Search Results for speaker
1-20 of 231 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... elements of the context, for example, I can fail to refer to the speaker. More precisely, indexicals are syntactically akin to logical variables. They can be free, in which case they work, roughly, on the Kaplan model. But they can also be bound: this happens, in a systematic fashion, when they are in the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Daniel Hoek Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... theses that I will compress into one sentence. Semantic theory should assign sentences a (1) truth-conditional content that is (2) determined compositionally with (3) limited input from context that (4) does not contain speaker intentions as a parameter. The methodology involves countenancing (nonobvious...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Peter Pagin The basic observation is that the referential contents alone are not of much help to the speaker for achieving his or her aims. The referential content of (2) is the same as that of ‘I am I’ (as said by Perry) and ‘John Perry is John Perry’, neither of which conveys the intended...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
... illocutionary acts (IAs). Alston argues that to perform an illocutionary act is to utter a sentence while taking responsibility for (R’ing) the holding of certain conditions. This term captures the idea that IA performance consists in an alteration of the speaker’s normative status, rendering her “open to...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
... salient, first- come-to-mind properties and holds instead that a name’s reference-fix- ing content is typically given by (a cluster of) egocentric properties specified in terms of broadly causal relationships between a speaker and his environment: properties like being the actual individual called...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
.... [[must(Bc,i = 1 if and only if , , w , ∀w ∈ [[B]]c i c ti = 1 (In what follows, we will sometimes refer to ϕ as the prejacent, a useful term introduced by our medieval colleagues.) If it is only the speaker’s...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
... to an existing individual and that the speaker cannot be wrong about that individual has been much discussed. The term‘I’ has an epistemic security in that the speaker of that term cannot be wrong about the referent. Bar-On 293 BOOK...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 459–462.
Published: 01 July 2002
.... Quotation marks reveal a speaker’s demonstration of quoted expressions, and substitution produces a different demonstratum. Quotation is closed when the demonstration functions as a singu- lar term, and innocence is assured since the quoted material expresses its nor- mal content in a sentence separate...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
... judgment. Judgment, according to Frege, is the transition from sense to reference. A speaker’s grasp of a thought, and hence of its constituent senses, must be such that it provides the speaker with suffi cient infor- mation to place him in a position to make this transition, that is, to be able to...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
... best understood pragmatically, and presupposition is best understood as about what speakers tend to presuppose, rather than what expressions presuppose. Thus, his explanation is autonomously pragmatic: the derived context in (1) is derivative from the CGC, and even if antecedents of conditionals...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... p ’ depends on such factors as the interests, purposes, and expectations of the speaker. While EC has “been met with overwhelming scepticism by a vast majority of epistemologists and philosophers of language” (1), according to Michael Blome-Tillmann, this is largely owing to shortcomings of extant...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... challenging their assimilation to the category of singular terms. The first chapter is devoted to a battery of powerful arguments against the direct reference account. The two basic pieces of data King discusses are as follows. First, there are what King calls “No Demonstration, No Speaker Reference...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... their truth conditions. This strongly suggests that a serious assessment of contextualism will demand a discerning look at the question of what it takes for a speaker to make a warranted assertion. And it turns out that the knowledge account of assertion—according to which what one is in a position...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 427–440.
Published: 01 July 2007
... Sider, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson, an audience at Cornell, and especially to Tamar Gendler and Robert Williams for com- ments and conversation. 1. We might imagine charity formulated to give a special weighting to the sentences the speaker is most confi dent of: I am not going to...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 290–293.
Published: 01 April 2000
... against the realist. In a recent statement of the idea, Dummett (1993, xii) writes, “ [Alny knowledge attributed to a speaker as constituting a component of his knowledge of a language must be manifest in his employment of that language, including his reactions to things said to him by others...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... effect the “speaker” communicatively intends to have on them. I put ‘speaker’ in scare quotes here because communication of this sort needn't involve speech, language, or even any conventional form of signal. Rather, the agent who initiates communication must merely present their audience with some kind...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 297–299.
Published: 01 April 2002
... metaphysical concerns" (xiii). Second, Plato's dialogues "do not seem to speak directly to one another. In no dialogue is an argument made to depend on an argument already made in an earlier dialogue. By Plato's choice of the form of the dramatic dialogue, no speaker in any of his dialogues can refer back...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 159–162.
Published: 01 January 2015
... conception of epistemic authority fits naturally with the interpersonal view of testimony. According to that view, when a speaker tells a hearer that p , the speaker has invited the hearer to trust him or her (122). The hearer “is not being offered evidence, and accepting [the invitation] is not taking...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... speaker. They do not describe the world, as we might expect assertions to do, but rather change it.1 This remark also suggests some factors that will not be important in determining whether a certain speech act is an assertion. Williamson cites declarative mood rather than the tense of the sentence...