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The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
.... Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 2 (April 2005) Must We Know What We Say? Matthew Weiner The knowledge account of assertion seems to provide a clear and sim- ple connection between...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Sheir, 189 -209. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ____. Forthcoming. “The Direct Argument: You Say Goodbye, I Say Hello.” In Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility , ed. Nick Trakakis. Newcastle, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Press. Fischer, John Martin, and...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Daniel Hoek Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 290–292.
Published: 01 April 2016
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 45–96.
Published: 01 January 2021
...J. Dmitri Gallow This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn’t cause) E in a causal model, M , then it will continue to say that...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
... course of action. Aristotle's account of the constraints governing rational deliberation is furthermore not incompatibilist—for all Aristotle says, we may deliberate rationally despite being committed to the truth of determinism. Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle’s Alternative to the...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... incompatibilists believe that we can or should forgo moral blame if determinism is true, their stance may seem out of touch with our emotional reality. This essay examines Strawson's claim that the reactive attitudes are inseparable from ordinary interpersonal relationships. Strawson says surprisingly little to...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism, with...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, cia ). Here we argue against such “relativist” semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then we catalogue central...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... memory by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory. 19. See, by way of comparison, Owens (2000, 141) , who treats cases of unsubstantiated testimony as akin to deficits of reasoning and...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
.... Benevolence seems to say that the only reason for departing from being bound to treat others like oneself is that more good would be produced. But the commonsense moralist will not agree that this is the only reason. In reply to the threat of an egoist's disagreement, this essay argues that many of the axioms...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis , a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action (in a sense the essay makes precise) that is such that if...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... count noun. This data set, they say, reveals that names’ interaction with the determiner system differs from that of common count nouns only with respect to the definite article ‘the’. They conclude that this special distribution of names is best explained by the-predicativism, the view that posits the...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
... complications. This essay tries to reconstruct psychological principles that would explain the thesis and that are at least consistent with what Rousseau otherwise says on the subject. Much of the value of this exercise, however, lies not in the particulars of the resulting psychology but rather in the depth of...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 661–664.
Published: 01 October 2020
... splits into four parts. Part 1 covers the nature of truth. Jago argues for a univocal theory of substantial truth, arguing against deflationism and pluralism. The meat of this part is in favor of orthodox truthmaking theory. Orthodoxy goes beyond saying that what is true depends on what the world's...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2003
.... What does the name ‘Hamlet’ denote? Followers of Russell and Searle say, “Nothing; it is an empty name.” Possibilists say it denotes a non-existent yet pos- sible prince whose mother married his father’s assassin, etc. Meinongians think it denotes a non-existent impossible abstract object that...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 195–234.
Published: 01 April 2000
... of Philosophy 3 (1995): 371-87, and his Descartes: An Intellectual Bi- ography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1995), 310ff. However, the claim is often qualified. Annas and Barnes, for example, say 195 GAIL FINE...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 479–481.
Published: 01 July 2001
.... VARZI.Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999. Pp. 238. The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then...