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weighing of reasons

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 663–666.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Jacob Ross John Broome, Weighing Lives Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix + 278 pp. Cornell University 2007 book reviews Joseph L. Camp Jr., Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. x + 246 pp. It...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... . Now the reasons structure is ℛ = 〈 N , ⊵ 〉 , where for every context K , N  ( K ) is the set of all expected-welfare properties; the weighing relation ranks singleton sets consisting of expected-welfare properties such that { P exp = w } ⊵ { P exp = w...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 95–130.
Published: 01 January 2020
... something requires weighing what one takes to be reasons for and against doing it. But even if she can propose a conception of deliberation that evades the foregoing argument, she faces a different problem: she must license forms of deliberation that are intuitively unacceptable. If I can deliberate about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... started going over all the reasons I had given myself for ending my past romances, weighing up each one to choose just three examples. If the reader wonders about such cases, we hold that these examples of apparent deliberation are actions just in case the counterpart cases involving overt bodily...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... philosophers who make use of the notion of “the strength of a reason” have been able to use that notion only in a meta- phorical way. The natural metaphor here is with the strength of a physi- cal force such as weight. As John Broome puts it, “Weighing is just what reasons are made for.” 4 As a result...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
... show that a thesis like the Coincident Reasons Thesis can provide only a necessary condition for the moral worth of actions. She argues that another factor, which she identifies as an agent’s “degree of moral concern,” weighs into the assessment of moral worth. But I will argue that while the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 367–371.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Alex Worsnip Snedegar Justin , Contrastive Reasons . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xiv + 149 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Justin Snedegar's book Contrastive Reasons is a deft, lean, and elegant explication and defense of contrastivism about reasons...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 297–300.
Published: 01 April 2007
...A. N. Williams Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xix + 271 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 302...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 435–439.
Published: 01 July 2016
... actual drawing of such conclusions is not part of the activity of reasoning, but goes beyond it” (38). To see the problem with this proposal, recall that reasons are always reasons for something: a reason is a consideration that supports or weighs in favor of some action or attitude. If you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... of the fact that practical reasons for doxastic states transmit, but epistemic reasons don't, is that practical reasons are reasons for actions bearing on beliefs, rather than reasons for the beliefs themselves. Here we're primarily concerned with a third argument that addresses the weighing of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 639–641.
Published: 01 October 2001
...: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE. By JUDEA PEARL. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 384. Judea Pearl has been at the forefront of research in the burgeoning field of causal modeling, and Causality is the culmination of his work over the last dozen or so years. For...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. Although the logical closure of belief and the Lockean thesis are attractive postulates in themselves, initially this may seem like a formal “curiosity”; however, as will be argued in the rest of the essay, a very reasonable theory of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Stephen Darwall Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Daniel Koltonski On the shared-ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend's valuable ends for the friend's own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... is easy to appreciate Leibniz's reasons for embracing this view, it has proven difficult to see how his doctrine of incompossibility might be reconciled with the broader commitments of his larger philosophical system. This essay develops, in four sections, a novel solution to the “puzzle of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...