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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Peter van Elswyk A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (2): 109–148.
Published: 01 April 2025
... . Finally, the author shows how strategic speakers can exploit the structure of open secrecy norms in order to both communicate about the open secret and shield themselves from retaliation for what they communicate. In the simplest and most straightforward kinds of conversations, what is common ground...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Daniel Hoek Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... to elements of the context, for example, I can fail to refer to the speaker. More precisely, indexicals are syntactically akin to logical variables. They can be free, in which case they work, roughly, on the Kaplan model. But they can also be bound: this happens, in a systematic fashion, when...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 167–171.
Published: 01 January 2021
... natural to apply existing epistemologies. Thus, testimony can be thought of as just another sign in the world, indicating its truth in the same way that smoke indicates fire. Understood in this way, testimonial knowledge might be explained in reliabilist terms, since both the receipt of a speaker's words...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
... on salient, first-
come-to-mind properties and holds instead that a name’s reference-fix-
ing content is typically given by (a cluster of) egocentric properties
specified in terms of broadly causal relationships between a speaker
and his environment: properties like being the actual individual called...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
... truth-conditions of sentences. To exemplify, Perry's utterance of (1) I have a broken arm is true referentially iff Perry has a broken arm (ignoring time). The sentence has the reflexive truth-conditions that any English utterance u of (1) is true iff the speaker of u has a broken arm (7...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... theses that I will compress into one sentence. Semantic theory should assign sentences a (1) truth-conditional content that is (2) determined compositionally with (3) limited input from context that (4) does not contain speaker intentions as a parameter. The methodology involves countenancing (nonobvious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 463–467.
Published: 01 July 2021
... ordinary speech by ordinary speakers under ordinary circumstances constitutes harm in virtue of enacting harmful norms. Mary Kate McGowan starts the book with the following examples to illustrate. An offhand sexist remark about sexual conquests at work oppresses women without the speaker intending...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...,i = 1 if and only if
, , w ,
∀w ∈ [[B]]c i c ti = 1
(In what follows, we will sometimes refer to ϕ as the prejacent, a useful
term introduced by our medieval colleagues.) If it is only the speaker’s
information...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
..., is the transition from sense to
reference. A speaker’s grasp of a thought, and hence of its constituent
senses, must be such that it provides the speaker with suffi cient infor-
mation to place him in a position to make this transition, that is, to be
able to judge whether the thought grasped is a true...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
... of illocutionary acts
(IAs). Alston argues that to perform an illocutionary act is to utter a sentence
while taking responsibility for (R’ing) the holding of certain conditions. This
term captures the idea that IA performance consists in an alteration of the
speaker’s normative status, rendering her “open...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 87–91.
Published: 01 January 2024
... states of mind. These states inform how hearers interpret speech, and since speakers anticipate this, they also inform how speakers design speech. Some would say that these states themselves fix the contents of context-sensitive expressions. Others would insist that the speaker’s intentions do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
... individual and that the speaker cannot be wrong about
that individual has been much discussed. The term‘I’ has an epistemic security
in that the speaker of that term cannot be wrong about the referent. Bar-On
293
BOOK REVIEWS
relies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... in
their truth conditions. This strongly suggests that a serious assessment
of contextualism will demand a discerning look at the question of what
it takes for a speaker to make a warranted assertion. And it turns out
that the knowledge account of assertion—according to which what one
is in a position...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 427–440.
Published: 01 July 2007
..., Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson, an
audience at Cornell, and especially to Tamar Gendler and Robert Williams for com-
ments and conversation.
1. We might imagine charity formulated to give a special weighting to the sentences
the speaker is most confi dent of: I am not going to fuss about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... carry out when
uttered in propria persona. Declarative sentences can be used to establish
definitions, legal propositions, or bets only given some initial prepara-
tion, such as a statement that the following sentence is a definition or
the investiture of legal authority in the speaker. They do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 378–382.
Published: 01 July 2022
... that occurs all at the same time? … Or to ask in a slightly different way, um, can … can anyone shut the [expletive] up?” Both the cover image—a crowd of speakers, heads turned unexpectedly this way and that—and the title of Sanford C. Goldberg’s new book evokes this familiar, maddening cacophony. In its...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
... mechanisms determining derived contexts and presuppositions. Stalnaker, by contrast, argues derived context is best understood pragmatically, and presupposition is best understood as about what speakers tend to presuppose, rather than what expressions presuppose. Thus, his explanation is autonomously...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
...] that p ’ depends on such factors as the interests, purposes, and expectations of the speaker. While EC has “been met with overwhelming scepticism by a vast majority of epistemologists and philosophers of language” (1), according to Michael Blome-Tillmann, this is largely owing to shortcomings of extant...
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