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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise have been around for millennia and come in various different forms. One familiar such argument, inspired by Nelson Pike, 1 could be put informally as follows: Suppose that one thousand years ago God believed that you would sit a few...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... in the future: (1*) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now. (2*) Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now, then Jones sits at time t. Therefore, (3) Jones has no choice about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... AND PATRICK TODD 2. Merricks’s Argument Here is the Main Argument and Merricks’s initial reflections on it: Let time t be just a few minutes in the future from now, and consider the Main Argument: (1) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was true a thousand...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
... am I’ (as said by Perry) and ‘John Perry is John Perry’, neither of which conveys the intended information. Similarly, the referential content of (3) is the same, in the example, as that of ‘Eros is thirsty’, which would not help the bartender who does not know that Eros is the person sitting next...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 99–117.
Published: 01 January 2008
... of complex demon- stratives, such as the following:27 8. A student1 was sitting in the library. Another student who had an iPod2 was sitting across from him1.That student2 had a logic book. To see the problem this raises for DRCD, including Salmon’s version, suppose...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 284–288.
Published: 01 April 2004
... a folder full of papers, while only 4% of those participants who had found no coin helped.2 According to Darley and Batson (1973), 63% of unhur- ried participants helped a coughing and groaning confederate who was sitting slumped in a doorway, while only 10% of hurried participants helped. Accord- ing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 525–544.
Published: 01 October 2000
... to be true (where the subscript ‘I’ refers to me). To see this, consider the actions avail- able to me at the moment. I can stand up; I can drink a glass of water; I can (as I am doing presently) just sit here typing on my keyboard; and so Now, if I were to stand up, 2 + 2 would still...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 389–391.
Published: 01 July 2006
... several times, one could—or one would sense one could—just sit back and let the causes oper- ate. But one knows that this wouldn’t work, that nothing will happen unless one does the action. If appeals to phenomenology are truly incontestable, as Searle may think, then perhaps the only thing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 391–395.
Published: 01 July 2006
... several times, one could—or one would sense one could—just sit back and let the causes oper- ate. But one knows that this wouldn’t work, that nothing will happen unless one does the action. If appeals to phenomenology are truly incontestable, as Searle may think, then perhaps the only thing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 395–398.
Published: 01 July 2006
... the action will occur” (69). If it were otherwise, Searle says several times, one could—or one would sense one could—just sit back and let the causes oper- ate. But one knows that this wouldn’t work, that nothing will happen unless one does the action. If appeals to phenomenology are truly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 399–403.
Published: 01 July 2006
... the action will occur” (69). If it were otherwise, Searle says several times, one could—or one would sense one could—just sit back and let the causes oper- ate. But one knows that this wouldn’t work, that nothing will happen unless one does the action. If appeals to phenomenology are truly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 404–408.
Published: 01 July 2006
... several times, one could—or one would sense one could—just sit back and let the causes oper- ate. But one knows that this wouldn’t work, that nothing will happen unless one does the action. If appeals to phenomenology are truly incontestable, as Searle may think, then perhaps the only thing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018
... that Rafael's portrait depicts a sitting that really took place. What about paintings that depict a completely fictional situation? Take for instance this description of Rafael's St. George : George   confronts   the   dragon   on   a   white   horse . One way to do this is as follows. We...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 373–378.
Published: 01 July 2022
... been challenged by Saul Kripke and others. In short: it seems that a speaker can refer to an object even when the implicit description is inaccurate or too indeterminate to be unique. Parallel arguments have been made for the pictorial case. Suppose Amelia sits for a portrait; suppose further...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 661–664.
Published: 01 October 2013
... to wonder at. The distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, critical to his psychology and epistemology, will sit more easily with some philosophers than with others. Naturalistically inclined normative realists, intuitionists, and expressivists are frequently motivated in their views by what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... intentions. These are held to corrupt the spirit, if not the flesh, of formal semantics. As she puts it: “An expression whose semantic contribution is determined by what the current speaker is thinking sits uncomfortably within an approach which treats semantic content as essentially immune...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 85–87.
Published: 01 January 2001
..., a standard problem for the pragmatic justification of induction. This may be the best that we can say about the problem of induction in iso- lation, but it sits ill with Maxwell’s motivation for preferring AOE to SE:the only sorts of things SE can appeal to in choosing a theory over its...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 111–113.
Published: 01 January 2001
... puts all the epistemic weight on his own intuition, nor a proto-Rawlsian offering some kind of reflective equilibri- um theory. Rather, Sidgwick’s appeal to self-evidence sits alongside “discur- sive” and “social” verifications, which appeal respectively to intra- and inter- personal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 311–313.
Published: 01 April 2002
... that go beyond the traditional framework provided by Aristotle and Boethius on Topics. Burley's first example of an accidental infer- ence is "If a man is an ass, you are sitting," which follows by virtue of the rule 312 BOOK REVIEWS...