Search Results for sense
1-20 of 781 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 89–92.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Todd Ganson ARISTOTLE ON THE SENSE-ORGANS. By T. K. Johansen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xvi, 304. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REWEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000) ARISTOTLE ON THE SENSE-ORGANS...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 583–585.
Published: 01 October 2002
...Edward Minar Eli Friedlander, Signs of Sense: Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. `Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp. xx, 227. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2002) Eli...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Jon Erling Litland Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology, this...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... and shows why this idea, though initially appealing, does not address the real problem. As the essay shows, the idea derives its spurious plausibility from the fact that the dependency conception cannot even make sense of our pretheoretic idea of causal redundancy. The essay concludes by briefly...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This essay argues that the key to...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Eugene Mills Suppose you and I are “human beings” in the sense of human animals , members of the genus Homo . Given this supposition, this article argues first and foremost that (it's at least very plausible that) we originated not at the moment of our biological conception but either before or...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Thomas Sattig It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...-free.” Russell's notion of acquaintance, since it fits this bill, is therefore motivated by his solution to the puzzle, as is his choice of sense-data to be the referents of genuine Russellian names of particulars. Finally, the article argues that since a version of the George IV puzzle arises for...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
..., first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... being possibly thus-and-so (in the epistemic sense of ‘possibly’) is not a trait that an object has in and of itself, but one that an object possesses only relative to a way of thinking of the domain of quantification. I consider two theories that implement this insight: a static version of counterpart...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... and not p⌝ and ⌜Not p and might p⌝ are inconsistent? To make sense of this situation, I propose a new theory of epistemic modals that aims to account for their subtle embedding behavior and shed new light on the dynamics of information in natural language. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Maegan Fairchild According to material plenitude , every material object coincides with an abundance of other material objects that differ in the properties they have essentially and accidentally . Although this kind of plenitude is becoming increasingly popular, it isn't clear how to make sense of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
... possible worlds in the object language. This, in turn, requires that the truth of a semantic value of a sentence (or whatever structure is embedded in a modal) be relativized to a sequence of worlds rather than to an individual world, and thus be distinguished from a proposition in the traditional sense...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... commitments really are. In particular, investigating prepunishment can help to bring out the inadequacy of the “Ockhamist” reply to the argument, as well as the sense in which God's past beliefs need to depend on what we do, if we are plausibly to have a choice about those beliefs. There is, I think...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
... Fregean thoughts composed of senses. The Fregean view faces a challenge of compositionality here. This essay describes the challenge and offers a response on the Fregean's behalf. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 1–34.
Published: 01 January 2016
... Leibniz's monads may, in a perfectly reasonable sense, be spatially located. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 Galileo's calculation of how much weight the beam can support is presented as a ratio comparing the amount of force it would take to break the beam by pulling directly on it along the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis , a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action (in a sense the essay makes precise) that is such that if...