Skip Nav Destination
Search Results for think
1-20 of 955 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 267–272.
Published: 01 April 2007
...David O. Brink Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 302 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 302 pp. Allan...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 305–308.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Dominic J. O'Meara Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Nondiscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xxii, 266. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS In addition to covering the topics...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 121–123.
Published: 01 January 2003
...Ann E. Cudd Margaret A. Crouch, Thinking about Sexual Harassment: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 315. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 1 (January 2003...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 554–557.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Seth Shabo van Inwagen Peter , Thinking about Free Will . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2017 . viii + 232 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 Thinking about Free Will contains a selection of Peter van Inwagen's writings on free will and moral responsibility...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
...) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like `think', are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... in natural languages and in standard artificial languages. For those of us who think sentences with different logical forms express different propositions, it would mean that no proposition expressed in a typical formal language is expressible in any natural language. The article begins by clarifying...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
.... There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 129–168.
Published: 01 April 2022
.... Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? This essay argues that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... Widerker. It shows that neither is sufficient to reject the Direct Argument. The article then proceeds to challenge the argument in a novel fashion. Van Inwagen has not given us good reason to think that the principle in question has an adequate anchor in our inferential practices, especially in light...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... even in the context of a thoroughly idealist metaphysics in which the only true substances are nonextended, mindlike “monads.” The essay concludes by drawing some connections between Leibniz's thinking about the puzzle of incompossibility and the development of his views concerning the status...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
.... It is surprisingly difficult, or at least surprisingly complicated, however, to articulate even a possible psychology that would explain the thesis of possible goodness. Interpretations of Rousseau, even several to which the author of this essay is highly indebted, have not fully engaged, I think...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues that this conflict does arise and that it creates problems...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental facts are qualitative are arguably...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
... that one should think of attitude formation like one does (practical) choices among options. The article motivates this view linguistically, extending “relevant alternatives” theories of the attitudes to both belief and to the other, non-doxastic attitudes. Given a natural principle governing choice...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 533–581.
Published: 01 October 2021
.... In this paper, I argue that they also shed light on the theory of truth. In particular, I argue that the notion of ground can be deployed to clearly articulate one strand of deflationary thinking about truth, according to which truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” I offer a ground-theoretic explication...
FIGURES | View All (5)
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
...J. Robert G. Williams The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Cian Dorr; John Hawthorne Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... that being possibly thus-and-so (in the epistemic sense of ‘possibly’) is not a trait that an object has in and of itself, but one that an object possesses only relative to a way of thinking of the domain of quantification. I consider two theories that implement this insight: a static version of counterpart...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...