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sensitive knowledge

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... or disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This essay argues that the key...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... diagnosis of probabilistic analogues of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2014
... approach raise some questions. (a) Discussing problems with appeals to methods, which Nozick introduced to solve the problem of insensitive knowledge, Zalabardo rejects the approach based primarily on a case of method-sensitive belief without knowledge (61). But few think sensitivity is sufficient...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 73–114.
Published: 01 January 2018
... endorsed in the sciences. © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 epistemic closure multiple comparisons safety sensitivity Epistemic closure ( ec ) is the thesis that knowledge is closed under known entailment, or, in other words, if one knows that ϕ and one knows that ϕ entails ψ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
..., and by ordinary standards, as we have no good reason to suppose that skeptical possibilities do not obtain. Perhaps PEC, together with the idea that ‘knowledge’ = ‘evidence’, has the consequence that ‘evidence’ (‘justification’, ‘good reason’) is context sensitive too, and that our ‘evidence’ in ordinary contexts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
..., 187 -205. Malden, MA: Blackwell. ____. 2002 . “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” Philosophical Review 111 : 167 -203. ____. 2004 . “The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 : 346 -50. Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2002...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
..., whereas the latter is part of Locke’s project of vindicating sensitive knowledge. Bodies will be colored whether we speak with the crowd or with the philosophers. If secondary qualities aren’t real beings that our predicates ought to track faithfully, then Locke may reasonably alternate between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 439–447.
Published: 01 July 2016
... knowledge attributions are assessment sensitive, and he intends those remarks to generalize to the other expressions he discusses (310). But it is hard to bring what he says on that point into contact with the question I have been pursuing in the last few paragraphs, since he says little about retraction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 298–301.
Published: 01 April 2012
... is ad hoc, then so too, for the very same reason, is IRI. Ram Neta University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539143 3. See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 285–290.
Published: 01 April 2012
... is ad hoc, then so too, for the very same reason, is IRI. Ram Neta University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539143 3. See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 291–293.
Published: 01 April 2012
... is ad hoc, then so too, for the very same reason, is IRI. Ram Neta University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539143 3. See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 294–298.
Published: 01 April 2012
... is ad hoc, then so too, for the very same reason, is IRI. Ram Neta University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539143 3. See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 302–304.
Published: 01 April 2012
... is ad hoc, then so too, for the very same reason, is IRI. Ram Neta University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539143 3. See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 304–308.
Published: 01 April 2012
... is ad hoc, then so too, for the very same reason, is IRI. Ram Neta University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, 2012 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539143 3. See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 144–149.
Published: 01 January 2020
... with other knowledge, and the capacity to unify otherwise disparate phenomena” (87) Using these terms, Chakravartty suggests that a proposition is “sufficiently informed by or sensitive to scientific-empirical investigations”—as required by the norm of naturalized metaphysics—only if it is not too...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 143–148.
Published: 01 January 2016
... on whether our understanding of the story indicates that the agent should be certain of x at that time or not. There may also be further extrasystematic constraints if the story is one in which we think further rational requirements may apply (for instance, symmetries of dice rolls or knowledge of chances...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... . “Concealed Questions and Specificational Subjects.” Linguistics and Philosophy 28 : 687 -737. Russell, B. 1911 . “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 : 108 -28. ———. 1956 . “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.” In Logic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
... the phenomenon is and how it might arise. First, maybe I can only believe H if I know which proposition H is. This might be right, though I have my doubts. 10 Mostly I think the notion of knowledge-“wh” (here, knowledge-“which”) is too context-sensitive in ways that still remain pretty obscure to do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... and processed. It is this subconscious sensitivity that led to Nour’s belief that her host is racist. Here is my question: Is Nour’s belief that her host is racist (epistemically) justified? I think the intuitive answer is yes. Nour’s belief, after all, is the product of a sensitivity to racism, a sensitivity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2008
...A. D. Carpenter Gail Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 464 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press...