Search Results for speaker
1-20 of 230 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Daniel Hoek Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... elements of the context, for example, I can fail to refer to the speaker. More precisely, indexicals are syntactically akin to logical variables. They can be free, in which case they work, roughly, on the Kaplan model. But they can also be bound: this happens, in a systematic fashion, when they are in the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... compress into one sentence. Semantic theory should assign sentences a (1) truth-conditional content that is (2) determined compositionally with (3) limited input from context that (4) does not contain speaker intentions as a parameter. The methodology involves countenancing (nonobvious) context sensitivity...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
...-conditions of sentences. To exemplify, Perry's utterance of (1) I have a broken arm is true referentially iff Perry has a broken arm (ignoring time). The sentence has the reflexive truth-conditions that any English utterance u of (1) is true iff the speaker of u has a broken arm (7). This is very...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
... to perform an illocutionary act is to utter a sentence while taking responsibility for (R’ing) the holding of certain conditions. This term captures the idea that IA performance consists in an alteration of the speaker’s normative status, rendering her “open to the possibility of censure...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
...- come-to-mind properties and holds instead that a name’s reference-fix- ing content is typically given by (a cluster of) egocentric properties specified in terms of broadly causal relationships between a speaker and his environment: properties like being the actual individual called ‘Aristotle...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
.... [[must(Bc,i = 1 if and only if #2; , ,#4;w#2;, #5; ∀w ∈ [[B]]c i c ti = 1 (In what follows, we will sometimes refer to ϕ as the prejacent, a useful term introduced by our medieval colleagues.) If it is only the speaker’s...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
... individual and that the speaker cannot be wrong about that individual has been much discussed. The term‘I’ has an epistemic security in that the speaker of that term cannot be wrong about the referent. Bar-On 293 BOOK REVIEWS relies on the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 459–462.
Published: 01 July 2002
... speaker’s demonstration of quoted expressions, and substitution produces a different demonstratum. Quotation is closed when the demonstration functions as a singu- lar term, and innocence is assured since the quoted material expresses its nor- mal content in a sentence separate from that containing the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
..., according to Frege, is the transition from sense to reference. A speaker’s grasp of a thought, and hence of its constituent senses, must be such that it provides the speaker with suffi cient infor- mation to place him in a position to make this transition, that is, to be able to judge whether the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... on such factors as the interests, purposes, and expectations of the speaker. While EC has “been met with overwhelming scepticism by a vast majority of epistemologists and philosophers of language” (1), according to Michael Blome-Tillmann, this is largely owing to shortcomings of extant versions of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
... contexts and presuppositions. Stalnaker, by contrast, argues derived context is best understood pragmatically, and presupposition is best understood as about what speakers tend to presuppose, rather than what expressions presuppose. Thus, his explanation is autonomously pragmatic: the derived context...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... to the category of singular terms. The first chapter is devoted to a battery of powerful arguments against the direct reference account. The two basic pieces of data King discusses are as follows. First, there are what King calls “No Demonstration, No Speaker Reference” [NDNS] cases, such as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... truth conditions. This strongly suggests that a serious assessment of contextualism will demand a discerning look at the question of what it takes for a speaker to make a warranted assertion. And it turns out that the knowledge account of assertion—according to which what one is in a position to...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 427–440.
Published: 01 July 2007
... Williamson, an audience at Cornell, and especially to Tamar Gendler and Robert Williams for com- ments and conversation. 1. We might imagine charity formulated to give a special weighting to the sentences the speaker is most confi dent of: I am not going to fuss about this for now. I am also...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 290–293.
Published: 01 April 2000
... statement of the idea, Dummett (1993, xii) writes, “ [Alny knowledge attributed to a speaker as constituting a component of his knowledge of a language must be manifest in his employment of that language, including his reactions to things said to him by others.” Though no doubt controversial, this...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... guides an audience's attempt to read one's mind, in part by revealing the intention to do so. Intentions to hijack others' mindreading capacities in this way are called ‘communicative intentions’. According to intentionalists, communication happens when an audience recognizes what effect the “speaker...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 297–299.
Published: 01 April 2002
..., Plato's dialogues "do not seem to speak directly to one another. In no dialogue is an argument made to depend on an argument already made in an earlier dialogue. By Plato's choice of the form of the dramatic dialogue, no speaker in any of his dialogues can refer back to a written dialogue...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 159–162.
Published: 01 January 2015
... naturally with the interpersonal view of testimony. According to that view, when a speaker tells a hearer that p , the speaker has invited the hearer to trust him or her (122). The hearer “is not being offered evidence, and accepting [the invitation] is not taking the testimony as evidence” (129). The...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... sentence would carry out when uttered in propria persona. Declarative sentences can be used to establish definitions, legal propositions, or bets only given some initial prepara- tion, such as a statement that the following sentence is a definition or the investiture of legal authority in the speaker...