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Search Results for subjective value
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The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
..., this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
..., with the complications. This essay tries to reconstruct psychological principles that would explain the thesis and that are at least consistent with what Rousseau otherwise says on the subject. Much of the value of this exercise, however, lies not in the particulars of the resulting psychology but rather in the depth...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... the normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 281–283.
Published: 01 April 2001
... a strong impression in the reader s mind. Kupperman s substantive views about value are pluralistic. He holds that (with qualifications) pain and suffering are bad and bliss good; many call these subjective values. But he also affirms objective or perfectionist values such as theoretical contemplation...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
...” and “visual-values” (hereafter, “g-values” and “v-values”), respectively. ART (extended): The valenced aspects of “positive” perceptual experiences are constituted by subjectively satisfied positive conative attitudes toward the conditions that are (perceptually) represented by those experiences...
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 399–410.
Published: 01 July 2005
... charitably ascribed to the subjects in question). What one wants here is a normative account, of what we can and cannot reasonably value, which is based however on an a posteriori understanding of what we and our preference-forming mechanisms are in fact like. In other words, we want some- thing more...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
...David O. Brink Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (April 2003) Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value David O. Brink Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... fixes the values of these parameters—whether features of the context, of the subject of know-how, or other elements. Similarly, I avoid commitments about whether and how know-how ascriptions end up being context dependent in the relevant ways. These are important questions, but I don't have the space...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 438–441.
Published: 01 July 2004
... exchange, Howie’s book is now the definitive treat- ment of the subject. Though billed as a piece of history of science, it brims with philosophical insights. In terms of its effect on the practice of statistics, the Fisher/Jeffreys debate was a rout: even though statisticians freely used Bayesian...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Jenefer Robinson PHILOSOPHIES OF ARTS: AN ESSAY IN DIFFERENCES. By Peter Kivy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xi, 242. Cornell University 2000 Budd, Malcolm. 1995 . Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music. London: Penguin. BOOK...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018
... not interfere too much with the subject matter under discussion, since that interference limits the area of logical space on which the resultant message has a truth value. Well, in this subsection we can throw caution to the wind, because mn has no bearing on the whole vast subject matter that is C : our...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
... as closeness to truth, a sub- ject’s reliability is a function of the distance of a subject’s judgment from the truth-value of the proposition judged. So in terms of P, the diagram shows that A is distance a from the truth, B is distance b from the truth, and since a , b, A is closer than B to the truth...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 157–185.
Published: 01 April 2007
... problems about objec- tivity, says Korsgaard; and the problems are different, depending on how we collapse the distinctions together. If we suppose that to have intrinsic value is no more than to be valued as an end, we make goodness sub- jective—too subjective, she thinks, since whatever we happen...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 473–480.
Published: 01 July 2020
... : Cornell University Press . Chisholm, Roderick . 1986 . Brentano and Intrinsic Value . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Crane, Tim . 2006 . “ Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence .” In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy , edited by Textor Mark , 20 – 35...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... 2006 and Yalcin 2007. On this naı¨ve semantics, assertions of sentences embed- ding language of subjective uncertainty express advice concerning credal states. In particular, the semantic value of a sentence is a constraint on your credence distribution, and an assertion of the sentence expresses...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94.
Published: 01 January 2002
... the same evidence, then within any fixed speaker context ‘S is justified’ and ‘SN is justified’ have the same truth value, although across speaker contexts, these sentences can have dif- ferent truth values. So, a contextualist might claim that, despite the fact that the subjects in the Train Cases...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., on the other hand, determines the relation between the semantic values (truth- conditions) of compound sentences and those of their constituents. b) Pragmatics The degree to which a rational agent will believe a sentence is given by his or her subjective probability for the sentence’s being true. More...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... Chartreuse, to hear a chainsaw, to smell a skunk, to see the clear, blue sky. Each of these states has a distinctive subjective character or raw “feel” to it. These raw “feels”—qualia, as they are often called—resemble and differ from one another to varying degrees. The subjective “feel...