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stalnaker

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 384–391.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Ofra Magidor Robert Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World . New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. vii + 148 pp. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Elga, Adam. 2000 . “Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.” Analysis 60 : 143 –47. Dorr, Cian. 2002 . “Sleeping...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 251–266.
Published: 01 April 2007
...Robert Stalnaker Cornell University 2007 Critical Notice of Scott Soames’s Case against Two-Dimensionalism Robert Stalnaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology This rich and stimulating book1 gives both a clear and cogent big...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Una Stojnić Stalnaker Robert , Context . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2014 . viii + 248 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 This book is a development of Stalnaker's dominant research program (going back to Stalnaker 1970 ), defending the “autonomy of pragmatics” thesis that “it...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 381–384.
Published: 01 July 2010
.../00318108-2010-005 Robert Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. vii + 148 pp. 1. Introduction This is an extremely rich book, which offers a novel picture of knowledge of our internal world and how it fits into a more general picture of ourselves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 391–394.
Published: 01 July 2010
... Philosophical Review, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2010 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2010-005 Robert Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. vii + 148 pp. 1. Introduction This is an extremely rich book, which offers a novel picture of knowledge of our internal world and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2010
... Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. vii + 148 pp. 1. Introduction This is an extremely rich book, which offers a novel picture of knowledge of our internal world and how it fits into a more general picture of ourselves as both bearers and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 398–401.
Published: 01 July 2010
.../00318108-2010-005 Robert Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. vii + 148 pp. 1. Introduction This is an extremely rich book, which offers a novel picture of knowledge of our internal world and how it fits into a more general picture of ourselves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... over several recent papers, is Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC), the main inspirations for which are found in the work of David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. Working, like Lewis, within a relevant-alternatives framework, Blome-Tillmann proposes that (L * ) x satisfies ‘knows p ’ in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
...David J. Chalmers; Frank Jackson Cornell University 2001 Austin, D. F. 1990 . What's the Meaning of “This”? Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Balog, K. 1999 . “Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Review 108 : 497 -528. Block, N., and R. Stalnaker...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
....) Lewis's (1976) triviality theorem 2 addresses a principle about what subjective probability—or credence —it is reasonable to assign a conditional: Stalnaker's Thesis. For every reasonable credal state C , if C  ( A ) > 0, C   ( if   A ,   B ) = C   ( B   |   A...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 132–136.
Published: 01 January 2017
... two further features of Hanks's approach that forge interesting connections with other questions about mind and language. Properties as Rules . Naturalist views are motivated by the problem of explaining what it is for propositions to have truth conditions. Robert Stalnaker once challenged Hanks in a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 602–604.
Published: 01 October 2002
... primarily historical, outlines at a very high level of abstraction a program for a physicalistic account of belief and desire, in which a physicalistic account of truth would occupy a prominent place. The third paper, a review of Stalnaker, is something of a digression: its most memorable section, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
... sensitive to discourse structure. In particular, I argue that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading depends on the topic of conversation, understood as the question under discussion (henceforth, QUD) in the sense of Roberts (2004, 2012) . In the tradition from Stalnaker (1984, 1999a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... Stalnaker (1981, 143) once said the following: The case of the two gods . . . is . . . a case of ignorance of which of two indiscernible possible worlds is actual. One of these possible worlds is the actual world . . . , while the other is like it except that the god who is in fact on the tallest...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... University Press. Bealer, George. 1987 . “The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism.” In Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 1, Metaphysics , ed. James E. Tomberlin, 289 –365. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Block, Ned, and Robert Stalnaker. 1999 . “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
..., Graham. 2002 . “Rational Dilemmas.” Analysis 62 : 11 –16. Ross, Jacob. 2010. “Stalnaker's Sleeping Beauty Argument.” Home page for Jacob Ross at the Web site for the University of Southern California. www.rcf.usc.edu/jacobmro/ . Schervish, Mark, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Joseph Kadane. 1984...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
... yet, the standard views on counterfactuals and identity predict that most ordinary counteridenticals, such as the ones above, are trivial and uninformative. To illustrate, consider the semantics for counterfactuals defended by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) , according to which a counterfactual...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
... Skyrms,” by Robert Stalnaker, and “Conditionals as random variables,” by Robert Stalnaker and Richard Jeffries) are devoted to proving positive results. The key idea in all of these contributions is that of viewing conditional chances (in the case of Skyrms) and conditional sentences (in the case...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... ϕ ⌝ as meaning, roughly, ⌜S would ϕ if S tried to ϕ ⌝. 16 We argue that this approach avoids the problems raised for the orthodox analysis but faces a variety of problems of its own. The conditional analysis borrows the selection function from Stalnaker's (1968) theory of conditionals: a...