Search Results for tye

...Robert Van Gulick In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can...

...Michael Tye Cornell University 2006 Balog, K. 1999 . “Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Review 108 : 497 -528. Block, N. 1980a . “Troubles with Functionalism.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology , 1 : 268 -305. Cambridge, MA: MIT...

...Angela Mendelovici; David Bourget Tye Michael , Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . 133 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Michael Tye is perhaps best known for his defense of tracking representationalism , a view...

...Richard Price Tye Michael , Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2009 . xiv + 229 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Paul Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

... Tye's Ten Problems of Consciousness.” Mind and Language 12 : 101 -13. ____. 2001 . Purple Haze. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, David K. 1966 . “Percepts and Color Mosaics in Visual Experience.” Philosophical Review 75 : 357 -68. ____. 1980a . “Mad Pain and Martian Pain...

...,” by Michael Tye (which is a chapter from his Consciousness, Color and Con- tent). Horgan’s paper outlines and defends a theory of mental properties that Horgan wishes to count as nonreductive, and responds to objections Lewis raises in various places to causally efficacious higher-order unreduced mental...

... two papers: “Multiple Ref- erence, Multiple Realization and the Reduction of Mind,” by Terence Horgan, 265 BOOK REVIEWS and “Knowing What it is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argu- ment,” by Michael Tye (which...

... Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—A Reply to Tye 277 BOOK REVIEWS Bartha, Paul, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments reviewed by Joseph E. Earley 451 Beiser, Frederick C., Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from...

... by attending to its environmental objects. Thus Michael Tye: Suppose you are standing before a tapestry in an art gallery. As you take in the rich and varied colors of the cloth, you are told to pay close attention to your visual experience and its phenomenology. What do you do? … You attend closely...

... . Byrne A. Tye M. . 2006 . “ Qualia Ain’t in the Head .” Noûs 40 : 241 – 55 . Campbell J. 1993 . “ The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking .” In Spatial Representation , ed. Eilan N. McCarthy R. Brewer B. , 65 – 95 . Oxford : Blackwell . ———. 1994...

...-friendly solution to Jackson's knowledge argument, see the earlier proposal by Conee (1994) . Tye's intellectualist account gives a nice resolution to variants of the Mary puzzle, including one due to Nida-Rümelin (1996) in which Mary is shown something red but has no way to know whether it is red...

... of Arkansas Press. Boghossian, Paul, and David Velleman. 1991 . “Physicalist Theories of Color.” Philosophical Review 100 : 67 -106. Bradley, Peter, and Michael Tye. 2001 . “Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves.” Journal of Philosophy 98 : 468 -87. Broackes, Justin. 1997...

... 1997 , 251 -64. Originally published 1990. Shapiro, Stewart. 2006 . Vagueness in Context . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sorensen, Roy. 1988 . Blind spots . Oxford: Clarendon Press. ____. 1994 . A Thousand Clones. Mind 103 : 47 -54. Tye, Michael. 1994a . Sorites Paradoxes...

.... 1994 . Mental Representation . Oxford: Blackwell. Tye, Michael. 1995 . Ten Problems of Consciousness . Cambridge: MIT Press. Weiskrantz, Lawrence. 1988 . Some Contributions of Neuropsychology of Vision and Memory to the Problem of Consciousness. In Consciousness in Contemporary Science...

... Bonfiglio. Princeton: Princeton University Press. x þ 380 pp. Ruse, Michael. 2012. The Philosophy of Human Evolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. x þ 271 pp. Sainsbury, R. M., and Michael Tye. 2012. Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts...