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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 1. (Color online.) Standard Bayesian model of a Headser’s rational opinions. Left: Generalized-Kripke (Markov) diagram, in which blue numbers within circles represent the prior probabilities of possibilities, and labeled red arrows from circles represent the posterior probabilities More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
...Andrew Y. Lee Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Alex Byrne; Riccardo Manzotti When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
...) obligations that become overridden are not always lost (i.e., sometimes you keep having an obligation when you acquire a stronger incompatible obligation) entails that (ONIM) “ought” does not imply “must” (i.e., some obligations are not all-things-considered). It is standard to infer ONIM—via (2)—from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... justified (a thesis the article labels Standard Phenomenal Conservatism ). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, the article embeds it, first, in a probabilistic framework in which updating on new evidence happens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Peter van Elswyk A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... in space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Caspar Hare Some moral theories (for example, standard, “ex post” forms of egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and constraint-based deontology) tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jeffrey Sanford Russell; John Hawthorne Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
...Barry Maguire; Jack Woods It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... in natural languages and in standard artificial languages. For those of us who think sentences with different logical forms express different propositions, it would mean that no proposition expressed in a typical formal language is expressible in any natural language. The article begins by clarifying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 285–320.
Published: 01 April 2011
... several challenges to Garber's interpretation, questioning, among other things, Garber's claims about development and Garber's account of Leibniz's primary arguments for the theory of monads. The article concludes that while crucial elements of the standard interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Jacob Ross This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 415–419.
Published: 01 July 2015
... account of vagueness. According to this account, vagueness, while often accompanied by context sensitivity, does not depend essentially on context sensitivity. And while vagueness is, on this view, a semantic phenomenon, unlike standard semantic analyses, Raffman's semantic analysis of vagueness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
...- tences) fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet) for such a state- ment to be true. In some contexts, “S knows that P” requires that S have a true...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 439–447.
Published: 01 July 2016
... into relief when we compare it with more familiar contextualist theories. A simple version of contextualism about “tasty,” for example, might say that, relative to a context of use c , the sentence “Chili is tasty” expresses the proposition that chili meets the standard of taste possessed by the speaker...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 1–31.
Published: 01 January 2005
... this common view, the standard philosophical analysis defines borderline cases for vague predicate as items that are neither definitely (clearly, determinately) ⌽ nor definitely not ⌽. A borderline case for is then also a borderline case for ‘not being borderline not ⌽ consists in being neither...