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Published: 01 January 2015
Figure 2   The transition rule f Figure 2 . The transition rule f More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 537–540.
Published: 01 October 2019
...Claudio López-Guerra Anderson Karen , Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don't Talk about It) . Princeton: Princeton University Press , 2017 . 196 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Alicia narrowly escaped extreme violence and deprivation in her...
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Published: 01 October 2015
Figure 9   Rules of truth Figure 9 . Rules of truth More
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Published: 01 October 2015
Figure 10   Strong Kleene rules Figure 10 . Strong Kleene rules More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Robert Sugden EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALITY: GAME THEORY REVISID BY DECISION RULES. By Paul Weirich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 235. BOOK REVEWS consistency and organic character of his political philosophy. ERIN KELLY Tujis University points developed in this essay...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 586–589.
Published: 01 October 2000
...Michael E. Bratman RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING. By Simon Blackburn. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. vii, 334. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVEWS entails the existence of final causes, and these...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness that ties it closely to blameworthiness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 423–462.
Published: 01 October 2019
...C. Thi Nguyen Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Michael G. Titelbaum Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... question here is this: if you have already been ( justly) punished by God for doing something, how then could you avoid doing that thing? As we'll see, there is a strong argument that seems to show that you couldn't. However, this essay argues that if divine prepunishment rules out human freedom, then so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
..., we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
... probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 probabilism rational requirements...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2014
... David Lewis's (1969) seminal Convention . According to Marmor, a social rule R is a convention if and only if: There is a population P that normally follows R in circumstances C. There is a reason A for members of P to follow R in C. There is at least one other potential rule, S, that if...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2001
... terms. 3. An Example of Conceptual Role Semantics: The Logical Constants There are many different versions of conceptual role semantics.” According to the version of conceptual role semantics that I wish to develop, the meaning of a term is given by the basic rules of rationality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
... illocutionary act type. This potential is itself explained in terms of illocu- tionary rules (I-rules), normative rules governing the acceptable use of sentences. The account of sentence meaning is set out in part 2 of the book. Part 1 pro- vides the foundation for this account: Alston’s own analysis of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 286–289.
Published: 01 April 2015
... all seem to be legal or quasi-legal (the Major's commands have priority over the Captain's, and so forth). But I therefore worry that the generality of Horty's framework glosses over important differences between legalistic reasoning on the one hand, where talk of “rules” seems more natural, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... , for an overview. To show that this model violates Commutativity, consider a state S that doesn't rule out either of A or ¬ A . Then S [might A ] passes the test, and thus is the same as S . So S [might A ][¬ A ] =  S [¬ A ], which is not absurd. On the other hand, S [¬ A ] does...