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true ideas

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... to solving both problems is Locke's claim that simple ideas are all real, adequate, and true. This explains why, on Locke's view, we have certain knowledge through the senses. It also explains how sensitive knowledge can consist in perceiving an agreement between ideas: perceived agreements among simple...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
... since Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus, some have thought that if certain propositions about future actions were 31 TRENTON MERRICKS true, those actions would not be free.3 Suppose their idea was that any truth implying the occurrence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 244–247.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of his discussion. Entirely central to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 250–253.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 253–255.
Published: 01 April 2009
... method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment is focused...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 256–258.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 259–261.
Published: 01 April 2009
... method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment is focused...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 261–266.
Published: 01 April 2009
... method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment is focused...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 269–273.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to Spinoza’s method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 273–276.
Published: 01 April 2009
... method, in contrast, is the project of cog- nitive “emendation” described in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and taken up in chapter 3. Garrett rightly emphasizes that true ideas are, for Spinoza, innate in the human mind, so that the process of intellectual devel- opment is focused...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 123–126.
Published: 01 January 2017
... of its cause, (3) things that have nothing in common cannot be understood through one another, and (4) a true idea must agree with its object. The definitions are (1) something is self-caused just in case it pertains to its nature to exist, (2) something is a substance just in case it is in itself...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 642–645.
Published: 01 October 2000
... Descartes allows for only one kind of idea pre- senting corporeal content (intellectual ideas whose objects are the immu- table essences), Vinci argues that in Principles 1:71 Descartes suggests that there is a class of true ideas that are sensory presentations of corporeal objects. In 1:71...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 292–297.
Published: 01 April 2016
... to quantity as it is in the imagination . . . it will be found to be finite, divisible , and composed of parts” (my emphases). Since division is a function of the imagination and since, for Spinoza, the imagination is a domain of inadequate, confused, and not true ideas, 6 it seems that to see reality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
.... 19. Hume's claim that “the true idea” of a human mind represents it as a “system of different perceptions” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261) might seem to settle this issue: assuming that the relevant sense of ‘true’ is “agreement . . . to real existence and matter of fact” (T 3.1.1.9; SBN 458, italics...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... will say (following, roughly, Spinoza’s characterization of truth as the correspondence of ideas with their objects at 1a6) that I is true to the extent that it corresponds to O. To say, “The mind is conscious of the sun,” can mean (at least) three different things, any of which arises most naturally...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 386–390.
Published: 01 July 2022
...-level physical facts. But this seems mysterious, and suggests that contingentism is not true. So none of the candidate determinate answers is true, and that leads us back to the idea that there is no determinate answer: nonfactualism is true. I’ve ridden roughshod over many of the finer details...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 237–240.
Published: 01 April 2018
...-argued book, A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief , Allan Hazlett calls this idea into question. It might just be that “there is nothing more to the value of true belief than the fact that some people, contingently, care about, or love, or value, true belief” (274). This suggestion...