Search Results for weighing of reasons
1-20 of 106 Search Results for
weighing of reasons
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 663–666.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Jacob Ross John Broome, Weighing Lives Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix + 278 pp. Cornell University 2007 book reviews Joseph L. Camp Jr., Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. x + 246 pp. It...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... properties weighing of reasons reason-based representation consequentialization deontic equivalence underdetermination choice theory The aim of this essay is to propose a new approach to the formal representation of moral theories. We show that any moral theory within a very large class can be...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... started going over all the reasons I had given myself for ending my past romances, weighing up each one to choose just three examples. If the reader wonders about such cases, we hold that these examples of apparent deliberation are actions just in case the counterpart cases involving overt bodily...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... philosophers who make use of the notion of “the strength of a reason” have been able to use that notion only in a meta- phorical way. The natural metaphor here is with the strength of a physi- cal force such as weight. As John Broome puts it, “Weighing is just what reasons are made for.” 4 As a result...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
... reasons morally justifying them) coincide. The essay calls this the Coincident Reasons Thesis and argues that it provides plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for morally worthy action, defending the claim against proposed counterexamples. It ends by showing that the plausibility of the thesis...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 435–439.
Published: 01 July 2016
... such conclusions is not part of the activity of reasoning, but goes beyond it” (38). To see the problem with this proposal, recall that reasons are always reasons for something: a reason is a consideration that supports or weighs in favor of some action or attitude. If you say that the fact...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 297–300.
Published: 01 April 2007
...A. N. Williams Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xix + 271 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 302...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 639–641.
Published: 01 October 2001
...: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE. By JUDEA PEARL. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 384. Judea Pearl has been at the forefront of research in the burgeoning field of causal modeling, and Causality is the culmination of his work over the last dozen or so years. For...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. Although the logical closure of belief and the Lockean thesis are attractive postulates in themselves, initially this may seem like a formal “curiosity”; however, as will be argued in the rest of the essay, a very reasonable theory of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Stephen Darwall Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Daniel Koltonski On the shared-ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend's valuable ends for the friend's own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... is easy to appreciate Leibniz's reasons for embracing this view, it has proven difficult to see how his doctrine of incompossibility might be reconciled with the broader commitments of his larger philosophical system. This essay develops, in four sections, a novel solution to the “puzzle of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... and other elements of our emotional lives. It then shows how this argument helps to answer an important recent challenge to Strawson's position. If this essay is right, there is good reason to doubt that the reforms envisaged by some incompatibilists, reforms to our blame-related practices, are a real...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... may thereby give us reason to revise our judgments regarding the fea- tures that distinguish depictive from nondepictive representations. My aim, in what follows, is to provide a resemblance account of depiction that both answers the metaphysical question and goes a considerable way toward...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... upcoming selection of cases covers considerable ground, it is not exhaustive. In particular, no cases are included that establish the distinctness of coin- ciding objects on the basis of differences between these objects at possible worlds other than the world of coincidence. The reason is that while...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., one in the theory of chance (section 3) and one in the theory of counterfactual conditionals (section 4). Section 5 explores some strategies that an antihaecceitist could employ to respond to these problems and argues that they are likely to confront signiﬁcant challenges. 1. A Reason to Care...