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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
.... 117, No. 2, 2008
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-039
Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiii + 449 pp.
First-person utterances raise philosophical problems. Basically, first-person
utterances, especially those expressing mental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 463–467.
Published: 01 July 2021
... central claims: “ordinary utterances routinely enact [oppressive] norms without the speaker having or exercising any special authority” (2). To make her case, McGowan spends the book’s first half elucidating the novel mechanism of norm-enactment (chapters 1–4). The second half considers examples: chapter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537.
Published: 01 October 2002
..., the puzzle may be posed thus: How can ‘This
is that’, if true, differ at all in content from an utterance of ‘That is that’
while pointing with two hands straight ahead to the same thing? Kaplan
lifts much of his theory of demonstratives from Frege’s remarks, yet dis-
agrees with Frege concerning...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
... truth-conditions of sentences. To exemplify, Perry's utterance of (1) I have a broken arm is true referentially iff Perry has a broken arm (ignoring time). The sentence has the reflexive truth-conditions that any English utterance u of (1) is true iff the speaker of u has a broken arm (7...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
... further things. In utter-
ing ‘I promise to come to your party’, I promise to come to your party. In
uttering ‘It starts at eight’, you assert that it starts at eight. In uttering ‘I
apologize for forgetting about your party’, I apologize for forgetting about
your party. A speech act is that which you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
...” thesis that “it is possible and fruitful to theorize about the structure and function of discourse independently of a specific theory about the mechanisms that languages use to serve those functions” (1). The program is broadly Gricean, explaining the contents of utterances and attitudes independently...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 167–171.
Published: 01 January 2021
... the illocutionary authority a speaker has over her utterance with her dependence on her audience for this utterance being the illocutionary act she intended. I still think that the assurance account needs to include reference to a background of trust as an essential part of the explanation as to how speaker...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 191–214.
Published: 01 April 2003
...: La Nuovo Italia. Reprinted in Montague 1974, 95-118. ____. 1974 . Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague . Ed. Richmond H. Thomason. New Haven: Yale University Press. Predelli, Stefano. 1998a . `I Am Not Here Now'. Analysis 58 : 107 -15. ____. 1998b . Utterance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
... the name N is somehow declared to be empty,
to have no application. But this is simply not the case. What typically
happens after an utterance of a negative existential is further, often
even busier, conversation, seemingly about the very object declared to
be non-existent. This is scarcely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
...’ has been evolving gradually from some very different starting point. There must thus have been a first minute during which people using ‘assert’ began making assertions about assertion. Now, consider an utterance at that time of ‘People who used “assert” five minutes ago made assertions about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... in motion. If the circumstances are right, this evidence may be entirely idiosyncratic and unprecedented—just the right wiggle of one's nose, or an act of passive-aggressively doing the addressee's laundry, for example. Alternatively, an utterance of a kind that would standardly serve as evidence of one...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
... of illocutionary acts
(IAs). Alston argues that to perform an illocutionary act is to utter a sentence
while taking responsibility for (R’ing) the holding of certain conditions. This
term captures the idea that IA performance consists in an alteration of the
speaker’s normative status, rendering her “open...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
... be at the party
only get assigned truth-values relative to contexts of utterance, indices of
evaluation, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment. We dub such
semantic analyses CIA theories.1 Our goal here is to catalogue some cen-
tral problems that any CIA theory must solve. We begin by briefly sketch...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 405–451.
Published: 01 October 2022
... and the Beth case? Why do I know while Andy does not? The modal view, by itself, is silent on these questions. The implicature view doesn’t help here either. For that view would have to say that while Andy’s utterance on Saturday morning implicates that he has direct evidence concerning Beth, my utterance...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
...—that have the property that their references may vary from utter-
ance to utterance. These expressions, therefore, may express different
senses on each occasion of use. But then sense is not invariant, and hence
sense qua meaning does not satisfy (II). Ergo, senses are not meanings. As
Tyler Burge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 199–241.
Published: 01 April 2006
..., however we con-
strue the a priori. Burge is saying that, in a favorable case, I can gain a war-
ranted belief (indeed can come to know) that p, by being told that p, but
that your having uttered certain words—a sentence, say, that means that
p —does not at all contribute to this warrant. That you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 356–362.
Published: 01 July 2019
... to a proposition relative to a context, by uttering a sentence therein. Let ‘δ P ’ abbreviate ‘At noon on day d , [Professor] Brainstorm says that P ’, and assume that at noon on day d , Professor Brainstorm utters the following sentence: (L) ¬ ∃ P (δ P & P ). Relative to that context, L...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 473–478.
Published: 01 July 2002
... strategies
for understanding context-sensitivity. Stern is impressed by and hopes to
exploit various affinities among metaphors, indexicals, and demonstratives. All
three devices make context-dependent contributions to the propositions
expressed by utterances in which they occur. Which place counts...
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