is true” (212), so that we must “[look...

...Christopher Hitchcock CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE. By Judea Pearl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 384. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) CAUSALITY...

..., and not just to describing the parts of each chapter. It becomes easy to lose the general thread of William’s reasoning when reading through a list of summaries of the treatise’s individual parts. For the translation of the text itself, Teske relies on François Hodot and Blaise Le Feron’s 1674 edition...

... : Oxford University Press . Fogal Daniel 2016 . “ Reasons, Reason, and Context .” In Weighing Reasons , edited by Lord Errol and Maguire Barry , 74 – 103 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Johnson King Zoë Forthcoming . “ We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It Too...