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warrant

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology, this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 33–61.
Published: 01 January 2005
... to this third condition as warrant.1 Thus, when p is true and S believes that p, S will know that p just in case p has warrant for S. But if p is false or S doesn’t believe that p, S will not know that p, even if p has warrant for S.2 We can now use the notion of warrant to introduce the other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
.... ———. 2005 . “Why Basic Knowledge Is Easy Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 : 417 –30. Davies, Martin. 1998 . “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant.” In Knowing Our Own Minds , ed. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, 321 –61. Oxford: Oxford...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 199–241.
Published: 01 April 2006
... use or use by others; moreover, it does so without adding to, or altering, the original epistemic status of the belief (see, for example, ibid., 466, 486–87 and 1997, 37). It just transfers the original warrant (if any) along with the belief, from one’s earlier self to one’s later self, or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... warrant into an argument. When I recall a general fact, I use substantive content mem- ory. When I recall an event, I use experiential memory. When I use an earlier-instantiated step in an argument to combine with an inference rule, I rely on purely preservative memory. I introduced substantive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 159–194.
Published: 01 April 2000
...: Cambridge University Press. Plantinga, Alvin. 1993 . Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press. Quine, W.V. 1969 . “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 69 -90. New York: Columbia University Press. Schmitt, Frederick. 1992 . Knowledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... years. But there is further reason for surprise that more has not been done to bring them together. The chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the con- cern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 572–575.
Published: 01 October 2003
... with the justification of beliefs or the warrant of reason, but with explaining the presence of belief and how belief is retained in the face of skeptical arguments (177). Chapter 9. Owen’s final chapter moves into new territory and treats the con- ditions, if any, in Hume’s writings under which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 453–456.
Published: 01 July 2000
..., they diverge from it at a number ofjunctures- for example, Firth argues that what is crucial for foundational beliefs is not their certainty, but their self-warrant. In “Radical Empiricism and Perceptual Relativity,” Firth defends a ver- sion of radical empiricism against the “argument from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 79–82.
Published: 01 January 2001
... Quine, tells us there exist no num- bers at all, and so no prime numbers. Nominalists are aware that the assertion of the existence of prime numbers is warranted by the standards of mathe- matical science; they simply reject scientific standards of warrant. Nominalists insist on calling all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... truth norm, the hearer may reasonably expect that the speaker has some warrant for what she says. The most plausible warrants for assertions that are not predictions or retrodic- tions will generally be, in conjunction with truth, sufficient for knowl- edge. Recall first DeRose’s distinction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 77–79.
Published: 01 January 2001
... Goodman and Quine, tells us there exist no num- bers at all, and so no prime numbers. Nominalists are aware that the assertion of the existence of prime numbers is warranted by the standards of mathe- matical science; they simply reject scientific standards of warrant. Nominalists insist on...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
... conclusion not warranted by the evidence, or it may inherit the epistemic flaws of a premise on which it relies. If the banana's consciously seeming yellowish stems from an inference that relies on your belief that bananas are yellow, strengthening that belief in the face of experience is epistemically worse...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
... is rational for you to believe ϕ. And if ψ is a necessary condition for χ, then every ρ that is implied by ψ is a necessary condition for χ as well. So given that, as per (4), rational assertability is a necessary condition for warranted assertability and given that, by the belief-assertion...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 629–631.
Published: 01 October 2001
... BOOK REVIEWS abstract, and its arguments insufficiently attentive to the evidence that arises within the narrative context of lived Christian experience. “Rationality” rather than justification or warrant is the key concept of epistemic appraisal by which faith commitments are judged...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 456–459.
Published: 01 July 2000
... -20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldman, A. 1967 . “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Journal of Philosophy 64 : 357 -72. BOOK REVLEWS tal.” It offers an off-beat criticism of reliabilist accounts of warranted belief, and continues Firth’s cautious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 661–664.
Published: 01 October 2013
... least under conditions suitable for reflection, whether or not we ought to do so. Consequently, one of the most in-depth and interesting chapters in the book concerns warrant for both our nonnormative beliefs and our normative ones. The capacity for spontaneous insight into normative truths is the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 107–109.
Published: 01 January 2000
... predominant motivation is skeptical: theory systematically exceeds the reach of empirical warrant. Antirealists deny that explanatory power is evidential; realists deny that the reach of empirical warrant sum- marily terminates at the boundary of the observable. But these counter- arguments are mere...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 447–482.
Published: 01 October 2003
... warrant investigation is the thought that transparency is merely the by-product of the redundancy associated with the truth predicate. Just as adding that p is true to one’s assertion of p is redundant, adding that one believes that p to be true adds noth- ing to one’s assertion that one believes that...