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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 290–293.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Michael Glanzberg THE TAMING OF THE TRUE. By Neil Tennant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xvii, 465. Cornell University 2000 Dummett, Michael. 1991 . The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1993 . The Seas Of Language. Oxford...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 237–240.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij Hazlett Allan , A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2013 . xi + 302 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 We commonly think of true belief as something valuable. In his provocative and well...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 363–366.
Published: 01 July 2019
... that results from the execution of responsible epistemic agency. Elgin Catherine Z. , True Enough . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2017 . ix + 309 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 The project Catherine Elgin embarks on in her latest book, True Enough , is expansive and ambitious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... the world would be like if one or another supposition were true). To capture this observation, this essay proposes that the semantic contents of conditionals be treated as sets of vectors of possible worlds, not singleton worlds, with the coordinates of each specifying the world that is or would be true...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Sarah-Jane Leslie `Ducks lay eggs' is a true sentence, and `ducks are female' is a false one. Similarly, `mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus' is obviously true, whereas `mosquitoes don't carry the West Nile virus' is patently false. This is so despite the egg-laying ducks' being a subset...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other than what you are determined to do would require one of two things: either a miracle , a violation of the actual laws of nature...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
...), then it is natural to conclude that they really are the entities we talk about when we speak of worlds, so that haecceitism is true after all. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals Boris Kment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... in the literature: conciliationism is true when we look at well-grounded belief, but a nonconciliatory view like Thomas Kelly's “total evidence view” is correct when we look at peer disagreement exclusively in terms of evidential support. The general lesson is that it is hard to acknowledge the force of Kelly's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
...; they are predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description : a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
...David James Barnett A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Seth Yalcin As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... even in the context of a thoroughly idealist metaphysics in which the only true substances are nonextended, mindlike “monads.” The essay concludes by drawing some connections between Leibniz's thinking about the puzzle of incompossibility and the development of his views concerning the status...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... reasonably be confident in a counterfactual whose consequent can be true only if a certain very finely tuned microphysical configuration obtains. This essay develops the foregoing puzzle and explores several possible solutions. There is much that cries out for clarification and justification...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... to solving both problems is Locke's claim that simple ideas are all real, adequate, and true. This explains why, on Locke's view, we have certain knowledge through the senses. It also explains how sensitive knowledge can consist in perceiving an agreement between ideas: perceived agreements among simple...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 397–430.
Published: 01 July 2016
... is a more satisfactory explanation of why, if PSR is true, there should be no conjunction of all contingent truths. This sheds new light on the nature of the explanatory demand embedded in PSR and uncovers a number of surprising implications for the commitments of rationalism. © 2016 by Cornell University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
...Cian Dorr This essay considers how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that determinism is true. It argues against Lewis's influential view that if anything had happened that did not actually happen, the actual laws of nature would have been false, and defends the competing view...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...