...David O. Brink Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 302 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 302 pp. Allan...

...Seth Shabo van Inwagen Peter , Thinking about Free Will . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2017 . viii + 232 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 Thinking about Free Will contains a selection of Peter van Inwagen's writings on free will and moral responsibility...

... lives and experiences of animals will bring home to us our interdependence. Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris opens with a short but extremely helpful overview—in some ways, the most satisfying part of the book. As Wei notes, “There has been a tendency amongst both literary...

...Dominic J. O'Meara Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Nondiscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xxii, 266. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS In addition to covering the topics...

...Ann E. Cudd Margaret A. Crouch, Thinking about Sexual Harassment: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 315. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 1 (January 2003...

... acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making...

...) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like `think', are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names...

.... There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively...

... in natural languages and in standard artificial languages. For those of us who think sentences with different logical forms express different propositions, it would mean that no proposition expressed in a typical formal language is expressible in any natural language. The article begins by clarifying...

.... Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? This essay argues that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions...

... Widerker. It shows that neither is sufficient to reject the Direct Argument. The article then proceeds to challenge the argument in a novel fashion. Van Inwagen has not given us good reason to think that the principle in question has an adequate anchor in our inferential practices, especially in light...

..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed to quareers instead...

...Delia Graff Fara One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names...

... not be denied by someone of whom one has no more reason to suspect of error than oneself. For Sidgwick, then, the egoist must not deny the axioms. But it would seem that an egoist would reject benevolence . Second, Sidgwick thinks he must show that the commonsense moralist agrees to the axioms. Benevolence...

...J. Robert G. Williams The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical...

...Cian Dorr; John Hawthorne Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition...

... that being possibly thus-and-so (in the epistemic sense of ‘possibly’) is not a trait that an object has in and of itself, but one that an object possesses only relative to a way of thinking of the domain of quantification. I consider two theories that implement this insight: a static version of counterpart...

... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...

...Daniela Dover It is widely believed that we ought not to criticize others for wrongs that we ourselves have committed. The author draws out and challenges some of the background assumptions about the practice of criticism that underlie our attraction to this claim, such as the tendency to think...

... even in the context of a thoroughly idealist metaphysics in which the only true substances are nonextended, mindlike “monads.” The essay concludes by drawing some connections between Leibniz's thinking about the puzzle of incompossibility and the development of his views concerning the status...