Search Results for sensory

...Craig French [email protected] Papineau David , The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . 176 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 What is the nature of conscious sensory experience? In The Metaphysics of Sensory...

... and perception. It distinguishes nonperceptual sensing from perceptual representation and explicates perceptual representation as a type of objective sensory representation. Objectivity is marked by perceptual constancies. Representation is marked by a nontrivial role for veridicality conditions in explanations...

...Hilla Jacobson Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects . The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm...

...” demanding “demotion of space and time to mere forms of our sensory intuition.” This paper aims at an adequate understanding of Kant’s enigmatic idealist argument from handed objects, as well as an understanding of its relation to the other key supports of his idealism. The paper’s central finding...

...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly...

....: Ridgeview, 1996 ), 19 -49. Boghossian, P., and D. Velleman. 1989 . “Color as a Secondary Quality.” Mind 98 : 81 -103. Clark, A. Sensory Qualities . 1993 . Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. Strawson, Galen. 1989 . “Red and `red'.” Synthese 78 : 193 -232. Strawson, P...

... intentionality. The aim of the book is to “solve the part of Brentano's problem that is within reach” (3). Brentano's problem is the problem of explaining intentionality; the part of this problem that is supposedly within reach is that of explaining nonconceptual sensory-perceptual intentionality; and Neander...

...- pacity to judge that, upon sensory stimulation, generates the Categories through its basic logical functions ofjudgment (B167, Ak 17:492, 18:8, 12, cf. 7:222-23; Longuenesse, 221 n. 17, 243, 252-53). This “epigenesis” of reason and our fundamental capacity to judge that drives it is the topic...

... inconceivable, however, quibbling over these sorts of examples is probably not the best strategy. Her discussion of sensory processing suggests a better tactic for dealing with transparent bodies: Cavendish might argue that even perfectly transparent bodies are in fact colored—namely, colored by the things we...

... sensory or imaginative representation that we associate with what we desire, or when we believe that the object of our desire is more or less likely to be achieved. The Hedonic Aspect: If agents occurrently desire D, increases in the sub- jective probability of D or vivid sensory...

... Descartes allows for only one kind of idea pre- senting corporeal content (intellectual ideas whose objects are the immu- table essences), Vinci argues that in Principles 1:71 Descartes suggests that there is a class of true ideas that are sensory presentations of corporeal objects. In 1:71...

...” for one to be in a state. In a broad sense, he says, “experience” includes both sensory states and imagery on the one hand and “occurrent propositional attitudes” (such as thoughts and wishes) on the other (8–15). But in another—the genuinely phenomenal one—it con- cerns what he calls the “awareness...

...” for one to be in a state. In a broad sense, he says, “experience” includes both sensory states and imagery on the one hand and “occurrent propositional attitudes” (such as thoughts and wishes) on the other (8–15). But in another—the genuinely phenomenal one—it con- cerns what he calls the “awareness...

...” for one to be in a state. In a broad sense, he says, “experience” includes both sensory states and imagery on the one hand and “occurrent propositional attitudes” (such as thoughts and wishes) on the other (8–15). But in another—the genuinely phenomenal one—it con- cerns what he calls the “awareness...

...” for one to be in a state. In a broad sense, he says, “experience” includes both sensory states and imagery on the one hand and “occurrent propositional attitudes” (such as thoughts and wishes) on the other (8–15). But in another—the genuinely phenomenal one—it con- cerns what he calls the “awareness...

...,” and of there being “something it’s like” for one to be in a state. In a broad sense, he says, “experience” includes both sensory states and imagery on the one hand and “occurrent propositional attitudes” (such as thoughts and wishes) on the other (8–15). But in another—the genuinely phenomenal one—it con- cerns...

... of phenomenal consciousness: talk of “experi- ence,” and of there being “something it’s like” for one to be in a state. In a broad sense, he says, “experience” includes both sensory states and imagery on the one hand and “occurrent propositional attitudes” (such as thoughts and wishes) on the other (8–15...

... with a similar GOTHic treatment of dreaming (see note 36). Note that both sensory imagination and dreaming share the humdrum nature of hallucination (section 5 ). 40. For the neuroscientists, see Clark 2016: 308n3; Barrett 2020: 71. The reversed slogan is borrowed from Andy Clark (2016: 196)—it fits our...

... problems. The first ten chapters of Problems concern questions that arise from Reid's theory of sensory perception (excepting chapter 8, which examines memory and personal identity). At the heart of Reid's theory is his distinction between sensation and perception. According to Reid, sensations...

..., the result is akin to feature-placing, which brings us to the second thesis: what sensory systems represent is that features are instantiated at place-times. Accordingly, sensory systems do not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163). Finally...