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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Mandy Simons ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND SENTENCE MEANING. By William P. Alston. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii, 327 Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS Solomon Feferman et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 203...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... might be raining, and it's not’ and Moorean sentences like ‘It's raining, and for all I know it's not’. A variety of approaches have been developed to account for those differences. All approaches agree that both Moore sentences and Wittgenstein sentences are classically consistent. In this article I...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 385–443.
Published: 01 July 2008
... essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth-conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other. This...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Zoltán Gendler Szabó Consider the hypothesis that every quantified sentence in every natural language contains some expression or other whose extension constrains the domain of quantification. If the hypothesis is correct, quantificational domains are fixed in fundamentally different ways in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Malte Willer A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Sarah-Jane Leslie `Ducks lay eggs' is a true sentence, and `ducks are female' is a false one. Similarly, `mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus' is obviously true, whereas `mosquitoes don't carry the West Nile virus' is patently false. This is so despite the egg-laying ducks' being a subset of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
... taller than I would be’ or ‘if I am seven feet tall, I am taller than I am’. These examples exemplify the fact that whether a sentence's evaluation remains at the actual world in the scope of a modal or conditional depends on the combination of mood in the embedded and matrix clauses rather than, as is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... existence of the null-determiner ‘the’ preceding bare singular names. This essay argues that they have incorrectly discerned the syntactic facts: their critical data point concerning the ungrammaticality of sentences like “The Katherine wants coffee” is mistaken. Such sentences’ grammaticality undermines...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... alternative resemblance account, drawing on Grice's account of nonnatural meaning and its role in determining sentence meaning to argue that something depicts an object if it bears intention-based resemblances to the object that jointly capture its overall appearance. In addition to solving the metaphysical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Kai von Fintel; Anthony S. Gillies Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Seth Yalcin As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
..., we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis , a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action (in a sense the essay makes precise) that is such that if...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 157.
Published: 01 January 2008
... Cornell University 2007 Erratum for Andrew Chignell 2007. “Belief in Kant.” Philosophical Review 116: 323–360. In the section titled “E.2. Theoretical Belief,” p. 345, the sentence beginning “I’ll refer to it here as Theological Belief should instead read: “I’ll refer to it here as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 88–91.
Published: 01 January 2001
...- guage proteinterpretation of the sentential calculus” (NLPI of SC) is a function that assigns meanings of declarative sentences of English to sentence letters. Where I is an NLPI of SC and + is a sentence letter, Chihara uses ‘ d ’ to refer to “+ with the meaning it has been assigned by I” (191...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 356–362.
Published: 01 July 2019
... obtain the Liar without truth, Rumfitt admits an infinite class of objectual variables P , Q , R , . . . that can take only the sentence position and that range over ways that things may be said to be (henceforth propositions ). Also, Rumfitt posits a relation of saying which a person can bear to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
... about expressivist semantics for natural language. The sort of expressivism Schroeder is concerned with holds: (uses of) declarative sentences express mental states; while some of these states are beliefs, others—in particular, those ex- pressed by ascriptions of goodness...