1-20 of 756 Search Results for

state

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
×Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 233–236.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Laurie Shrage Chambers Clare , Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xi + 226 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Against Marriage appeals to liberal feminist principles to expose the injustices of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 271–273.
Published: 01 April 2000
...A. John Simmons AN ESSAY ON THE MODERN STATE. By Christopher W. Morris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. x, 305. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVlEWS The Philosophical him,Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2000) ANESSAY ON THE MODERN...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 603–606.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Kevin E. Dodson WELFARE IN THE KANTIAN STATE. By Alexander Kaufman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. Xii, 179. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS (Incidentally, it is unfortunate that Curley and Walski perpetuate the strange mistranslation of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... philosophers of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Moral Psychology Research Group; Ohio State University; the Ohio Philosophical Association; the Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics; State University of New York, Albany; University of California, Davis; and the Workshop on Moral Expertise...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 547–551.
Published: 01 October 2017
... related to one another, and what the ancestral state of previous populations was like). Sober starts out noting that there is an important sense in which (almost) no one expects evolution to be parsimonious—indeed, the evolution of particular traits often produced developmental pathways that seem quite...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
... other animals, Korsgaard argues, humans are conscious of their own mental states and, as a result, face the question of whether to endorse them as a basis for action or belief (1996c, 92–93). We have the capacity to step back from our desires and reflectively evaluate them. Moreover, the reflective...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 247–251.
Published: 01 April 2018
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 536–541.
Published: 01 October 2018
... Epistemology is a broad, impressive, and interesting collection of essays on the nature of implicit bias. It presents various views on the kind of cognitive states that underlie implicit bias; how to interpret the results of methodological tools that purport to measure implicit bias; the relation to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 116–121.
Published: 01 January 2019
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
... see this, let us start with the Appendix. After stating that distinct perceptions “form a whole only by being connected together,” Hume continues: “But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding” (T App 20; SBN 635). This recalls his earlier claim that we do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 295–300.
Published: 01 April 2017
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 393–398.
Published: 01 July 2017
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... object is doing and activities like looking or visually scrutinizing which have as their aims knowledge of the states or conditions of the objects of perceptual awareness. Cornell University 2009 Alexander, H. G. 1953 . “Paying Heed.” Mind 62 : 518 -20. Baldwin, Tom. 2003 . “Perception...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new “Qualified Reflection” principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is certain that he or she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... to quareers instead of to careers, would serve equally well. It is further argued that the circularity objection to psychological accounts can be answered without appeal to the notion of quasi-memory. Because of the internal relations between the causal profiles of mental states and the persistence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... of the relevant states. Cornell University 2009 Perceptual Objectivity Tyler Burge University of California, Los Angeles A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine conditions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... which knowledge characterizes a mind's conscious states. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 This essay is dedicated to the memory of Paul Hoffman. A version was presented at the New England Colloquium in Early Modern Philosophy. Thanks to Alison Simmons, Jeff McDonough, and the conference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we raise questions about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... character to representational content. Unlike other reductionist theories, however, it does not require the acceptance of phenomenal externalism (the view that phenomenal character does not supervene on the internal state of the subject). According to the view offered here, phenomenal characters essentially...