Search Results for reliabilism

... in recognizing a cat, or perhaps even an oak tree. If so, his proposal might more closely resemble Comesaña's (2002) than mine. Comesaña holds that the relevant type for a belief that p based on evidence e is the type believing that p on the basis of e . I consider this a kind of indicator reliabilism...

... themselves heading in the direction of a virtue-based version of reliabilism. Greco defends this gen- eral type of theory and outlines the major components of his preferred version of the theory. Greco stops short of defending a fully precise account of knowl- edge, but he offers a spirited defense...

... traditional epistemology with science; (ii) the kind of reliabilism advocated in Alvin Goldman’s Epistemology and Cognition, according to which traditional epistemology should at least par- tially be transformed into science; and (iii) the kind Almeder himself pro- poses, which he calls “harmless...

... and, in particular, reliabilist accounts of warrant.10 If, as reliabilism dictates, reliability is a sufficient condition for a belief source to be a knowledge source, then a reliable 35 JOSÉ L. ZALABARDO belief source will be a knowledge source, even...

... epistemology. Its two authors disagree sharply about the nature of epistemic justification: both are foundationalists but whereas BonJour is a staunch defender of a traditional version of internalist foundationalism, Sosa argues for an externalist virtue reliabilism. In spite of their differences...

... process reliabilism. Although (EC i ) is not implausible, it is less clear to me than it is to Berker (2013a, 2013b) that it has ever been the standard view in traditional epistemology, or in the foreground of many classic discussions. For, importantly, (EC i ) isn't clearly implied...

... various guises, resulting in the familiar conflicting “-isms” from introductory epistemology courses (Cartesian foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and the like). Now this way of viewing epistemology is controversial. For instance, many contemporary epistemologists frame their fundamental...

... but aim to mitigate its threat. Zalabardo tells us that he undertook to show that “our philosophical outlook was incompatible with some of our most cherished knowledge claims” (vii). He found that reliabilism presented “the main obstacle to a cogent sceptical argument” (vii), and so he set out to discover...

... Solipsism as a Research Strategy in Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 : 63 -73. Foley, R. 1985 . What's Wrong with Reliabilism? Monist 68 : 188 -202. Ginet, C. 1985 . Contra Reliabilism. Monist 68 : 175 -87. Goldman, A. I. 1979 . What Is Justified Belief? In Justification...

... for the value of knowledge problem to be explained in an epistemology classroom without some reference to Zagzebski’s espresso-machine example, which sharply highlights a problem for reliabilism. 3 Her key espresso analogy that makes mischief for reliabilism proceeds as follows: A reliable process...

... versions of reliabilism. Sanford Goldberg's newest book gives yet another theory of justification. But the deep and programmatic work breaks the monotonous mold in very important (and satisfying) ways. Goldberg bridges the internalist/externalist divide in a way that takes seriously the intuitions on both...

... that are immune to all conceivable doubt to be foundational and permits only introspective con- sciousness to be the source of such beliefs, a position both too demanding and too thin for the production of knowledge. Reid’s alternative, de Bary argues, is a form of reliabilism: Reid’s first principles...

... own belief depends on the actual reliability or justification of one's source, while symmetrical theories say that the justification of one's beliefs never depends on those kinds of factors. One familiar example of an asymmetrical theory is reliabilism, which says roughly that, in the absence...

..., it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having thus defended a naturalistic approach to epistemology, in chap- ter 2 Kornblith turns...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

..., it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having thus defended a naturalistic approach to epistemology, in chap- ter 2 Kornblith turns...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

... be conferred without experi- ence, merely by reliably arriving at true utterances (or thoughts) and reliably succeeding in actions. Reliabilism about this kind of justification is dismissed at the outset for disrespecting the bedrock intuition that, without experience, such justification is missing...