Search Results for sobel

...Samuel Asarnow Sobel David , From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 . viii + 312 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism collects fifteen of David Sobel's papers on normative...

...Lorraine Besser-Jones Sobel Jordan Howard , Walls and Vaults: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics according to David Hume) . Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley and Sons , 2009 . xiii + 414 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Huw...

... Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 4, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1630894 2. J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 633 BOOK REVIEWS Jordan Howard Sobel, Walls and Vaults...

... Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 4, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1630894 2. J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 633 BOOK REVIEWS Jordan Howard Sobel, Walls and Vaults...

... Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 4, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1630894 2. J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 633 BOOK REVIEWS Jordan Howard Sobel, Walls and Vaults...

... Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 4, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1630894 2. J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 633 BOOK REVIEWS Jordan Howard Sobel, Walls and Vaults...

... prominent contemporary subjectivists, Mark Schroeder and David Sobel, to favor subjectivism in the first place. These theorists begin by observing that at least some of our reasons are grounded in our desires: the fact that there will be dancing at the party is a reason for me to go there because I want...

... Realism . New York : Oxford University Press . ———. n.d. “ Idealizing Still Not Off the Hook: A Reply to Sobel .” Unpublished manuscript. Available online at faculty homepage for David Enoch at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law, law.huji.ac.il/eng/index.asp . Evers Daan...

... by William E. Mann 302 Schellenberg, J. L., The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion reviewed by Paul Draper 291 Shapiro, Scott, Legality reviewed by Gideon Yaffe 457 Shoemaker, Sydney, Physical Realization reviewed by Eric Hiddleston 467 Sobel, Jordan Howard, Walls and Vaults...

... of Scientific Theories , edited by Robert Colodny. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Skalia, H. J. 1975 . Non-Archimedean Utility Theory . Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Skyrms, Brian. 1980 . Causal Necessity . New Haven: Yale University Press. Sobel, Howard. 1994 . Two Envelopes. Theory...

... Sobel, and Hong Zhou, and to audiences at the University of Sydney, ANU, MIT, the University of Michigan, and Oxford for much discussion and many helpful comments at various points. I am also indebted to several anonymous referees for this journal, and I am grateful to the Australian Research Council...

... Principles of Choice .” In Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel , ed. Rescher N. , 114 – 46 . Dordrecht : D. Reidel . Skyrms B. 1980 . Causal Necessity . New Haven : Yale University Press . Sloman S. 2005 . Causal Models . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Sobel J...

... Eggleston, Chris Heathwood, Doug Portmore, Connie Rosati, David Sobel, the editors of the Philosophical Review , and several anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on previous drafts of this essay. Subjectivism without Desire Dale Dorsey...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...

... to J. H. Sobel’s 1987 Bayesian reconstruction of Hume’s argument. Sobel had argued that if we set the prior odds of a miracle infinitesimally low, then, given a finite chance of mistaken testimony, we ought not believe in testimony of miracles. I think that setting the chances of a miracle...