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The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 89–92.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Todd Ganson ARISTOTLE ON THE SENSE-ORGANS. By T. K. Johansen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xvi, 304. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REWEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) ARISTOTLE ON THE SENSE-ORGANS...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 583–585.
Published: 01 October 2002
...Edward Minar Eli Friedlander, Signs of Sense: Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. `Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp. xx, 227. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2002) Eli...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Jon Erling Litland Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably...
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The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
... thoughts composed of senses. The Fregean view faces a challenge of compositionality here. This essay describes the challenge and offers a response on the Fregean's behalf. The difficulty is compounded if we adopt the further Fregean doctrine that expressions that occur in indirect contexts denote...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... or disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This essay argues that the key...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... and shows why this idea, though initially appealing, does not address the real problem. As the essay shows, the idea derives its spurious plausibility from the fact that the dependency conception cannot even make sense of our pretheoretic idea of causal redundancy. The essay concludes by briefly discussing...
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The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Eugene Mills Suppose you and I are “human beings” in the sense of human animals , members of the genus Homo . Given this supposition, this article argues first and foremost that (it's at least very plausible that) we originated not at the moment of our biological conception but either before...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 45–96.
Published: 01 January 2021
...J. Dmitri Gallow This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn’t cause) E in a causal model, M , then it will continue to say...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 129–168.
Published: 01 April 2022
.... Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? This essay argues that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... that being possibly thus-and-so (in the epistemic sense of ‘possibly’) is not a trait that an object has in and of itself, but one that an object possesses only relative to a way of thinking of the domain of quantification. I consider two theories that implement this insight: a static version of counterpart...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... and not p⌝ and ⌜Not p and might p⌝ are inconsistent? To make sense of this situation, I propose a new theory of epistemic modals that aims to account for their subtle embedding behavior and shed new light on the dynamics of information in natural language. A more substantial departure concerns order...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Maegan Fairchild According to material plenitude , every material object coincides with an abundance of other material objects that differ in the properties they have essentially and accidentally . Although this kind of plenitude is becoming increasingly popular, it isn't clear how to make sense...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... the latter constitutively play the functional role of explaining what state one just plain ought to be in. The authors conjecture that all and only practical reasons are authoritative. Hence, in one important sense, all reasons for belief are practical reasons. But this account also preserves the autonomy...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 159–210.
Published: 01 April 2020
...David Enoch The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis , a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action (in a sense the essay makes precise...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...-free.” Russell's notion of acquaintance, since it fits this bill, is therefore motivated by his solution to the puzzle, as is his choice of sense-data to be the referents of genuine Russellian names of particulars. Finally, the article argues that since a version of the George IV puzzle arises...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
..., first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities...