...Alison Simmons Cornell University 2001 The PhiZosophicaZReviezu, Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) Changing the Cartesian Mind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation and Consciousness Alison Simmons What did Leibniz have to contribute...

...Jennifer Smalligan Marušić Locke seems to hold that we have knowledge of the existence of external objects through sensation. Two problems face Locke's account. The first problem concerns the logical form of knowledge of real existence. Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement...

... not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163). Finally, an empirically correct account of the mechanisms of spatial repre- sentation for an organism, combined with an account of the neural correlates, in that organism, of its sensations of features, would...

... problems. The first ten chapters of Problems concern questions that arise from Reid's theory of sensory perception (excepting chapter 8, which examines memory and personal identity). At the heart of Reid's theory is his distinction between sensation and perception. According to Reid, sensations...

..., and Norms , ed. Kenneth R. Westphal, 59 -87. New York: Fordham University Press. Armstrong, David M. 1962 . Bodily Sensations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ____. 1968 . A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Baldwin, Thomas. 1990 . G. E. Moore . London...

..., but not dispositional, properties of the objects around us. On his view, an object is red if and only if it is actu- ally causing a certain sensation in some observer. The philosophical problem of what colors are can be distinguished from various empirical questions about colors, though the answer...

..., Descartes states that in addition to having sensations that do not represent anything located outside our thought (sensations of tastes, smells, and sounds, etc.) “the mind perceived sizes, shapes, motions and so on, which were presented to it not as sensations but as things, or modes of things...

... from his reading of Kant's attempt to deal, without leaving the level of sensibility itself, with the problem of how little is provided by sensation . Thus beyond (a) a bare “synopsis” of sensations (so called at A94, 97), as a manifold of affections of a perceiver, two things are yet needed for so...

... like sensations and feelings and (2) appearances as public, “perceivable,” spatiotemporal objects, like colors (76) and other physical states and substances (“the boat here, then there” [108]), which are constituted by (dispositional) relations between (3) whatever transcendentally real subjects...

... various shapes and motions; that its shapes and motions are merely modes which no power whatever can cause to exist apart from body,” from which he concludes that “colors, smells, tastes, and so on, are merely sensations which exist in my thought” (AT VII 440/CSM II 297). We can sharpen up this argument...

... with “objective validity,” leads Green to see Spir as focusing on the puzzle of how the “timeless unity of apperception connects with the temporal flow of sensation” (47). This is the fundamental “tension between the apperceptive and phenom- enalist elements in Kant” (43) that Green, and supposedly Spir...

... is not uncontested would be appro- priate). This Kant, including a particular interpretation of the concern with “objective validity,” leads Green to see Spir as focusing on the puzzle of how the “timeless unity of apperception connects with the temporal flow of sensation” (47). This is the fundamental...

... is not uncontested would be appro- priate). This Kant, including a particular interpretation of the concern with “objective validity,” leads Green to see Spir as focusing on the puzzle of how the “timeless unity of apperception connects with the temporal flow of sensation” (47). This is the fundamental...

... is not uncontested would be appro- priate). This Kant, including a particular interpretation of the concern with “objective validity,” leads Green to see Spir as focusing on the puzzle of how the “timeless unity of apperception connects with the temporal flow of sensation” (47). This is the fundamental...

... it is only ideas or sensations that are colored—never speaks of colored ideas, colored sensations, red ideas, blue sensations, and so forth” (Stuart 2003, 65–66). Good point. An even more decisive piece of evidence against my previous view comes in a passage where Locke argues...

..., 420. Kant famously declares that “although all our cognition commences with experience, . . . it does not on that account all arise from experience” (Bl). This marks Kant’s disagreement with empiricism, and his contention that human knowledge and experience require both sensation and the use...

..., an empirically correct account of the mechanisms of spatial repre- sentation for an organism, combined with an account of the neural correlates, in that organism, of its sensations of features, would suffice to explain “how … a merely material system” can “produce the … tangy phenomenology of sense” (vii...

... (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruy- ter, 1900- ), with volume and page numbers separated by a colon. 235 HOUSTON SMIT sensation (sensatio). Objective perception is cognition [Erkenntnis]. This [Diese, so objective...

... cases of imagination, memory, sensations, and passions that have given rise to the suggestion that Descartes is a trialist. In one place she writes that although these phenomena depend caus- ally on the mind-body union, they are modes of thought and belong therefore to the mind, and not to the body...

... the Cartesian Mind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation, and Consciousness ..Alison Simmons 3 1 Edited by the Sage School OfPhilosophy Cornell Univers$ THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW A Quarterly Journal...