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The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... an object is doing and activities like looking or visually scrutinizing which have as their aims knowledge of the states or conditions of the objects of perceptual awareness. Cornell University 2009 Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual Activity...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Michael E. Bratman Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency Michael E. Bratman 1. Core Features of Human Agency We...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
... as rival virtues. Pru- dence, as traditionally conceived, is temporally neutral. It attaches no intrinsic significance to the temporal location of benefits or harms within the agent’s life; the prudent agent should be equally concerned about all parts of her life. But people’s values and ideals often...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
...: (A) the claim that causation not only yields knowledge of the temporal relations of simultaneity and succession but also has a role in metaphysically constituting them; (B) the contention that causal powers and their activity are metaphysically indeterminate; (C) the proposal that Kant’s theory of causation...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 136–139.
Published: 01 January 2004
... is an important discussion of what Leibniz meant by the “law- of-the-series” (as the authors write it) for a particular substance. Leibniz clearly meant that the law-of-the-series determines how a substance is unfolded into temporal states. But what is the ontological status of the law-of-the-series itself...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2017
... problematic: Kant's doctrine entails that we cannot cognize things as they are in themselves but only “appearances” (Kantian humility). But it also claims to establish that there are things in themselves and that they are not spatial or temporal—indeed, those items of knowledge are supposed to be part...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... is extremely modally plastic. 3 In thinking about whether we could embrace such plasticity, it can be helpful to consider an analogous claim about the way in which the truth about the relevant semantic subject matter varies over time. As regards the meaning of ‘salad’, proponents of temporal plasticity...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 527–531.
Published: 01 October 2019
... and promising suggestions, and the boldness of some of these. The book surveys various types of temporal experiences more generally, some of which go beyond the dispute between A- and B-theorists—the selective summary to follow won't do justice to the richness of Prosser's discussion. Chapter 1 begins...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 420–422.
Published: 01 July 2004
... of intelligibility, according to Being and Time, is the temporal structure of human existence. Keller provides a philosophically sophisticated reconstruction of the dialec- tic that leads from Husserl’s early reflections on Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle, to Husserl’s late attempt at explaining...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 278–281.
Published: 01 April 2002
... to this debate and in part because it addresses and endeavors to solve the metaphysi- cal problems of temporal solipsism (which Ludlow and some others call “pre- sentism”) that other temporal solipsists have not addressed . Following Chomsky (see Chomsky’s The Minimalist Program (1995) and Knowledge...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... in such a mental state at a time is a temporally intrinsic, hard feature of that time. That is, it is not relevantly similar to Kennedy’s having been shot forty-six years prior to our writing this essay. Rather, God’s having a certain belief at a time is relevantly similar simply...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 281–286.
Published: 01 April 2000
... research in tense logic is perhaps his deepest and most original work. Copeland provides a valuable service in his introduction by tracing the early history of this research. The book also benefits greatly from two short, previously unpublished pieces by Prior in which he elaborates his temporal...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... supplanted with General Relativity and increasingly complex attempts to provide a unified physical theory of gravity, space-time, statistical mechanics, and quantum mechanics. A major debate in the philosophy of physics concerns which temporal structure could underwrite the final theory. But even if Special...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 495–499.
Published: 01 July 2020
... principle. Sullivan makes a strong case for temporality neutrality across the board. But I think those philosophers sympathetic to some of these time biases will be unmoved, for they will have principled objections to some of the key arguments. I'll give two examples. The remainder of the book...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 250–254.
Published: 01 April 2019
..., in contemporary terminology. In his own terminology, he locates modality in the manifest image, not the scientific image. Seen this way, the problem of explaining the modal aspects of the manifest image is bound to be closely related to that of explaining the temporal aspects. Arguably, it is a central part...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... for the temporal cases is expected to be extendable to the modal cases, the modal cases are expected to require a different technical background (see nn. 23 and 34). The most prominent of the modal cases of coincidence is Allan Gibbard’s case of Lumpl and Goliath in Gibbard 1975...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 110–113.
Published: 01 January 2003
..., 2001. Pp. xi, 250. How do the familiar concrete objects of common sense persist through time? The four-dimensionalist argues that they perdure, that is, they persist through time by having temporal parts at each of the times at which they exist. The three- dimensionalist, on the other hand...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... it). But that it was correct, so the thought goes, is no threat to the claim that you could have refrained from sitting at t . Of course, the correctness of Smith's belief was temporally prior to your sitting at t ; Smith's belief was correct before—we could even suppose long before—you ever sit at t . But we shouldn't...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... some time after t. In contrast, a soft fact is temporally relational as regards the future (relative to the time it is about); that is, a soft fact about some time t is at least in part genuinely about some time after t. For instance, it is a hard fact about 1963 that John F. Kennedy...