...Samuel Asarnow Sobel David , From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 . viii + 312 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism collects fifteen of David Sobel's papers on normative...

...C. Allen Speight Songsuk Susan Hahn. Contradiction in Motion: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. xv + 220 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life...

...Jonas Olson Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. xi + 244 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. 2 vols...

...Rae Langton Cornell University 2007 Objective and Unconditioned Value Rae Langton MIT Preamble A claim to objectivity about value is sometimes cast as a claim about the value something has in itself, independent of...

...Michael Bukoski In The Sources of Normativity and elsewhere, Korsgaard defends a Kantian ethical theory by arguing that valuing anything commits one to valuing humanity as the source of all value. I reconstruct Korsgaard's influential argument to show how she can resist many of the objections that...

...Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij So much for the idea of true belief's eudaimonic value. Of course, epistemologists might at this point be perfectly unperturbed. In contemporary epistemology, claims about the value of true belief are typically framed in terms of the epistemic value of true belief, as...

...Shamik Dasgupta Much recent metaphysics is built around notions such as naturalness, fundamentality, grounding, dependence, essence, and others besides. In this article I raise a problem for this kind of metaphysics, the “problem of missing value.” I survey a number of possible solutions to the...

... friends, or to my wife, in that paternalistic way. Our question is whether there are or can be reasons for love, in this paradigmatic form. This is often denied, as by Harry Frankfurt in The Reasons of Love : far from being a response to reasons, or to “the inherent value of its object,” love is “the...

...Earl Conee Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 3 (July 2000) DISCUSSION The Moral Value in Promises Earl Conee 1. The Problem Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem...

...David Phillips COMMITMENT, VALUE, AND MORAL REALISM. By Marcel S. Lieberman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xi, 210. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS to contemporary thought. In presuming that we can directly indulge in the rational...

...Thomas Hurka VALUE... AND WHAT FOLLOWS. By Joel J. Kupperman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. vi, 168. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVLEWS The Philosophical Reviezu, Vol. 110, No. 2 (April 2001) VALUE . . . AND WATFOLLOWS. By JOEL...

...David O. Brink Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (April 2003) Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value David O. Brink Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen as...

...Stein Haugom Olsen Robert Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Pp.xi, 322. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (April 2003...

...David Merli Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This...

...Niko Kolodny Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (April 2003) Love as Valuing a Relationship Niko Kolodny At first glance, love seems to be a psychological state for which there are normative reasons: a...

...Dale Dorsey Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued , under the proper conditions, by x . Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is...

...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by...

... vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have if it is to measure the distance from a set of credences to a set of truth values; he shows that, on any such measure, and for any...

...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of...

... orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability of...