Search Results for time
1-20 of 759 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 250–254.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Huw Price Callender Craig , What Makes Time Special? Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xvii + 336 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Craig Callender's What Makes Time Special? is a special book in at least four dimensions. It is the most original work on the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 417–420.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Mary Salvaggio Michaelian Kourken , Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2016 . xx + 291 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Mental Time Travel defends the extraordinary claim that episodic memory is...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 91–94.
Published: 01 January 2001
...John Heil THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS: SUBSTANCE, IDENTITY, AND TIME. By E. J. Lowe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. x, 275. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVLEWS concerns the metaphysics of Lewis, Plantinga, Forbes, and Rosen...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 148–152.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Steven Weinstein GÖDEL MEETS EINSTEIN: TIME TRAVEL IN THE GÖDEL UNIVERSE. By Palle Yourgrau. Chicago: Open Court, 1999. Pp. xiv, 253. Cornell University 2002 Bell, John. 1976 . “How to Teach Special Relativity.” Reprinted in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 278–281.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Quentin Smith Peter Ludlow, Semantics, Tense, and Time. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xxi, 252. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS inalienability is a normative notion, it is hard to see why a person’s not being able to give up a right should imply...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 110–113.
Published: 01 January 2003
...Kathrin Koslicki Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. xi, 250. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS ical speculations in an attempt to “get closer to some real (even if inarticulate...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of two apparent truths about watching an object throughout a period of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... Beauty awakens her degree of belief in heads should be one-third. This demonstrates that it can be rational for an agent who gains only self-locating beliefs between two times to alter her degree of belief in a non-self-locating claim. © 2008 by Cornell University 2008 Arntzenius, F. 2003...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Dilip Ninan When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are “further facts,” over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Thomas Sattig It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
... “governing” view of laws of nature, a view of laws as more than mere regularities that turn out to be exceptionless over all time. Incompatibilism follows. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 I am grateful to John Perry and John Martin Fischer for much valuable discussion and encouragement. I also...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
... elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. However complex the truth conditions of generics appear to be, though, young children grasp...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Peter B. M. Vranas The claim that (OIC) “ought” implies “can” (i.e., you have an obligation only at times at which you can obey it) entails that (1) obligations that become infeasible are lost (i.e., you stop having an obligation when you become unable to obey it). Moreover, the claim that (2...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... when the judgment is in fact mistaken). In these instances, your friendship can make it the case that you may not act on your own practical and even moral judgments because, at those times, you have a duty as their close friend to defer to their judgments. As a result, treating your friend properly as...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
... conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 297.
Published: 01 April 2015
..., the last five lines of the quoted text should read: …space and time first become possible. For since through it [that is, through synthesis] (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... a static manifold. And, it describes passage without substantially modifying Minkowski geometry. Some philosophers attempt to reconcile the Passage Intuition with Special Relativity by overwriting it: they argue that while Minkowski geometry does not specify a unique foliation of space-time into...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 411–416.
Published: 01 July 2004
... time at which I did B (a violation of the actual world’s laws of nature just sufficient to lead to my doing B instead of A). In my original article, I motivated premise (1) with some intuitive examples, whose force Beebee acknowledges. Surprisingly, then, Beebee pro- poses to defend compatibilism...