Skip Nav Destination
Close Modal
1-20 of 469 Search Results for
structure of experience
Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account
Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
1
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
..., and deploy a new theoretical tool in the empirical investigation of consciousness. A noteworthy consequence of this new framework is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects...
FIGURES
| View All (7)
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 423–462.
Published: 01 October 2019
... of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 420–422.
Published: 01 July 2004
... the structure of intentionality
in terms of the temporal structure of human experience, to Heidegger’s own
early commentary on Aristotle (also prompted by a study of Brentano’s inter-
pretation), which ultimately issues in Being and Time’s argument for the claim
that what makes intentionality possible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 442–447.
Published: 01 July 2002
... depends on the spatio-temporal structure of
experience,” and his case substantially depends on an “account of arithmetical
truth making no appeal to intuition” (60), a derivation of arithmetic from def-
initions by logic. A crucial part of what makes this possible is that while Kant
had only general...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2003
...Logi Gunnarsson Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi, 286. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3 (July 2003...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 471–474.
Published: 01 July 2021
... is to present and defend a metaphysical picture of arbitrary objects. The second is to develop some applications of that metaphysical picture—mostly in the philosophy of mathematics, and mostly in connection to debates around structuralism. The third goal is to illuminate the connections and relations among...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 472–475.
Published: 01 July 2001
... to the resemblance intuition and
its comparative or relational nature. Construing the experience on which
picturing depends as one of resemblance imposes a comparative structure on the
experience that would require that the perceiver have experiences of both the
depiction and what it represents...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 608–614.
Published: 01 October 2000
... experience is one thing, sounds that by design provide for such
experience are quite another. In short, Scruton mislocates the primary
intentionality of music as music. It resides not in the receptive experience
of the listener, but in the creative projection of sound structures...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 365–369.
Published: 01 July 2022
... by self-affection. The objects of inner and outer experience are thus jointly generated. However, as will emerge especially in part 3, those objects are not structured in the same way, not only with respect to the forms of sensibility in which they appear (time for inner sense, space and time for outer...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 632–634.
Published: 01 October 2001
... within it. The central claim of the book is that “place
is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience” (32), where experience
is understood in a broad sense that is not restricted to perception but also
includes thought and action. More generally, “place is … that within which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 132–135.
Published: 01 January 2002
... of emotional experience, bodily feeling, perceptions, thoughts, etc., all
structured into a broader narrative, articulated from a personal point of view,
in terms of which the subject’s responses can be explained. It is this central
claim that he fleshes out in detail throughout.
In doing so, Goldie...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
.... On this usage,
P implies Q when the material conditional P 3 Q is a priori; that is,
when it is possible to know that P entails Q with justification
independent of experience. On this usage, entailment is a nonmodal
notion, while implication involves an epistemic modality. We will
assume...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 635–638.
Published: 01 October 2001
... sets out the structure of his essay
as follows.
The central focus throughout part 1 is the following thesis:
(R) Perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs.
And the argument for (R) rests on two premises:
(1) The most basic beliefs about the spatial world have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 430–437.
Published: 01 July 2015
... and that ( PQI ⇒ A ) is not a priori, 5 then, Chalmers notes (154), a simple argument from T will yield ( PQTI ⇒ ¬A ). Chalmers's cosmoscope thought experiment makes a plausible case for the claim that any truth M that anyone has ever been in a position to know is conditionally scrutable from PQTI...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 609–614.
Published: 01 October 2021
... the experience’s epistemic power changes in such a state of convergence; the change in its epistemic capacities stems from a change in the structure of the view. Thanks to Raja Rosenhagen for pointing out this possibility. References Davidson, Donald. 1986. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Justification...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 341–348.
Published: 01 July 2019
...” (170). But in chapter 8, O'Callaghan considers the objection that the first two candidates do not suffice for richly multimodal perceptual experience: “Someone might maintain that multimodal perceptual experiences can instantiate only phenomenal features of types that unimodal perceptual experiences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
...
language, and an interesting consideration of the theme “All is in flux.”
The transitional Wittgenstein postulated a primary language dealing
with immediate experience, and a secondary language-our ordinary
one-for speaking of things in space and time. The second language must
be cashed out...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 441–463.
Published: 01 July 2007
.... ‘There’s something it’s like’ and the
Structure of Consciousness
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto
For an experience to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be
something it’s like; our talk about phenomenal consciousness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... intimately experience, that structures our reasoning about cause and effect, that structures our rational planning, and that has profound consequences for our freedom? Objective Becoming works hard (and innovatively) to recover the letter of the Passage Intuition, but in the process misses the spirit...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 540–544.
Published: 01 October 2005
... can be of the world only if it is rationally constrained by expe-
rience. One of the main ideas of MW is that experience can rationally constrain
thought because conceptual capacities are at work in experience itself. Expe-
rience is not something that is itself nonconceptual...
1
