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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 611–618.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in content and strength is a genuine possibility. But because motivating reasons have only one dimension of strength, while normative reasons...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Tim Henning Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Daniel Koltonski On the shared-ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend's valuable ends for the friend's own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 81–122.
Published: 01 January 2017
... that we have come to a different and more expansive understanding of ‘all sets’ (or ‘all ordinals’ or ‘all cardinals’). But indefinite extensibility is philosophically puzzling: extant accounts are either metasemantically suspect in requiring mysterious mechanisms of domain expansion, or metaphysically...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 385–443.
Published: 01 July 2008
.... The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth-conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
... not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 315–336.
Published: 01 July 2010
...John Martin Fischer The Frankfurt cases have been thought by some philosophers to show that moral responsibility does not require genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. But various philosophers have rejected this putative “lesson” of the cases, and they have put forward...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 169–213.
Published: 01 April 2022
..., which he sometimes called “genuine knowledge” (真知). I argue for a new interpretation of this notion, according to which genuine knowledge requires freedom from a form of doxastic conflict. I propose that, in Wang’s view, a person is free from this form of doxastic conflict if and only if they are acting...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
...) to propose a new way of deferring to chance. The principle I endorse, called the Trust Principle, requires chance to be a good guide to the world, permits modest chances, tells us how to listen to chance even when the chances are modest, and entails but is not entailed by the New Principle. As I show...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 459–490.
Published: 01 July 2023
.... The test contained in the FUL is meant to determine whether an action could be grounded solely on the agent’s maxim or whether it requires a cause external to the will. This account permits one to build eventual distinctions concerning the morality of actions on prior and independent distinctions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...J. Robert G. Williams Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
... are not required to save three instead of one, even when those you could save are perfect strangers. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 In The Sovereignty of Good , Iris Murdoch placed among the facts “which seem to have been forgotten or ‘theorized away’” in contemporary philosophy “the fact that love...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... view that this essay goes on to develop and defend, called the group epistemic agent account : groups are epistemic agents in their own right, with justified beliefs that respond to both evidence and normative requirements that arise only at the group level but that are nonetheless importantly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This essay argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one's knowledge of what the relevant kind of thing looks like. To make the case requires examining the nature of knowing what Fs look...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
.... There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... of the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way, reveals...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. This article shows that an adequate account of the basing relation requires a particular refinement and combination of these two views. On the hybrid account defended here, the basing relation involves a disposition exercise that is individuated...