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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 127–131.
Published: 01 January 2006
...John W. Carroll John Heil, From an Ontological Point of View . Oxford: Clarendon, 2003. xv + 267 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This volume...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 137–140.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Paul Redding John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. ix + 285 pp. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Hanna, Robert. 2005 . “Kant and Nonconceptual Content.” European Journal of Philosophy 13...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 241–261.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., W.V. 1951 . “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In From a Logical Point of View , 2d ed., 20 -46. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1970 . Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Russell, B. 1914 . Our Knowledge of the External World. London: Routledge, 1993...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Peter Van Inwagen PERSONS AND BODIES: A CONSTITUTION VIEW. By Lynne Rudder Baker.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 233. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS enology of sense includes representing moving objects, Clark’s theory seems to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 243–258.
Published: 01 April 2002
... Generalization of Quantifiers.” Fundamenta Mathematicae 44 : 12 -36. Sher, Gila. 1991 . The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint . Cambridge: MIT Press. ____. 1996 . “Did Tarski Commit `Tarski's fallacy'?” Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 : 653 -86. ____. 2001 . “The Formal-Structural View...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2005) 114 (3): 414–416.
Published: 01 July 2005
...Lisa Tessman Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xi, 312. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3 (July 2005) Christine Swanton, Virtue...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 409–413.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Jason S. Miller John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will . Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007. viii + 232 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Shields, Aristotle. London: Routledge, 2007. xvi...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 277–282.
Published: 01 April 2005
...Jonathan Waskan John Preston and Mark Bishop, editors, Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xx, 300. Cornell University 2005 Schank, Roger. C., and Robert Abelson. 1977 . Scripts, Plans, Goals...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Mark Schroeder According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions —the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for a wide range of conceptions of evidential support...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... for traditional skeptical views in epistemology. In particular, it argues that on certain popular views about the nature of belief, it is impossible to adopt the near-global agnosticism recommended by the skeptical epistemologist. On other plausible views, it is possible only in special circumstances...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... transmission and transmission failure really are, thereby exposing two questionable but quotidian assumptions. It attacks existing views of transmission failure, especially those of Crispin Wright. It defends a permissive view of transmission failure, one holding that deductions of a certain kind fail to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... Lewis’s views on these two matters, by presenting a class of decision problems—some of them themselves Newcomb problems—in which Lewis’s view of the relevance of inadmissible evidence seems in tension with his causal decision theory. It offers a diagnosis for this dilemma and proposes a remedy, based on...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
...David James Barnett A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Thomas Crowther There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Tyler Burge A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
... refute Backtracking Compatibilism, the view that (BT) is true and yet the freedom to do otherwise is compatible with determinism. The form of the Action-Type Argument for (FP) also leads to a Simple Argument for incompatibilism, which does not assume (BT). What the Simple Argument does assume is a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...