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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
...) obligations that become overridden are not always lost (i.e., sometimes you keep having an obligation when you acquire a stronger incompatible obligation) entails that (ONIM) “ought” does not imply “must” (i.e., some obligations are not all-things-considered). It is standard to infer ONIM—via (2)—from the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Jacob Ross This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... natural languages and in standard artificial languages. For those of us who think sentences with different logical forms express different propositions, it would mean that no proposition expressed in a typical formal language is expressible in any natural language. The article begins by clarifying the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 285–320.
Published: 01 April 2011
... several challenges to Garber's interpretation, questioning, among other things, Garber's claims about development and Garber's account of Leibniz's primary arguments for the theory of monads. The article concludes that while crucial elements of the standard interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist can be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jeffrey Sanford Russell; John Hawthorne Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Caspar Hare Some moral theories (for example, standard, “ex post” forms of egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and constraint-based deontology) tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 415–419.
Published: 01 July 2015
... Raffman calls “the Standard Analysis” of borderline cases: The Standard Analysis: x is borderline ϕ just in case x is neither definitely ϕ nor definitely not- ϕ . Now it is worth noting that there are various versions of the Standard Analysis that are possible depending on how one understands...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 439–447.
Published: 01 July 2016
... standard of taste possessed by the speaker of c at the time of c . Here it is assumed that propositions receive a truth value relative to a possible world. According to this view, when I say, “Chili is tasty,” I assert the proposition that chili is tasty according to my present standard of taste; when...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... variants of such sen- tences) fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet) for such a state- ment to be true. In some contexts, “S knows that P” requires...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
... agents in an ideal game decide rationally, have the power to anticipate each other, and have full knowledge of the payoff structure of the game and the circumstances of the agents” (29). The purpose of this idealization, he says, is to close the gap between “objective standards” of rationality and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 1–31.
Published: 01 January 2005
...- nitely out” (1994b, 18). Reflecting this common view, the standard philosophical analysis defines borderline cases for vague predicate as items that are neither definitely (clearly, determinately) ⌽ nor definitely not ⌽. A borderline case for is then also a borderline case for ‘not being...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): i.
Published: 01 July 2003
... judged by members of the Sage School of Philosophy. Provided the number and standard of submissions is sufficiently high, a winner will be chosen to present their article at a symposium to be held at Cornell University. Two spe- cialists in the field will be invited to comment on the winner's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): i.
Published: 01 January 2004
... judged by members of the Sage School of Philosophy. Provided the number and standard of submissions is sufficiently high, a winner will be chosen to present their article at a symposium to be held at Cornell University. Two spe- cialists in the field will be invited to comment on the winner's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 657–661.
Published: 01 October 2013
... their view and clarify their commitments. All consequentialists should therefore read this book. Hurley claims that there are “tensions within the consequentialist approach itself” (3). Most consequentialists, he asserts, accept three propositions: 1) Rational Authority of Moral Standards (RAMS...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
... available book-length treatment of epistemo- logical issues associated with the a priori. Moreover, it provides the most comprehensive articulation and defense of traditional rationalism. The book is tightly organized, crisply argued, and sets the standard against which competing accounts must be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... cases is to accept that varying standards govern whether speakers can appropriately ascribe knowledge to subjects of certain prop- ositions but to argue that this doesn’t reflect any variation in the standards for truthfully ascribing knowledge (this is known as a “warranted assertibility ma- neuver...