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siegel

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Susanna Siegel A THEORY OF SENTIENCE. By Austen Clark. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. v, 288 Cornell University 2002 Block, N. “Mental Paint and Mental Latex.” In E. Villanueva, ed. Philosophial Issues, vol. 7: Perception , ed. E. Villanueva (Atascadero, Calif...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Susanna Siegel John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. vii, 267. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (July 2004) John Campbell, Reference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 246–251.
Published: 01 April 2006
...Harvey Siegel Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. x + 189 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 284 pp. At any...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
...Susanna Siegel Cornell University 2006 Armstrong, D. 1991 . “Intentionality, Perception, and Causality.” In John Searle and His Critics , ed. R. van Gulick and E. Lepore, 149 -58. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Bach, K. n.d. “Searle against the World: How Can Experiences Find...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Casey O'Callaghan Stemming from inference does not just explain epistemic downgrade in hijacking. It also anchors Siegel's case that experiences can be more or less rational. A subject who has a downgraded experience suffers rationally. Siegel's conception thus levels the psychological landscape...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... of phenomenal conservatism implausible. Siegel ( 2011 , 2017 ) has also argued against phenomenal conservatism from the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. If Siegel is correct that perceptual experiences whose etiologies mirror structures of irrational belief formation are irrational...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... workspace model. The view also differs from views on which conscious experience doesn't exclusively involve intermediate-level content. For example, it might also involve more high-level representations, such as those involved in object categorization, as on Siegel's (2010) view. Both aspects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 609–614.
Published: 01 October 2021
... experience is simultaneously receptive and conceptually articulated. Susanna Siegel (2016), more recently, has argued that our beliefs, desires, and prejudices can reach down and shape the character of our experiences, thereby making our perceptions themselves “epistemically charged.” It is a central...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
.... 10. A prominent line of attack is the objection from tainted sources: do seeming-states justify when they are the causal products of unjustified beliefs and biases, of wishful thinking or desires? (See, e.g., Markie 2005 ; Lyons 2011 ; Siegel 2012, 2013 ; McGrath 2013 ; and Pace 2017...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... seeing. Or suppose that Jill thinks—for no good reason—that Jack is angry with her, and this causes her to see his (neutral) facial expression as angry. She believes on the basis of this visual experience that Jack is angry ( Siegel 2012 ). Jill's experience doesn't seem to have the epistemic force...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2002
... to underestimate its complexity.1 SUSANNA SIEGEL Harvard University References Block, N. “Mental Paint and Mental Latex.” In E. Villanueva, ed. Philosophial Issues, vol. 7: Perception, ed. E. Villanueva...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... claim that perception represents both low-level properties (e.g., color, shape, and motion) and high-level properties (e.g., causation and natural kinds), while thin theorists claim that perception represents only low-level properties (see Siegel and Byrne 2016 for a debate). In section 3, I'll...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 230–235.
Published: 01 April 2022
.... Crockett, Molly J., Zeb Kurth-Nelson, Jenifer Z. Siegel, Peter Dayan, and Raymond J. Dolan. 2014. “Harm to Others Outweighs Harm to Self in Moral Decision Making.” PNAS 111, no. 48: 17320–25. Paul, L. A. 2014. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paul, L. A., and Kieran...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 611–617.
Published: 01 October 2011
... for the A Priori? Chicago: Open Court. Sheinman, Hanoch. 2011. Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. xiii þ409 pp. Siegel, Susanna. 2010. The Contents of Visual Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. x þ 222 pp. Singer, Irving. 2011. Modes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
..., the immediate epistemizer includes my having an experience with a higher-level or rich content, for instance, an experience representing the things I see as being avocados. This proposal is attractive. Siegel (2010) makes a strong case that after developing perceptual expertise with things of a certain kind...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
... was supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant 1001/17. For helpful comments and conversations, I am grateful to David Bain, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Jonathan Cohen, Susanna Siegel, Preston Werner, and two anonymous referees. I thank the participants of the Philosophy of Mind Discussion Group in at New...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 243–246.
Published: 01 April 2006
... and do not settle the deep issues— Is reliabilism correct? Is knowledge a natural kind? Can naturalism avoid self-defeat or damning circularity? and so on—that animate the naturalism/ traditionalism controversy. Nevertheless, the book advances the debate in interesting ways. Harvey Siegel...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 251–255.
Published: 01 April 2006
... and do not settle the deep issues— Is reliabilism correct? Is knowledge a natural kind? Can naturalism avoid self-defeat or damning circularity? and so on—that animate the naturalism/ traditionalism controversy. Nevertheless, the book advances the debate in interesting ways. Harvey Siegel...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2006
... on—that animate the naturalism/ traditionalism controversy. Nevertheless, the book advances the debate in interesting ways. Harvey Siegel University of Miami Philosophical Review, Vol. 115, No. 2, 2006 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2005-017 Albert Casullo, A Priori Justifi cation. New York: Oxford...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 259–262.
Published: 01 April 2006
... on—that animate the naturalism/ traditionalism controversy. Nevertheless, the book advances the debate in interesting ways. Harvey Siegel University of Miami Philosophical Review, Vol. 115, No. 2, 2006 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2005-017 Albert Casullo, A Priori Justifi cation. New York: Oxford...