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resentment
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Seth Shabo In his seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson drew attention to the role of such emotions as resentment, moral indignation, and guilt in our moral and personal lives. According to Strawson, these reactive attitudes are at once constitutive of moral blame and inseparable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Ram Neta Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
..., occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and resentment. Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
... involves giving up some form of holding the other person accountable. Famously, forgiving can be characterized as, in some fashion, relinquishing one's resentment. 3 As Pamela Hieronymi (2001) has pointed out, resentment here should not be understood as simply a bare negative emotion from which we try...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 575–578.
Published: 01 October 2015
... (1993) , both of whom invoke P. F. Strawson's (1962) seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” as an example of such a retrospective account. Javier Echeñique argues against Irwin and Meyer that several important details of Strawson's conception of responsibility (which make it a theory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
...). It then defends the view from three serious skeptical challenges. responsibility blameworthiness anger response-dependence amusement There are many contested features of P. F. Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment.” But the feature most people reject is Strawson's response-dependent view of moral...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... on the
overwhelming probabilities. Indeed, let us suppose that when the win-
ning ticket is announced, it turns out that Alice’s has lost. Still, as Wil-
liamson notes (2000, 246), Alice is entitled to feel resentment against
Sarah for asserting (1) on merely probabilistic grounds. Prima facie,
this means...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 445–448.
Published: 01 July 2008
....
The disposition to be just is consequently transformed through a Nietzschean
process of enforced “forgetting.” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 448–451.
Published: 01 July 2008
... of an unconditional virtue.
The disposition to be just is consequently transformed through a Nietzschean
process of enforced “forgetting.” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 451–455.
Published: 01 July 2008
....
The disposition to be just is consequently transformed through a Nietzschean
process of enforced “forgetting.” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 455–458.
Published: 01 July 2008
....” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens the eviction of the conditionality of
justice from consciousness and yet its simultaneous retention...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 458–462.
Published: 01 July 2008
....
The disposition to be just is consequently transformed through a Nietzschean
process of enforced “forgetting.” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 462–464.
Published: 01 July 2008
....
The disposition to be just is consequently transformed through a Nietzschean
process of enforced “forgetting.” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 465–468.
Published: 01 July 2008
....” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens the eviction of the conditionality of
justice from consciousness and yet its simultaneous retention...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 468–471.
Published: 01 July 2008
....
The disposition to be just is consequently transformed through a Nietzschean
process of enforced “forgetting.” But the Janus-faced nature of the motivation
of justice is nevertheless revealed by the emotion of resentment: “As a product
of forced forgetting, resentment betokens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
...
285
TYLER BURGE
epistemically, though not developmentally, independent. Empirical rep-
resentation of the physical environment is nonetheless a central aspect of
objective representation. I shall concentrate on it here.
A certain type of account...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
.... Alternatively, Leibniz might argue
that appetitions ultimately derive from the representational content of the
41
ALISON SIMMONS
resents a musical composition and so omzoWhat is distinctive about
percqtual or mental representation, Leibniz...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 387–422.
Published: 01 October 2019
... that Harriet has all of the following four moral failings. (1) In her private thinking about others, she is (in absolute terms) excessively prone to resentment and indignation. (2) In her private introspection, she is (in absolute terms) excessively indulgent of, or simply oblivious to, her own frailties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... represents the same affordance (or set of
affordances) in all possible worlds and for all subjects, which allows,
though admittedly does not require, the reduction of phenomenal char-
acter to representational content. An experience can also be said to rep-
resent ordinary properties, however...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 460–465.
Published: 01 July 2001
... on freedom and resentment,” David Pears applauds
Strawson’s attempt to broaden the compatibilist position in the free will
debate by focusing on the whole range of situations that evoke reactive
attitudes such as gratitude and resentment. However, Pears rejects Strawson’s
relativizing move. He...
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