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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Stephen Darwall Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 153–181.
Published: 01 April 2009
... connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable indicate that there must be some such necessary connections. Thus, in the absence of alternative support, there is no reason to believe the Humean claim. Cornell University 2009 Barnett, David. 2005 . “The Problem of Material...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Rachael Briggs Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... diachronic Dutch book arguments give greater support to CA than to the GTP. In the final section, the essay considers the possible responses to the conflict between CA and the GTP and argues that the most plausible response is to acknowledge the possibility of rational dilemmas. © 2010 by Cornell University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 315–336.
Published: 01 July 2010
... provide further support for the author's view that the Frankfurt cases help to establish that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 I have benefited from giving a previous version of this essay as the first in a series of lectures delivered at...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
... characterize verbal disputes, spell out a method for isolating and resolving them, and draw out conclusions for philosophical methodology. I then use the framework to draw out consequences in first-order philosophy. In particular, I argue that the analysis of verbal disputes can be used to support the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... support this intriguing claim, and thus far no argument for it has emerged in the literature. This essay's aim is to remedy this. Specifically, it sets out an argument for a suitably formulated version of the inseparability claim, an argument that appeals to the relationship between the reactive attitudes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
...David Shoemaker This essay attempts to provide and defend what may be the first actual argument in support of P. F. Strawson's merely stated vision of a response-dependent theory of moral responsibility. It does so by way of an extended analogy with the funny. In part 1, it makes the easier and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
... is sure to have a big impact on the philosophy of perception, as epistemic questions return to focus. Perception is not an unjustified justifier, according to Siegel. Instead, its epistemic status can vary. Accordingly, the power of conscious perception to support judgments, beliefs, and outlooks can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 295–300.
Published: 01 April 2017
... collective obligation—as the group of food purchasers—not to support factory farming. Plainly, most members of the group ignore the collective obligation, purchasing factory-farmed meat anyway. What should the rest of us do? He suggests that we should dissociate ourselves from the group's failure to respect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 413–418.
Published: 01 July 2018
... what justification they need for these case-judgments. Intuitions are surplus to justificatory requirements. Like Cappelen, Deutsch treats the question, do philosophers adduce intuitions as evidence? as empirical and seeks to support a negative answer by examining first-order philosophical texts (78...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2003
... individuals to develop according to their own unique tendencies. It would also provide persons with the stimulation of exposure to new ideas. At the same time, Oberdiek stresses the value of community as con- text for individual choice. He supports group rights that would help to sustain minority...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... Snapper, and the anonymous referees for the Philosophical Review. The Purdue Research Foundation and the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame provided the financial support that made writing this essay possible. I thank each of these individuals and institutions. Bergmann...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 284–288.
Published: 01 April 2004
... compassion is an eth- ically important “test case” (29), does not make the problem go away. (2) The second premise, which Doris takes to be a “highly plausible specu- lation” (38), is not clearly supported by the experimental results (which do not always concern situations “typically experienced” by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 584–587.
Published: 01 October 2004
... supporting, for the deprivation of the poor. The duty to alleviate world pov- erty is a duty of justice that the rich have because they are unjustly harming the poor. Thus one of Pogge’s primary goals is to show the different and complex ways in which members of well-off countries are harming the global...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... possible world and a variable assignment. A state of information s is said to support a formula φ just in case updating s with φ simply returns s : in symbols, s [ φ ] = s . Where φ contains no modal operators, a state of information will support φ just in case φ is true at...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 435–439.
Published: 01 July 2016
... conclusions is not part of the activity of reasoning, but goes beyond it” (38). To see the problem with this proposal, recall that reasons are always reasons for something: a reason is a consideration that supports or weighs in favor of some action or attitude. If you say that the fact that donuts are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 140–144.
Published: 01 January 2018
... about how Sattig conceives of them. These obscure what Sattig's theory is about. That in turn obscures the psychological support for the theory. It also obscures the relevance of its resolutions to the puzzles. Sattig says that our concept of ordinary object requires that ordinary objects be sortable...