... ], it consists simply in the fact that we do not feel we are determined by any external forces” (84; see also AT VII.57). Ragland finds that the “first clause defines freedom as a two-way power . . . and hence evidence for PAP. The second part of the definition defines freedom as ‘spontaneity’” (85; see also...

..., he proposes that nondescriptive propositions can be true without there being truth makers for them on account of the capacity of agents to have spontaneous normative insight. This insight is not to be confused with intuition about normative facts but instead is a basic, nonperceptual faculty...

... world, but the intel- ligible world is governed by the laws of reason. Since the human being is conscious of both his receptivity in his experience of sensation, and his spontaneity in his free operation of reason, we must conceive of ourselves as rooted in both the sensible and the intelligible...

... by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what...

... of laws: all laws (i) are necessary and (ii) result from a spontaneous act of legislation by an appropriate authority (paradigmatically a spontaneous mental faculty). Furthermore, in a rousing piece of historical scholarship, Watkins describes the generic conception as emerging from and wedding together...

... of the great services of Valmisa’s study. Valmisa distinguishes adapting from flexibility, relying, conforming, balancing, and spontaneity. Flexibility, she says, is a prerequisite for adaptability, but an adaptive agent is also “situationally responsive, creative beyond conventions, innovative in his use...

... life by reason, espousing instead an ideal of spontaneity in which one s actions follow essentially and effortlessly from one s nature (154). But while Socrates sought a rationally grounded art of life, he never achieved it; yet despite his lack of knowledge his virtuous actions flowed from his...

... from determination through the laws of nature. Consequently, the will of a rational agent does not belong to the natural order for Kant. For Fichte, by contrast, rational agency presupposes merely a form of intellectual or deliberative freedom: the freedom to spontaneously form intentions based...

... O’Connor illuminates this more complicated story using evolutionary game-theoretic modeling. This framework, she argues, shows how type-conditioning of behavior using categories such as gender can emerge spontaneously in response to certain coordination problems, even where those categories are inherently...

... close to the heart of his philosophical enterprise. He vehemently rejected what he saw as the fundamental Socratic error, the attempt to control one’s life by reason, espousing instead an ideal of spontaneity “in which one’s actions follow essentially and effortlessly from one’s nature” (154...

... spontaneous and effortless, and they do not typically strike us as being under direct, deliberate, or deliberative control in the short run. In addition, reflexive seemings typically do provide a measure of warrant for perceptual judgments and beliefs, and we take them to do so. Seemings are part...

... analogues of such mature meta- physical claims as the doctrine of spontaneity, the denial of inter-substantial causation, and the notion of a complete concept. In part 3 Mercer describes Leibniz’s “Metaphysics of Divinity.” Here she argues that Leibniz’s metaphysical scheme bears a heavy debt...

... of Leibniz’s views on creaturely cau- sation, Leibniz held a view that some interpreters have described as his “thesis of spontaneity”: “every non-initial, non-miraculous state of every created substance has as a real cause some preceding state of that very substance.”54 Evidence for attributing...

..., or neither. 2 Explaining how the terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ relate to terms like ‘(passive) actualization’, ‘spontaneity’, and ‘receptivity’ would also help to locate Hyman's view with respect to philosophers like Kant and McDowell, who also appeal to capacities to explain agency, but are little...

... that a synthesis, as understood in the context of the analysis of discursively possible knowledge, can bind only a completed set of representations, as they must be apprehended together and reproduced by a spontaneous finite act of thought (A100–2). 17 To summarize, the unity of space in question...

..., “fear makes us minded to deliberate” ( Rhetoric 2.5, 1383a6–7). Or a sudden threat may prompt action without reflection ( NE 3.8, 1117a18–22). In contrast to deontologists and consequentialists alike, Aristotle is a philosopher of spontaneity. Ideally, of course, thought and feeling are at one...

..., involving complete spontaneity. Freedom of this variety would, it is conceded, be incompatible with mechanism if there were a single comprehensive point of view from which we both adopted that conception and deployed mechanistic explanations. But-so the argument goes- there is no comprehensive...

... justification. However Katz is less than explicit about the nature of rational insight. Inappropriate causal metaphors are deployed, and it is unclear whether rational insight is supposed to be a conscious episode or merely the disposition to spontaneously form immediately justified a priori belief...

... episode or merely the disposition to spontaneously form immediately justified a priori belief. But if Realistic Rationalism prompts us to inquire more closely into the grounds of a priori justification, it will have succeeded, at least in part, in counteracting what Katz regards as a legacy...

... reading of Kant, reflecting judgment does not just make cognition of objects outside of us possible, but it also guides how we reflect on ourselves and enables us to cognize ourselves both as spontaneous agents and as appearing in the phenomenal world. Finally in part 3, Ginsborg addresses...