...Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij Hazlett Allan , A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2013 . xi + 302 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 We commonly think of true belief as something valuable. In his provocative and well...

..., at least not explicitly. Epistemic acceptability may be a broadened category from truth, but Elgin's coherentism provides no obvious basis for a distinction between true and untrue epistemically acceptable posits. It seems both categories of posit are simply subject to the requirement that they feature...

...Michael Glanzberg THE TAMING OF THE TRUE. By Neil Tennant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xvii, 465. Cornell University 2000 Dummett, Michael. 1991 . The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1993 . The Seas Of Language. Oxford...

... that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture...

...? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other than what you are determined to do would require one of two things: either a miracle , a violation of the actual laws of nature...

... the world would be like if one or another supposition were true). To capture this observation, this essay proposes that the semantic contents of conditionals be treated as sets of vectors of possible worlds, not singleton worlds, with the coordinates of each specifying the world that is or would be true...

...Sarah-Jane Leslie `Ducks lay eggs' is a true sentence, and `ducks are female' is a false one. Similarly, `mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus' is obviously true, whereas `mosquitoes don't carry the West Nile virus' is patently false. This is so despite the egg-laying ducks' being a subset...

...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...

... that that C caused (didn’t cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M . The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or noninertial behavior to its effect. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 causal models...

... reasonably be confident in a counterfactual whose consequent can be true only if a certain very finely tuned microphysical configuration obtains. This essay develops the foregoing puzzle and explores several possible solutions. Understand ‘semantics’ broadly, so that propositions about the speech acts...

... to solving both problems is Locke's claim that simple ideas are all real, adequate, and true. This explains why, on Locke's view, we have certain knowledge through the senses. It also explains how sensitive knowledge can consist in perceiving an agreement between ideas: perceived agreements among simple...

... is a more satisfactory explanation of why, if PSR is true, there should be no conjunction of all contingent truths. This sheds new light on the nature of the explanatory demand embedded in PSR and uncovers a number of surprising implications for the commitments of rationalism. © 2016 by Cornell University...

...Cian Dorr This essay considers how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that determinism is true. It argues against Lewis's influential view that if anything had happened that did not actually happen, the actual laws of nature would have been false, and defends the competing view...

...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...

... as incompatibilists believe that we can or should forgo moral blame if determinism is true, their stance may seem out of touch with our emotional reality. This essay examines Strawson's claim that the reactive attitudes are inseparable from ordinary interpersonal relationships. Strawson says surprisingly little...

...Trenton Merricks The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” ( Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine...

...), then it is natural to conclude that they really are the entities we talk about when we speak of worlds, so that haecceitism is true after all. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 For helpful comments and discussion, I am indebted to David Baker, Ross Cameron, David Chalmers, Shamik Dasgupta, John Divers...

... of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too...

... in the literature: conciliationism is true when we look at well-grounded belief, but a nonconciliatory view like Thomas Kelly's “total evidence view” is correct when we look at peer disagreement exclusively in terms of evidential support. © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 The peer disagreement debate...

...; they are predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description : a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence...