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The Philosophical Review (1 July 2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
... Senses.” Mind 113 : 57 -94. Tulunay-Keesey, U. 1982 . “Fading of Stabilized Retinal Images.” Journal of Optical Society of America 72 : 440 -47. Van Gulick, R., and E. Lepore, eds. 1991 . John Searle and His Critics . Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Subject and Object in the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 134–138.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Robert J. Howell Strawson Galen , The Subject of Experience . New York: Oxford University Press , 2017 . 336 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 It seems strangely appropriate that the binding of my copy of Galen Strawson's The Subject of Experience was flipped in...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2006
...Sven Bernecker Dieter Freundlieb, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy: The Return to Subjectivity . Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2003. ix + 195 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 529–532.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Michael Jacovides Jolley Nicholas , Locke's Touchy Subjects: Materialism and Immortality . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . 142 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 The two touchy subjects treated in this slim volume are the immateriality of thinking substances and...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... Sili-Brain will be experiencing. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 Hare Caspar , On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects . Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2009 . xviii +113 pp. (iv) The unauthorized argument for egocentric presentism . There is one other notable...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 454–456.
Published: 01 July 2001
...David Carr THE PARADOX OF SUBJECTIVITY: THE SELF IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL TRADITION. By David Carr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 150. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVLEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 3 (July 2001...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 416–419.
Published: 01 July 2003
...Thomas D. Senor E. J. Lowe, Subjects of Experience. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. x, 209. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS this certainly reflects my own “historicism” as an erstwhile Marxist, the region’s problems at this stage...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
...Anat Schechtman Descartes notoriously characterizes substance in two ways: first, as an ultimate subject of properties (that is, a subject in which properties inhere without itself inhering in anything); second, as an independent entity. The characterizations have appeared to many to diverge on the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... character to representational content. Unlike other reductionist theories, however, it does not require the acceptance of phenomenal externalism (the view that phenomenal character does not supervene on the internal state of the subject). According to the view offered here, phenomenal characters essentially...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. This essay shows that linguistic accounts of the paradoxes endorsing classical logic are subject to a particularly acute form of the revenge paradox...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
... complications. This essay tries to reconstruct psychological principles that would explain the thesis and that are at least consistent with what Rousseau otherwise says on the subject. Much of the value of this exercise, however, lies not in the particulars of the resulting psychology but rather in the depth of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... cannot empirically represent a physical subject matter as having specific physical characteristics unless the individual can represent some constitutive conditions under which such representation is possible. The version of this view that dominated the century's second half maintained that objective...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
... diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, language, and meaning. In this article I first...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... and subjective faces of the same practical coin. This has much the same metaphysical benefits as Lewis’s own view of chance and also throws interesting new light on Newcomb problems, providing an irenic resolution of the apparent disagreement between causal and evidential decision rules. © 2012 by...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Sarah Moss This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
..., reveals substantive constraints on the material world. In this article, I argue that any attempt to develop a coherent version of plenitude is subject to two under-appreciated challenges, and I develop a version of plenitude ( global plenitude ) capable of overcoming both. © 2019 by Cornell University...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... lottery, as opposed to simply picking one of the parties on more subjective grounds or out of pure whim. In addition to the practical consequences of this skeptical view, the article sketches some theoretical implications for debates about saving the greater number and about axiomatic utilitarianism...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the...