... bottleneck and a germline-soma distinction. Philosophers especially will be keen on considering Godfrey-Smith’s critical stance on gene selectionism. While many have followed David Hull in distinguishing replicators and interactors (sometimes favoring replicators as the unit of selection), Godfrey...

...Patrick Forber Samir Okasha, Evolution and the Levels of Selection . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. xi + 263 pp. © 2008 by Cornell University 2008 Damuth, J., and I. L. Heisler. 1988 . “Alternative Formulations of Multilevel Selection.” Biology and Philosophy 3 : 407 -30...

...A. D. Carpenter Gail Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 464 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press...

...Charles McCarty Parsons Charles , Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 2014 . xii +350 pp. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 The phrase ‘ontology of mathematics’ is ambiguous: it can refer either...

...Roger Crisp RATIONAL EGOISM: A SELECTIVE AND CRITICAL HISTORY. By Robert Shaver. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xii, 162. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical him,Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) RATIONAL EWISM...

..., and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects. Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief...

... Contextualism, or at least DeRose’s version, is just the view that what standards an ascriber selects are determined by his or her conversa- 459 BOOK REVIEWS tional purposes. So contextualism can easily accommodate both sorts of cases. As DeRose...

... Contextualism, or at least DeRose’s version, is just the view that what standards an ascriber selects are determined by his or her conversa- 459 BOOK REVIEWS tional purposes. So contextualism can easily accommodate both sorts of cases. As DeRose...

... Contextualism, or at least DeRose’s version, is just the view that what standards an ascriber selects are determined by his or her conversa- 459 BOOK REVIEWS tional purposes. So contextualism can easily accommodate both sorts of cases. As DeRose...

... Contextualism, or at least DeRose’s version, is just the view that what standards an ascriber selects are determined by his or her conversa- 459 BOOK REVIEWS tional purposes. So contextualism can easily accommodate both sorts of cases. As DeRose...

...Justin Khoo While this strategy achieves Schulz’s aims, it leaves open the question why “we can only know an arbitrary F to be G if all F s are G s…for [otherwise] we cannot know which [ F ] has been selected” (176). Notice that, if we could learn thin counterfactual information by ruling...

... of genic selectionism, he does so on the basis of its generality and unity, not on its unique ability to represent the causal structure of selec- tion. Kitcher believes that there are several equally acceptable treatments of selection (individual, genic, and group) that are often available...

... and Knowledge, not only presents a well-chosen and well-translated selection of significant texts from the Chris- tian Latin philosophical tradition, it presents them in a way that enhances the value of the translations themselves. The general introduction to the volume, the brief introduction to each text...

... follows, I will argue that contrastivity helps resolve paradoxes as to whether absences are causal (section 2), whether events are frag- ile (section 3), whether causation is extensional (section 4), whether causation is transitive (section 5), and whether selection of “the cause” is objective...

... in which a conditional A ! B is true at a world w iff its consequent, B, is true at the world f(w, A), where f is a selection function picking out, for any sentence and world w, the “nearest” world to w at which the sentence is true.11 Which world is the nearest is not something that is determined...

... of some favored text, topic, or author. I, for example, would have liked to see much more about the virtues, a topic of both historical and current interest that is treated only tangentially in the selections. But a criticism that would inevitably have applied to any possible version of this volume...

... kinds of differences that cognition might make to perception. I'll call these selection, modulation, and enrichment effects. A selection effect makes a difference to which information—objects, features, or relations—get passed to a perceptual process. More precisely, cognition exerts a selection...

... the level of reliability required for knowledge. First, the information producer itself can be reliable. Second, an unreliable information producer can be part of an overall reliable two-level system, as long as the endorsement mechanism selectively endorses truths. I discuss examples of each case below...

... and conditionals in which indicative mood clauses describe the selected accessible possible worlds rather than the actual world. Thus contrast (9) and (10), on the one hand, with (11) and (12). (9) Bob could have been taller than he is. (10) If Bob were six foot five, he would be taller than he...

..., and in providing for the reader a large selection of Wittgenstein’s remarks on a common theme. But while the book collects remarks from texts that range from his mid-period to his last writings, it does not give enough attention to whether differences in Wittgenstein’s thoughts...