Search Results for standpoint epistemology

... belief is not even internalistically justified. I take up this line of objection in section 3.3. 26. The classic elaboration of Marxist standpoint theory is Lukács (1923) 1971 . 27. The locus classicus of feminist standpoint epistemology is Hartsock 1983 . See also Harding 1983, 2004...

.... I thank Andrew Chignell and Don Garrett for helpful feedback on earlier drafts. Ideas, Evidence, and Method is essential reading not just for Hume scholars, but for all philosophers interested in early modern epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy...

... the world as given and explores it factually. The transcendental standpoint reflects on the subjective conditions that make it possible for the world to be an object for us. From the transcendental standpoint, we do not make, retract, or even epistemologically evaluate any ontic commitments we...

... with Husserl’s “natural attitude,” takes the world as given and explores it factually. The transcendental standpoint reflects on the subjective conditions that make it possible for the world to be an object for us. From the transcendental standpoint, we do not make, retract, or even epistemologically...

..., freedom, the highest good, epistemology and the supersensible, and epistemology and religion. There is not enough space in this review to discuss the papers in detail. Accordingly, I will restrict myself to briefly summarizing each of them and to offering a few thoughts regarding the volume's “twin tasks...

... is to articulate the kind of introduction to philosophy that Hegel thought necessary and his reasons for thinking as he did. In taking up this challenge Forster helpfully distinguishes three sorts of tasks the Phenome- nology sets out to accomplish-pedagogical, epistemological, and meta- physical-and the first...

...- jective, or inherently standpoint-relative. Thus, the attempt to derive the con- straints of standpoint-neutrality in our representation of objects from what Keller calls “the demands of self-consciousness”can seem paradoxical. What Keller calls impersonal self-consciousness is transcendental...

... of their views as in using his dis- cussions of them to construct and defend a philosophical position of his own, which he calls “pragmatic liberalism.” Because that position is closest to Rorty’s, he begins with an extended discussion of the latter’s “epistemological behaviorism” and “liberal ironism...

... that the demands of self-consciousnessexpress the demand of standpoint-neutrality in knowledge) is not entirely dispelled by Keller’s discussion, but an important merit of Keller’s interpretive approach is that it displays the centrality of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental selfcon- sciousness...

... to different standpoints. This issue is addressed by E. M. Adams in “On the possibility of a unified world view,” by Panayot Butchvarov in “The relativity of renllys,” and by Simon Blackburn in “Relativizationand truth.” Adams and Blackburn are both dissatisfied with the idea of relativization...

...- lected papers on that subject, and one on epistemology. As to the substance of Field’s contributions, limitations of space preclude doing much more below than indicating the range of issues addressed, and the general orientation taken towards them. As to the style of his writing, it well exhibits...

...Julie K. Ward References Medina José 2013 . The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imagination . New York : Oxford University Press . Sullivan Shannon 2006 . Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits...

.... 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. xii + 348 pp. Davidson, Donald. 2004. Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Clarendon. xx + 280 pp. de Gaynesford, Maximilian. 2006. The Meaning of the First-Person Term...

... and Subjectivity. In the series Controversies. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. ix + 411 pp. Beistegui, Miguel de. 2005. The New Heidegger. London: Continuum. viii + 210 pp. Bernecker, Sven. 2006. Reading Epistemology: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary. Reading Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell...

... distinctions that are arbitrary from the standpoint of the physical geometry of space-time . To think otherwise is just to beg the question against the overwrite option, which depends on resisting a thoroughgoing physicalist ontology. Moreover, given an appropriately externalist epistemology, it is possible...

.... This brings me to the final element in Bristow’s attempt to present the Phenomenology of Spirit as an essentially epistemological project, namely, his characterization of the phenomenological “we.” While a number of previous commentators have interpreted this “we” as occupying a privileged standpoint...

.... This brings me to the final element in Bristow’s attempt to present the Phenomenology of Spirit as an essentially epistemological project, namely, his characterization of the phenomenological “we.” While a number of previous commentators have interpreted this “we” as occupying a privileged standpoint...

.... This brings me to the final element in Bristow’s attempt to present the Phenomenology of Spirit as an essentially epistemological project, namely, his characterization of the phenomenological “we.” While a number of previous commentators have interpreted this “we” as occupying a privileged standpoint...

.... This brings me to the final element in Bristow’s attempt to present the Phenomenology of Spirit as an essentially epistemological project, namely, his characterization of the phenomenological “we.” While a number of previous commentators have interpreted this “we” as occupying a privileged standpoint...

.... This brings me to the final element in Bristow’s attempt to present the Phenomenology of Spirit as an essentially epistemological project, namely, his characterization of the phenomenological “we.” While a number of previous commentators have interpreted this “we” as occupying a privileged standpoint...