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Published: 01 October 2015
Figure 10 Strong Kleene rules Figure 10 . Strong Kleene rules More
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 108–110.
Published: 01 January 2001
...Louis C. Charland STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Jon Elster. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 252. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The PhilosophiculReviau, Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) STRONG FEELINGS...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... is this: if you have already been ( justly) punished by God for doing something, how then could you avoid doing that thing? As we'll see, there is a strong argument that seems to show that you couldn't. However, this essay argues that if divine prepunishment rules out human freedom, then so does divine...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... that is to be paid for this theory is a strong dependency of belief on the context, where a context involves both the agent's degree of belief function and the partitioning or individuation of the underlying possibilities. But as this essay argues, that price seems to be affordable. This essay develops a joint...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters. © 2010 by Cornell...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 51–91.
Published: 01 January 2007
... elusive, but should not be ignored. On refl ection, an important fact about parthood presents itself. Our job as philosophers is to understand it. We fail if we belittle it as being (merely) obscure. 3. Strong Composition as Identity One way of doing justice to the aphorisms of the previous...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 274–276.
Published: 01 April 2000
... infallible, exhaustive knowledge of the future. However, this means, Flint argues, that God did not know before creation exactly what 274 BOOK REVLEWS would occur, or exactly what will occur now, and this is incompatible with the strong...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 246–249.
Published: 01 April 2019
... on it in depth. Sobel states the objection as follows: “It is quite broadly intuitive that all agents have significant reason to avoid [certain] seriously nasty actions [such as harming a child out of anger], and, since subjectivism cannot vindicate this strong and widely shared intuition, this is a strong...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 124–126.
Published: 01 January 2003
...) concerns the nature and wrongness of racism. It begins with the observation that the charge of “rac- ism” has come to express an especially strong condemnation but that the charge is often used indiscriminately to cover all wrongs in the racial realm. To avoid this “conceptual inflation” and “moral...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2001
.... The crucial points are (a) that the arguments to be pre- sented for the ontological claim do not turn on considerations about the con- tent of mental states, (b) that environmentalism implies a strong form of externalism, and (c) that standard arguments for externalism, based on con- siderations about...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
...- ness. And let us call the capacity to take a stand as an agent-to determine where Istand with respect to a given first-order desire- the capacity for strong reflectiveness. A capacity for weak reflectiveness goes beyond what is strictly necessary for purposive agency. There can...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 281–283.
Published: 01 April 2001
... a strong impression in the reader s mind. Kupperman s substantive views about value are pluralistic. He holds that (with qualifications) pain and suffering are bad and bliss good; many call these subjective values. But he also affirms objective or perfectionist values such as theoretical contemplation...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 254–258.
Published: 01 April 2003
... not constant across all human languages, and hence that Romance languages (and, indeed, all human languages) were noncompositional. This is a very strong notion of com- positionality.5 Strong, but too strong? The crucial issue here is, I think, not what the answer to this question is, but how we...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 339–342.
Published: 01 July 2014
... or pleasant, rather than the reverse. Moss makes a strong case that for Aristotle, perceiving something as pleasant is a way of cognizing it as good and that such perception is always accompanied by pleasure and desire. Turning to evaluative phantasia (chap. 3), Moss argues against other scholars...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... as well.) How could Nour or Charles be justified , according to the (access) internalist, 13 given that neither has any awareness of the reliable grounds of his or her belief—and indeed, in Charles’s case, has strong internalistic reason to think he is not so reliably grounded? And how could...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
...: at the very least, isn’t it true that the more an agent thinks, the more rational they become? The contention of this paper is that even this weaker claim is too strong. There are situations in which more thought makes an agent less rational, situations in which the rational course is to think less...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 98–101.
Published: 01 January 2002
... about the theory of the Categories” (154). Wedin argues for what I call strong compatibilism. Wedin’s interpretations are extremely detailed and dense, and they contain many subtle points, which are worthy of admiration and thought. In this short review I can consider only two questions. First...