...Elizabeth Anderson Cornell University 2005 Critical Notice of Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom Allais, Maurice. 1953 . Le Compartement de l'Homme Rationnel Devant le Risque: Critique Des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Américaine. Econometrica 21 : 503 -46...

... the concept of primary goods; Dworkin, resources; Sen, capabilities or func- tionings; and various other criteria have been proposed.1 This article examines those alternatives to well-being, most clearly Rawls’s primary goods, Sen’s capabilities, and related approaches, that share two common...

... of resources, and inequality of opportunity, among other things, each of which may have multiple aspects ( Sen   1997 ; Temkin   1993 ). Welfare is widely held to be multidimensional: objective list theorists (or pluralists) hold that welfare consists not only in happiness or pleasure, but also in preference...

... on the part of the speaker. Alston offers a convincing argument against this view, the central thrust of which is simply that IA performance is possible in the absence of the expected perlocutionary intent. In part 2, the analysis of IAs provides the foundation of an account of sen- tence meaning...

.... For example, in his argument against the quantificational analysis of ‘x exists’, McGinn simply assumes that ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Holmes’ refer to (nonexist- ent) objects. But why should a proponent of the quantificational analysis accept this? There are accounts of the semantic contribution of ‘Vulcan’ to sen...

... in explicating Timmons is that he thinks something beyond a moral outlook is needed to take up the slack moral semantic norms introduce between the world and our moral sen- tences. What he goes on to say is that in making a moral utterance we are asserting “a specific moral stance” (145).What...

...Robert Merrihew Adams Cornell University 2001 Nagel, Thomas. 1970 . The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. Scanlon, T. M. 1982 . “Contractualism and Utilitarianism.” In Utilitarianism and Beyond , ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, 103...

... subtle distinction is sometimes made between sensations proper, which are attributable to the senses alone, and full-blown sen- sory perception that includes, besides sensations, a variety of habitual judgments attributable the intellect and will.3’We might further restrict sensations to the so...

...: Rodopi. xvi + 361 pp. Geuss, Raymond. 2010. Politics and the Imagination. Princeton: Princeton University Press. xvi + 198 pp. Gotoh, Reiko, and Paul Dumouchel, eds. 2009. Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Series 3. Cambridge...

..., all the sentences, period— express a single nonpropositional attitude of approval. Let S be a set of sen- 3 tences with S i in S expressing approval of act type Ai. Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction, and disjunction. Act types are properties...

..., all the sentences, period— express a single nonpropositional attitude of approval. Let S be a set of sen- 3 tences with S i in S expressing approval of act type Ai. Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction, and disjunction. Act types are properties...

..., in a complex way, by both the sen- tence that is used and the context of utterance. I shall try to sidestep all these complications here. I shall focus on moral statements in which all the most important contextual parameters are explicitly mentioned; the sentences used in making these moral...

..., that is, either true or false. Unfortunately, in my opinion, nobody pursuing this strategy has given a convincing account of how the truth-values, and hence probabilities, of compounded sen- tences depend on those of their constituents. In this essay, I want to look at another class of responses, namely...

... in the way that its sen- sory powers can and sometimes are. But so long as one accepts the distinction between the soul and its mental powers (a controversial claim among scholas- tics, but one that Suárez accepts), there is nothing at all incoherent in God’s impeding the development of those powers...

..., sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sen- tences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere.1 In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar...

... Philosophical Monographs. By MATHIEUMARION. New York Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. xx,260. It is reported that in reply to John Wisdom’s request in 1944 to provide a dic- tionary entry describing his philosophy, Wittgenstein wrote only one sen- tence: “He has concerned...

... living and nonliving things qualifies the former, but not the latter, for direct moral consideration. The empirical claim is defended by way of the etiological account of biological function advocated by Wright, Millikan, and others. Varner’s argument here is solid and sen- sible...

... applied necessarily has G. In this case, finding out which propositions are expressed by sen- tences using ‘F’ requires knowledge of necessary truths; hence, one could not tell a simple story about knowledge of modality arising solely from knowledge of nonmodal facts and of meaning. Jackson...