... justification attributions. One reason why it's fruitful to pursue a theory of process individuation without worrying about environments is that process reliabilism is a conjunction of two separable views: one about the epistemic role of reliability, the other about the epistemic role of processes...

... themselves heading in the direction of a virtue-based version of reliabilism. Greco defends this gen- eral type of theory and outlines the major components of his preferred version of the theory. Greco stops short of defending a fully precise account of knowl- edge, but he offers a spirited defense...

... traditional epistemology with science; (ii) the kind of reliabilism advocated in Alvin Goldman’s Epistemology and Cognition, according to which traditional epistemology should at least par- tially be transformed into science; and (iii) the kind Almeder himself pro- poses, which he calls “harmless...

... and, in particular, reliabilist accounts of warrant.10 If, as reliabilism dictates, reliability is a sufficient condition for a belief source to be a knowledge source, then a reliable 35 JOSÉ L. ZALABARDO belief source will be a knowledge source, even...

... epistemology. Its two authors disagree sharply about the nature of epistemic justification: both are foundationalists but whereas BonJour is a staunch defender of a traditional version of internalist foundationalism, Sosa argues for an externalist virtue reliabilism. In spite of their differences...

... process reliabilism. Although (EC i ) is not implausible, it is less clear to me than it is to Berker (2013a, 2013b) that it has ever been the standard view in traditional epistemology, or in the foreground of many classic discussions. For, importantly, (EC i ) isn't clearly implied...

... answers to our fundamental question, in its various guises, resulting in the familiar conflicting “-isms” from introductory epistemology courses (Cartesian foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and the like). Now this way of viewing epistemology is controversial. For instance, many contemporary...

...Kelly Becker References Becker Kelly 2006 . “ Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge? ” Dialectica 60 , no. 1 : 79 – 84 . Bonjour Laurence 1985 . The Structure of Empirical Knowledge . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press...

... Solipsism as a Research Strategy in Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 : 63 -73. Foley, R. 1985 . What's Wrong with Reliabilism? Monist 68 : 188 -202. Ginet, C. 1985 . Contra Reliabilism. Monist 68 : 175 -87. Goldman, A. I. 1979 . What Is Justified Belief? In Justification...

... of knowledge. It would probably be rare nowadays for the value of knowledge problem to be explained in an epistemology classroom without some reference to Zagzebski’s espresso-machine example, which sharply highlights a problem for reliabilism. 3 Her key espresso analogy that makes mischief for reliabilism...

... versions of reliabilism. Sanford Goldberg's newest book gives yet another theory of justification. But the deep and programmatic work breaks the monotonous mold in very important (and satisfying) ways. Goldberg bridges the internalist/externalist divide in a way that takes seriously the intuitions on both...

... that are immune to all conceivable doubt to be foundational and permits only introspective con- sciousness to be the source of such beliefs, a position both too demanding and too thin for the production of knowledge. Reid’s alternative, de Bary argues, is a form of reliabilism: Reid’s first principles...

... for an attempt to develop an objection to reliabilism that draws on what I take to be the same core insight. I am skeptical, however, that Huemer's argument supports his positive theory of justification, as I hope to discuss elsewhere. 15. I discuss the Existence thesis in more detail in Barnett 2014...

..., it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having thus defended a naturalistic approach to epistemology, in chap- ter 2 Kornblith turns...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

..., it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having thus defended a naturalistic approach to epistemology, in chap- ter 2 Kornblith turns...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

... investigation and so again not requiring anything unnatural (21–23). But, as above, it is unclear 247 BOOK REVIEWS how this appeal to reliabilism can be justifi ed without either contravening nat- uralism or presupposing it. Having...

... be conferred without experi- ence, merely by reliably arriving at true utterances (or thoughts) and reliably succeeding in actions. Reliabilism about this kind of justification is dismissed at the outset for disrespecting the bedrock intuition that, without experience, such justification is missing...