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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 108–110.
Published: 01 January 2001
...Louis C. Charland STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Jon Elster. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 252. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS
The PhilosophiculReviau, Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001)
STRONG FEELINGS...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... is this: if you have already been ( justly) punished by God for doing something, how then could you avoid doing that thing? As we'll see, there is a strong argument that seems to show that you couldn't. However, this essay argues that if divine prepunishment rules out human freedom, then so does divine...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... that is to be paid for this theory is a strong dependency of belief on the context, where a context involves both the agent's degree of belief function and the partitioning or individuation of the underlying possibilities. But as this essay argues, that price seems to be affordable. This essay develops a joint...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters. © 2010 by Cornell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 33–71.
Published: 01 January 2024
.... All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together, this seems accidental. It is not clear, then, how Marx’s concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity that he takes it to have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 51–91.
Published: 01 January 2007
... elusive, but should not be ignored. On
refl ection, an important fact about parthood presents itself. Our job as
philosophers is to understand it. We fail if we belittle it as being (merely)
obscure.
3. Strong Composition as Identity
One way of doing justice to the aphorisms of the previous...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 532–536.
Published: 01 October 2022
...Timothy O’Connor Chapter 8 then takes up the nature and existence of human free will. Wilson defends the interesting claim that there are strong parallels between the problem of mental causation and the traditional problem of free will. While I agree that there are instructive cross-lessons...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2023
... aside completely. At this point, Gaus’s argument comes to rest on his argument for the inevitability of an evolutionarily hardwired cooperative norm of “strong reciprocity” being internalized by social actors (37–43). He vacillates on whether the evolution in question is genetic (38) or cultural (65...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (4): 529–578.
Published: 01 October 2023
... from ⌜ p ⌝ is true to p preserves evidence. Properly taking this into account blocks the derivation of the liar paradox. The very same solution also blocks the strong liar paradox. Although the truth rules do not preserve evidence, they do preserve commitment. These rules can therefore...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 274–276.
Published: 01 April 2000
... infallible, exhaustive knowledge of the future. However, this
means, Flint argues, that God did not know before creation exactly what
274
BOOK REVLEWS
would occur, or exactly what will occur now, and this is incompatible with
the strong...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 246–249.
Published: 01 April 2019
... this argument cannot pull the weight Sobel assigns to it. To motivate subjectivism per se, Sobel must find flaw not only with strong objectivism, but also with weak objectivism. Yet the argument from reasons of taste has no force against weak objectivism. Since it is plausible that weak objectivism can avoid...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 235–240.
Published: 01 April 2022
... this prima facie tension with the following observation: “The virtuous motivation from which an act of virtue arises need not be either conscious or strong, so ordinary epistemic motives will often be sufficient. In fact, nothing in the definition prevents the motivational component from applying to motives...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2001
.... The crucial points are (a) that the arguments to be pre-
sented for the ontological claim do not turn on considerations about the con-
tent of mental states, (b) that environmentalism implies a strong form of
externalism, and (c) that standard arguments for externalism, based on con-
siderations about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 124–126.
Published: 01 January 2003
...) concerns the nature
and wrongness of racism. It begins with the observation that the charge of “rac-
ism” has come to express an especially strong condemnation but that the
charge is often used indiscriminately to cover all wrongs in the racial realm. To
avoid this “conceptual inflation” and “moral...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
...-
ness. And let us call the capacity to take a stand as an agent-to
determine where Istand with respect to a given first-order desire-
the capacity for strong reflectiveness.
A capacity for weak reflectiveness goes beyond what is strictly
necessary for purposive agency. There can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 281–283.
Published: 01 April 2001
... a strong impression in the reader s mind. Kupperman s substantive views about value are pluralistic. He holds that (with qualifications) pain and suffering are bad and bliss good; many call these subjective values. But he also affirms objective or perfectionist values such as theoretical contemplation...
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