..., September 1, 209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:NiFINftfa8gJ:philosophy.ucdavis.edu/glanzberg/relativism.pdf+Context,+Content,+and+Relativism&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us . Hellie, Benj. 2004 . “Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument.” In There's Something About Mary , ed...

...Stephen Law Bede Rundle, Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xii + 204 pp. Cornell University 2007 Van Inwagen, Peter. 1996 . “Why Is There Anything at All?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 : 95 -110...

...John Heil Cornell University 2007 Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. xiii + 186 pp. BOOK REVIEWS Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press...

...Catharine Abell Depiction is the form of representation distinctive of figurative paintings, drawings, and photographs. Accounts of depiction attempt to specify the relation something must bear to an object in order to depict it. Resemblance accounts hold that the notion of resemblance is necessary...

... in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a species of propositional...

... in space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon...

...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations...

... is this: if you have already been ( justly) punished by God for doing something, how then could you avoid doing that thing? As we'll see, there is a strong argument that seems to show that you couldn't. However, this essay argues that if divine prepunishment rules out human freedom, then so does divine...

... valuable in other ways: it helps mitigate their dependence on epistemic luck, for example. What we end up with, at the end of the day, are credences that are particularly good candidates for constituting probabilistic knowledge. What's more, examining the character of these credences teaches us something...

... be exported to the know-how debate. On the one hand, some of the expressivists' semantic resources can be used to deflect Stanley and Williamson's influential argument for factualism about know-how: the claim that knowing how to do something consists in knowing a fact. On the other, expressivism provides...

... to the problem and find them all wanting. This suggests a return to a kind of Goodmanian view that the world is a structureless mess onto which we project our own categorizations, not something with categories already built in. This is the same problem of missing value. The idea is that the primitive...

... still necessary? The seemingly obvious answer is “yes.” Killing is necessary since it is the only means to achieve the goal that stands to justify killing. The problem with this answer is that it presupposes a certain description of that goal as something like “saving Victim’s life” or “saving Victim’s...

... the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, language, and meaning. In this article I first...

...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...

... of a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. But they also point to something important, namely, that our uncertainty about conditionals is not confined to uncertainty about the facts (what the actual world is like) but also expresses uncertainty about the counterfacts (what...

... that that C caused (didn’t cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M . The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or noninertial behavior to its effect. A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation J. Dmitri Gallow...

... of conscious experiences is that there is something it is like to have them. Nagel explains the troublesome sense of ‘conscious’ as follows: [F]undamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism—something it is like...

.... That is what a singular term is for. What about a predicate, like ‘is wise’? Does it refer to something, too? And if so, can the referent of a predicate also be referred to by a singular term? The first half of Robert Trueman’s Properties and Propositions (henceforth, PP ) is devoted to a presentation...

... between coincidents. The resulting picture is radical: the material world is in some sense full to the brim with coincident objects. 2 According to defenders of material plenitude , in addition to the ring and the metal there is something that would be destroyed if this engraving were to wear...

..., and predication. So what are the Barcan formulas, and how might they be relevant for our understanding of Kant? Together they encode the view that it is possible that there is something that satisfies a condition just in case there is something that possibly satisfies the condition; or equivalently...