Search Results for warrant

..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed to quareers instead...

... of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology...

... use or use by others; moreover, it does so without adding to, or altering, the original epistemic status of the belief (see, for example, ibid., 466, 486–87 and 1997, 37). It just transfers the original warrant (if any) along with the belief, from one’s earlier self to one’s later self...

... to this third condition as warrant.1 Thus, when p is true and S believes that p, S will know that p just in case p has warrant for S. But if p is false or S doesn’t believe that p, S will not know that p, even if p has warrant for S.2 We can now use the notion of warrant to introduce the other concept...

... and Phenomenological Research 70 : 417 –30. Davies, Martin. 1998 . “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant.” In Knowing Our Own Minds , ed. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, 321 –61. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2000 . “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge...

... or warrant into an argument. When I recall a general fact, I use substantive content mem- ory. When I recall an event, I use experiential memory. When I use an earlier-instantiated step in an argument to combine with an inference rule, I rely on purely preservative memory. I introduced substantive...

... York: Cambridge University Press. Plantinga, Alvin. 1993 . Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press. Quine, W.V. 1969 . “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 69 -90. New York: Columbia University Press. Schmitt, Frederick. 1992...

... years. But there is further reason for surprise that more has not been done to bring them together. The chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the con- cern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability...

... sentences generally seem paradoxical, and why Aubrey’s and Holmes’s assertions can be proper in the absence of knowledge. The explanation is that if asser- tions are governed by the truth norm, the hearer may reasonably expect that the speaker has some warrant for what she says. The most plausible...

... of these differences. Now, I return to the epistemology of urges. We can think of the acquisition of self-knowledge as requiring a warranted transition from the ‘base’ state M that is the object of knowledge to the ‘concluding’ state (the self-ascription of M ) (labels are from O’Brien 2005). Though...

... or the warrant of reason, but with explaining the presence of belief and how belief is retained in the face of skeptical arguments (177). Chapter 9. Owen’s final chapter moves into new territory and treats the con- ditions, if any, in Hume’s writings under which the conclusions of reason...

..., then every ρ that is implied by ψ is a necessary condition for χ as well. So given that, as per (4), rational assertability is a necessary condition for warranted assertability and given that, by the belief-assertion parallel, rational assertability implies rational credibility, rational credibility...

... it at a number ofjunctures- for example, Firth argues that what is crucial for foundational beliefs is not their certainty, but their self-warrant. In “Radical Empiricism and Perceptual Relativity,” Firth defends a ver- sion of radical empiricism against the “argument from perceptual relativ- ity...

... there exist no num- bers at all, and so no prime numbers. Nominalists are aware that the assertion of the existence of prime numbers is warranted by the standards of mathe- matical science; they simply reject scientific standards of warrant. Nominalists insist on calling all their opponents...

... NISHI SHAH ing Richard Moran, let us call this feature of doxastic deliberation transparency.1 This paper is an investigation of the basis of transparency. A possible source of resistance to acknowledging that the phenomenon of trans- parency is deep enough to warrant investigation...

... between genuine and sham credences. Turning to the big picture, Joyce’s approach faces a motivational challenge. If credal states are not to be evaluated in and of themselves—but instead in terms of what they warrant doing —then why did we ever need a nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism ( Joyce...

... sophisticated. In such cases, it makes sense to assess the reasoning epistemically. It also can be warranted to hold the subject accountable for that cognitive act. If it is a bad inference, the subject showed poor sensitivity to reasons, or ought to have done better, and sometimes can appreciate...

... to the view defended in the essay. © 2011 by Cornell University 2012 References Beebee Helen . 2001 . “ Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism .” Philosophical Quarterly 51 : 356 - 74 . Brown Jessica . 2003 . “ The Reduction Argument and Transmission...

...- bers at all, and so no prime numbers. Nominalists are aware that the assertion of the existence of prime numbers is warranted by the standards of mathe- matical science; they simply reject scientific standards of warrant. Nominalists insist on calling all their opponents “platonists...

... -20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldman, A. 1967 . “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Journal of Philosophy 64 : 357 -72. BOOK REVLEWS tal.” It offers an off-beat criticism of reliabilist accounts of warranted belief, and continues Firth’s cautious...