Search Results for representation
1-20 of 418 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 479–481.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Franklin Mason PARTS AND PLACES: THE STRUCTURES OF SPATIAL REPRESENTATION. By Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999. Pp. 238. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS important philosophical topic. It deserves readers who...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 468–470.
Published: 01 July 2007
...Tobias Rosefeldt A. B. Dickerson, Kant on Representation and Objectivity . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. x + 217 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Jody Azzouni, Defl ating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Jeffrey E. Brower; Susan Brower-Toland This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Franz Dietrich; Christian List This essay presents a new “reason-based” approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. It shows that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 532–535.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Ian Proops Zalabardo José , Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's “Tractatus.” Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . 263 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 In deference to the extraordinary richness and dialectical subtlety of the Tractatus , José Zalabardo does...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
... the Representationality of Sensation,” in Central Themes in Ear4 MohPhilosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and M. Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990),1-22. I think this reading is unlikely, for (a) Descartes sometimes attributes the representation of something as good w bad to internal sensations (in...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... Individual Representationalism. According to this view, an individual cannot objectively and empirically represent a physical subject matter as having specific physical character- istics unless the individual has resources that can represent some central conditions under which such representation is...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 470–473.
Published: 01 July 2002
...Reinaldo Elugardo; Robert J. Stainton Charles Travis, Unshadowed Thought: Representations in Thought and Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.Pp. 263. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS References Gupta...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Catharine Abell Depiction is the form of representation distinctive of figurative paintings, drawings, and photographs. Accounts of depiction attempt to specify the relation something must bear to an object in order to depict it. Resemblance accounts hold that the notion of resemblance is necessary...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 215–287.
Published: 01 April 2013
...Gabriel Greenberg What is it for a picture to depict a scene? The most orthodox philosophical theory of pictorial representation holds that depiction is grounded in resemblance. A picture represents a scene in virtue of being similar to that scene in certain ways. This essay presents evidence...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mistake, which this essay calls the “numerical fallacy,” is to assume that a distinction that isn't represented by different numbers isn't represented at all in a mathematical representation. In this case, the essay claims that although the real numbers do not make all relevant distinctions, the full...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... several representation theorems for probabilistic measures of causal strength—that is, I demonstrate how these measures can be derived from a set of plausible adequacy conditions. Third, I use these results to argue for a specific measure of causal strength: the difference that interventions on the cause...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... undertakes by a representation of some kind. Defeating the agent's justification for that representation would defeat her justification for the commitment. 22 Of course, dispositionalism and representationalism as I've defined them are compatible with each other, and some of the most sophisticated...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
...) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like `think', are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 235–266.
Published: 01 April 2000
... concepts and intuitions remains a vexed matter. The locus classicus for these controversies is the Critique of Pure Reason’s famous taxonomy of representations (called the Stufenleiter; or “step-ladder The genus is representation in general (representatio). Under it stands...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 378–385.
Published: 01 July 2019
... examples and Brentano's discussion of “intentional inexistence.” One of Neander's starting assumptions is that most intentionality is ultimately derived from the underived (or original ) intentionality of nonconceptual sensory-perceptual representations and perhaps some core concepts. 1 Neander's aim...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 121–125.
Published: 01 January 2018
... exorcise.” In examining section 2 of the A version, he detects a central role for the notion of representation, specifically, the concept of an object in general, which he, correctly I believe, understands as consisting of the categories. He reads Kant as holding that the categories are second-order...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
... approaches that are usually labelled as 4E, and it is important to structure this diversity in some intelligible way. Gallagher does this by considering the issue of how radical each proposal is. By “how radical” he means how far an approach is from classical, computational, and representational cognitive...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 272–275.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., 286. In his Cntique OfPureReason, Kant makes the interesting, but obscure claim that the normative constraints that constitute the objectivity of our representations (their relation to objects) have their source ultimately in transcendental apper- ception. Keller focuses on this claim. He...