...Hongwoo Kwon There are close parallels between Frank Jackson's case of black-and-white Mary and David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods. This essay develops and defends what may be called “the ability hypothesis” about the knowledge that the gods lack, by adapting Lewis's ability hypothesis...

... in the intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths...

... of two-letter words.) The decision matrix is now as follows, with e1, e2, e3, and e4 amounts of earthly value: God exists God does not exist Wager for God (e1, 1) (e2, 0) Wager against God (e3, 0) (e4, 0...

... nontheists like myself who have a general interest in the nature of value and obligation. In part 1, “The Nature of the Good,” Adams develops his theistic conception of a transcendent Good. The argument has two parts. First, he explains the sense in which God and the Good are identical. Distinguishing...

... relying on prior substantial assumptions about God. (Adequacy): It should not be the case that there are any G-properties which are not plausible candidates to be among the divine attributes. Speaks identifies two strategies for the impure perfect being theologian. The first begins with something like...

..., it is strongly encouraged by two once widely held doc- trines that Leibniz also accepts: on the one hand, that God is wholly good and omnipotent, and, on the other hand, that reality or being is in some sense identical—or “convertible”—with the good.3 For if being itself is good, then it seems...

... of how God’s causal power relates to the natural causal activity of creatures, Leibniz held that both God and the creature are directly involved in the occurrence of these effects. A divine concurrentist, in general, intends to satisfy two theses that were held by the vast majority of theologians...

... serve as a coercive threat. The second line of argument, which comes in four versions, aims to establish that, despite his omnipotence, God is not able to make his existence known to us due to essential limitations in us. The first two versions turn on the fact that, according to Kant's theory, our...

.... Among them is to dissolve the Cartesian Circle—itself raising the most intractable interpretative problems surrounding the Meditations. On the canonical formulation of the circle, Descartes’s argument unfolds as a circle defined by two arcs: Arc 1: The conclusion that a non-deceiving God...

... of Spinoza’s attack on divine providence is directed at the idea that God creates the world for the benefi t of human beings so that they will worship him. He argues that this can’t be the goal of God’s creation of the world for two reasons: (1) that this would make certain fi nite mediate modes...

... not thought that Descartes’s masterwork depends heavily on these two or any other Augustinian texts. The question of Augustinian influence on Descartes’s Cogito is small potatoes compared to the thesis that Stephen Menn wishes to establish. Menn’s central task is to argue that Descartes’s search...

... by God, in which case the prime matter itself begins or ceases to exist as well. If substantial forms are rejected, a common scholastic charge goes, two theses necessarily follow: first, natural generation and corruption are impossible, and substances can begin and cease to exist only by being created...

... counterbalancing or outweighing them with goods, and defeating evils, which involves incorporating them into good organic unities. Two assumptions about divine goodness she makes are these: “At a minimum, God’s goodness to human individuals would require that God guarantee each a life...

... involved retain libertarian freedom. In chapter 10, Flint offers what he sees as two plausible explanations for unanswered prayer. Our prayers at times may be dependent on the free actions of others, actions that are not in fact forthcoming. At other times, it may be that God’s middle knowledge...

... on condition that the gods love it, and suppose the gods do love it: truth telling is objectively good. Suppose lying is good on condition that the gods love it, and suppose the 25. Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions,” 258. 173 RAE LANGTON...

... and beliefs, and giving non-Christians a lesser set of civil and political rights generally). Suppose too that like Pascal I consider only two possible states of nature (or “supernature,” in this case): the state in which there exists an exclusivist Christian god who saves only orthodox Christians...

... ago that Jones will sit at t is soft. But if God is necessarily existent and essentially omniscient, then the two facts would be logically equivalent. But how then could it even be possible that one fact be hard and the other soft? (We thank an anonymous referee for the Philosophical Review...

... in terms of that thing’s individual, active nature (14–15; 22). All other explanations are miraculous and hence nonnatural, which is Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism. According to Jorgensen, Leibniz also holds that two metaphysical principles, which are grounded in God’s creative activity...

... [see 41–42]. Thus there is no backward causation implied by the claim that that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago because Jones will sit at t. These two steps deliver a sense of ‘because’ in which God believed, a thousand years ago, that Jones sits at t...

...Peter Forrest Moser Paul K. , The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined . New York : Cambridge University Press , 2010 . x + 280 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Huw Price, Naturalism Without Mirrors. New York...