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utterance

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
... Philosophical Review, Vol. 117, No. 2, 2008 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-039 Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiii + 449 pp. First-person utterances raise philosophical problems. Basically, first-person utterances, especially those...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
...” on, the referent of Korta's utterance. She must conceive of Eros as the person sitting in front of her at the bar, next to Korta. KP basically accept the Gricean theory of implicatures, as well as the earlier Gricean ideas of communicative intentions. That communicative intentions play a crucial...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
...” thesis that “it is possible and fruitful to theorize about the structure and function of discourse independently of a specific theory about the mechanisms that languages use to serve those functions” (1). The program is broadly Gricean, explaining the contents of utterances and attitudes independently of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
... illocutionary acts (IAs). Alston argues that to perform an illocutionary act is to utter a sentence while taking responsibility for (R’ing) the holding of certain conditions. This term captures the idea that IA performance consists in an alteration of the speaker’s normative status, rendering her “open to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 497–537.
Published: 01 October 2002
..., the puzzle may be posed thus: How can ‘This is that’, if true, differ at all in content from an utterance of ‘That is that’ while pointing with two hands straight ahead to the same thing? Kaplan lifts much of his theory of demonstratives from Frege’s remarks, yet dis- agrees with Frege concerning...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... example. Alternatively, an utterance of a kind that would standardly serve as evidence of one intention may sometimes be used as evidence of a different kind of intention—a phenomenon normally called ‘implicature’ or ‘indirect speech’. Where does language fit into the picture? The intentionalist...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
... JOHN TURRI In performing a linguistic act, we often do further things. In utter- ing ‘I promise to come to your party’, I promise to come to your party. In uttering ‘It starts at eight’, you assert that it starts at eight. In uttering ‘I apologize for forgetting about your party’, I...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... contextualism about that word predicts that it rarely if ever happens that two utterances of the word contribute exactly the same content, so that speech reports involving that word are far more precarious than we normally suppose ( Cappelen and Lepore 2005 ). What has not been fully appreciated is that once we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
...’ to be a con- versation-stopper, since the name N is somehow declared to be empty, to have no application. But this is simply not the case. What typically happens after an utterance of a negative existential is further, often even busier, conversation, seemingly about the very object declared to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 191–214.
Published: 01 April 2003
... . Utterance, Interpretation and the Logic of Indexicals. Mind and Language 13 : 400 -414. ____. 2002 . Intentions, Indexicals and Communication. Analysis 62 : 310 -16. Quine, Willard van Orman. 1968 . Ontological Relativity. Journal of Philosophy 65 : 185 -212. Reprinted in Quine 1969, 26...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
... (1) Billy might be at the party only get assigned truth-values relative to contexts of utterance, indices of evaluation, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment. We dub such semantic analyses CIA theories.1 Our goal here is to catalogue some cen- tral problems that any CIA theory must solve...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... specify the content of that event. But this is pretty clearly false. Consider the event of my uttering the follow- ing sentence: “This utterance I am now making is an utterance of an English sentence.” Here the phrase “This utterance I am now making” succeeds in referring to a particular utterance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... is justified in two kinds of transitions: first, from subpersonal visual representations to demonstrative utterances (or their analogs in thought) of the form that F is G (for example, from the visual system’s representation of an object at location L to an utter- ance of That cup contains water...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... of semantic content as being delivered for sentences relativized to context of utterance (as we must to accommodate overt context sensitivity) the kind of context in play will be formal, Kaplanian ones, given by ordered sets of objective parameters…which do not include the intentional states of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 473–478.
Published: 01 July 2002
... independently accredited strategies for understanding context-sensitivity. Stern is impressed by and hopes to exploit various affinities among metaphors, indexicals, and demonstratives. All three devices make context-dependent contributions to the propositions expressed by utterances in which they occur...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
... demonstra- tives3—that have the property that their references may vary from utter- ance to utterance. These expressions, therefore, may express different senses on each occasion of use. But then sense is not invariant, and hence sense qua meaning does not satisfy (II). Ergo, senses are not meanings...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 148–152.
Published: 01 January 2002
... sentence meaning is set out in part 2 of the book. Part 1 pro- vides the foundation for this account: Alston’s own analysis of illocutionary acts (IAs). Alston argues that to perform an illocutionary act is to utter a sentence while taking responsibility for (R’ing) the holding of certain conditions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... other quantifi- cational determiners (‘every’, ‘some a two-place relation between proper- ties. For example, suppose Jane, in world w and at time t, utters ‘That apple is shiny’, when perceptually presented with a particular apple, call it A. Accord- ing to King, the first argument place of ‘that...